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Attorneys for Defendant 
_F_I-lA.k o~o ~M. 
MAY 1 9 2010 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIllRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CANYON COUNTY 
JACK L. GARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THELMA V. GARRETT, 
An individual, 
Defendant. 
) Case No: CV OC 09-8763-C 
) 
) DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S 











COMES NOW DefendantlCounterclaimant THELMA V. GARRETT, by and through 
her attorney of record, and moves this Court, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for entry of an order of summary judgment as follows: 
I. Declaring that the quitclaim deed from Alva Garrett to Jack L. Garrett with respect 
to the real property that is the subject of this action is void as a matter of law 
because the real property was community real estate and Thelma V. Garrett did not 
join in executing the deed by which it was conveyed in violation ofLC. §32-912. 
DefendantlCounterclaimant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 1 
0001.48 
2. Declaring that the quitclaim deed from Alva Garrett to Jack L. Garrett was the 
product of undue influence and therefore did not convey an ownership interest in 
the real property that is the subject of this action. 
3. Declaring that the quitclaim deed from Alva Garrett to Jack L. Garrett with respect 
to the real property that is the subject of this action did not convey an ownership 
interest in the real property because it was an incomplete inter vivos gift. 
4. Declaring that the quitclaim deed from Alva Garrett to Jack L. Garrett with respect 
to the real property that is the subject of this action did not convey an ownership 
interest in the real property because it was a purported testamentary gift that was 
never completed during the decedent's life, and breached the contract for wills 
between Alva Garrett and Thelma V. Garrett. 
5. Quieting title in the real property in Thelma V. Garrett as against Jack L. Garrett. 
This motion is supported by the pleadings on file in this matter, the Memorandum in 
Support of Thelma V. Garrett's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Affidavit of Christ T. 
Troupis filed concurrently herewith. 
DefendantiCounterclaimant requests oral argument on this motion. 
DATED: This 1~l1-day of May, 2010. 
Christ T. Troupls 
Attorney for DefendantiCounterclaimant 
Thelma V. Garrett 
DefendantiCounterc1aimant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 2 
0001.49 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this I~ay of May, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DefendantiCounterclaimant's Motion for Summary Judgment by 
U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
Nancy Jo Garrett 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chtd. 
101 S. Capitol Blvd, 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
DefendantiCounterclaimant's Motion for 
c~ 
Summary Judgment 3 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
F I A.k 1~O 9.M. 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
MAY 1 9 2010 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
J HEIDEMAN. DEPUTY 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/ 938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TIlE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CANYON COUNTY 
JACK L. GARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THELMA V. GARRETT, 
An individual, 
Defendant 
State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
) Case No: CV OC 09-8763-C 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS 
) IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT/ 
) COUNTERCLAIMANT'S 







Christ T. Troupis, being flIst duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am the attorney for the DefendantiCounterclaimant Thelma V. Garrett in this 
lawsuit. Each ofthe matters set forth herein are known to me of my own personal 
knowledge and if sworn as a witness in this matter, I could testify competently 
thereto. This Affidavit is submitted in support of Defend anti Counterclaim ant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Affidavit of Christ T. Troupis in Support of 
DefendantiCounterclaimant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
0001.51. 
1 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and accurate copy of the deposition of 
Thelma V. Garrett, taken on May 5, 2010. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and accurate copy of the deposition of Jack 
L. Garret, taken on May 5, 2010. 
FURTHER, AFFIANT SA YETH NOT. 
Dated: May 18,2010 thVV 
Christ T. TrouPiF 
State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho 
and County of Ada on this 18th day of May, 2010. 
~~ Notary pUbM'j 
My commission expires: 11 - tl - \ c;-
Affidavit of Christ T. Troupis in Support of 
DefendantiCounterclaimant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
0001.52 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of May, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Christ T. Troupis in Support of 
DefendantiCounterc1aimant's Motion for Summary Judgment by hand delivery to the following: 
Nancy Jo Garrett 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chtd. 
101 S. Capitol Blvd, 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
c~ 
Affidavit of Christ T. Troupis in Support of 





IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JACK L. GARRETT, 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV OC 09-8763-C 
vs. 
THELMA V. GARRETT, 
Defendant. 
DEPOSITION OF THELMA V. GARRETT 
MAY 5, 2010 
REPORTED BY: 
MARIA D. GLODOWSKI, CSR No. 725, RPR 
Notary Public 
Exhibit A 





THE DEPOSITION OF THELMA V.GARRETT, 
2 was taken on behalf of the Plaintiff at Troupis Law 
3 Office, P.A., 1299 East Iron Eagle, Suite 130, Eagle, 
4 Idaho, commencing at 2:25 p.m. on Wednesday, May 5, 2010, 
5 before Maria D. Glodowski, Certified Shorthand Reporter 
6 and Notary Public within and for the State of Idaho, in 




11 For Plaintiff: Moffatt, Thomas, Garrett, Rock 
12 & Fields, Chartered 
13 BY: Rebecca A. Rainey 
14 101 South Capitol Blvd. 
15 10th Floor 
16 Boise, Idaho 83701 
17 
18 For Defendant: Troupis Law Office, P .A. 
19 BY: Christ T. Troupis 
20 1299 East Iron Eagle 
21 Suite 130 
22 Eagle, Idaho 83616 
1 THELMA V. GARRETT, 
2 first duly sworn to tell the truth relating to said 
3 cause, testified as follows: 
4 
5 EXAMINATION 
6 BY MS. RAINEY: 
Page 4 
7 Q. Could you please state your name and your 
8 address for the record. 
9 A. Thelma Garrett. 10338 East Willis, Middleton, 
10 Idaho. 
11 Q. And, Thelma, how long have you lived at that 
12 address? 
13 A. Thirty-four years. 
14 Q. Okay. And have you -- who lives at that 
15 address with you? 
16 A. Noone. 
17 Q. Do you live there alone currently? 
1 8 A. In the house? Yes. 
19 Q. Okay. And have you lived alone there at that 
20 address since your husband's death? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. And when -- and your husband was Alva 
23 2 3 Garrett, correct? 
2 4 Also Present: Jack Garrett 2 4 A. Yes. 




Page 3 Page 
1 A. March 3rd, '08 -- 2008. 
2 Q. Okay. Thelma, have you ever had your 
3 TESTIMONY OF THELMA V. GARRETT PAGE 3 deposition taken before? 
4 Examination by Ms. Rainey 
5 
6 
7 DEPOSmON EXHIBIT NO.: 
8 6. Quitclaim Deed, dated 06118/1990 
9 7. One-Page Document, Willis Road, 





















4 A. No. 
5 Q. Okay. I'm sure that your attorney talked to 
6 you a little bit about how this process was going to 
7 occur, and what we're going to do. But I'm going to go 
8 over a few of those ground rules with you, again, simply 
9 so that we have them on the record, and that you and I 
10 make sure that we understand each other. Okay? 
11 A. Okay. 
12 Q. Okay. You understand that you've just taken 
13 the oath, which is the same oath that you would take if 
1 4 you were testifYing in court, correct? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Okay. As we sit here today, is there anything 
1 7 that would prevent you from testifYing truthfully and 
1 8 accurately? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Okay. Are you on any type of medication that 
21 affects your ability to remember things? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. As we start moving through this deposition, you 
2 4 will begin to be able to anticipate what I'm going to ask 
2 5 you and you'll be inclined to answer before I finish my 
2 (Pages 2 to 5) 
M & M COURT REPORTING (208)345-8800 (fax) 
845fcec4-327c-4cc3-ab91-f67dOd8d383a 
000:155 
Page 6 Page 8 
1 questions. It's very important for the court reporter 1 A. About eight months. 
2 that we wait for each other to fmish questions andfmish 2 Q. Okay. And where did he live prior to that? 
3 answers so that we're not talking over each other. Can I 3 A. He lives -- he lived on Blessinger Lane out at 
4 get your agreement to try to do that with me? 4 Star. 
S A. Yes. 5 Q. Okay. And did he own that property? 
6 Q. Okay. The other thing that people tend to do 6 A. Yes. And he sold it. 
7 in these depositions is to slip into the habit of nodding 7 Q. Okay. Does he pay you rent to live on that 
8 or giving nonverbal answers such as uh-huh or huh-uh. 8 property currently? 
9 I'll try to remind you as we move through if that begins 9 A. No. 
10 to happen that we need audible answers to the questions. 10 Q. Did you say that you own that property, or Tom 
11 Can I get your agreement to try to do that? 11 does? 
12 A. Yes. 12 A. I do. 
13 Q. Okay. Thelma, prior to your marriage to Alva, 13 Q. Okay. But he doesn't pay you rent? 
14 were you married before? 14 A. No. 
15 A. Yes. 15 Q. Okay. Is Tom married? 
16 Q. How many times were you married previously? 16 A. Yes. 
17 A. Once. 17 Q. Does he have children? 
18 Q. Okay. And what was your former husband's name? 18 A. Yes. 
19 A. James Longstreet. 19 Q. How many children does Tom have? 
20 Q. Okay. And how did that marriage end? 20 A. Six. 
21 A. He died. 21 Q. And do they live at the Willis Road property 
22 Q. In what year did James die? 22 with him? 
23 A. I can't remember. 23 A. No. They're all married or--
24 Q. That's fme. That's another rule. I don't 24 Q. Grown and gone? 
25 want you to guess on anything. But ifthere's something 25 A. They're grown and gone. One's in college. 
Page 7 Page 9 
1 that you don't remember, it's perfectly fine to let me 1 Q. Okay. 
2 know that you don't remember -- 2 A. Or the last one. 
3 A. Well, Ijust-- 3 Q. But none of them live at home? 
4 Q. -- and we'll just move on from there. 4 A. No. 
5 A. Yeah. Okay. 5 Q. Okay. Does Tom's wife live at that property 
6 Q. And did you have any children with James? 6 with him? 
7 A. Yes. 7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. How many children? 8 Q. And where does Cynthia live? 
9 A. Three. 9 A. In Nampa. 
10 Q. Three. And what were their names? 10 Q. And is she married? 
11 A. Garrett Longstreet, and Tom Longstreet, and 11 A. Yes. 
12 Cynthia Longstreet. 12 Q. Does she own the home that she lives in? 
13 Q. And are all ofthose children still living 13 A. Yes. 
14 today? 14 Q. Prior to his marriage to you, was Alva married? 
15 A. Yes. 15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Where does Garrett live? 16 Q. And did Alva have children from his former 
17 A. Boise. 17 marriage? 
18 Q. Okay. And approximately how old is Garrett? 18 A. Yes. 
19 A. Sixty-two. 19 Q. And how many children did Alva have from his 
20 Q. And where does Tom live? 20 former marriage? 
21 A. Tom lives beside me in Willis Road. 21 A. He had four. He had three, and then one 
22 Q. Is that on property that you own? 22 adopted. 
23 A. Yes. 23 Q. Okay. And those children, it's my 
24 Q. Okay. And how long has Tom lived on that 24 understanding, were Jack, John, Marilyn, and Eleanor --
25 property that you own? 25 A. Right. 
3 (Pages 6 to 9) 
(208)345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING (208)345-8800 (fax) 
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Q. -- is that correct? 
A. Yes. Yes. 







5 Q. Marilyn. Do any of those children currently 
6 reside on property that you own? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. At any time during your marriage to Alva -- or 
9 during your relationship with Alva, did you become 
10 divorced from him? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And when did you obtain a divorce from Alva? 
13 A. I think it was in the '80s. 
14 Q. In the '80s. And what were the circumstances 
15 of that divorce? 
1 6 A. Well, I have to count my age back. It was when 
17 I applied for Social Security. 
18 Q. Okay. 
19 A. And then -- I was just drawing on what I had 
2 0 and his, which is very little. And I found out that by 
21 going to my first husband, then I would get a considerable 
22 sum more. And so I -- and they told me that I would have 
2 3 to divorce him and go through all that. 
2 4 So I called the senators and everybody if this 
2 5 is what I had to do. And they said, yes, this is what I 
Page 11 
1 had to do. I mean, the law has changed now, but at that 
2 time, that's the way it was. And so then they said, well, 
3 to wait a week and then we would get -- be remarried, and 
4 that's what happened. 
5 Q. Okay. So you were divorced for approximately 
6 one week? 
7 
8 
A. Right. Yeah. 
Q. And you said you had to count back for your 
9 age. What was your age at that time? 
lOA. Well, what I was thinking about was -- yeah, 
11 you draw at 65 -- 66. 
12 Q. Okay. 
13 A. It was -- I must have been about 66. 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 A. Or, no. I'm getting discombobulated. You draw 
16 at 62. And so it must have been at, you know, 63 or 
1 7 something like that. 
18 Q. Okay. 
19 A. It was -- you know, it was -- I just found out 
2 0 about it, you know, later. 
21 Q. Right after you started drawing, within a year 
22 or so? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. How old are you today? 
25 A. Eighty-eight. 
Page 12 
1 Q. And so just -- I think I confinned this, but 
2 you were divorced for approximately one week from Alva? 
3 A. Right. 
4 Q. Okay. Was there any type of property 
5 settlement that you entered into with Alva at the time of 
6 that divorce? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. And you remarried Alva, and you had been 
9 married to him from that time --
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. -- until his death; is that correct? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. See, we're doing that thing where you knew what 
14 I was going to say. 
15 A. Yeah. I'm sorry. 
16 Q. That's okay. It's very easy to do that. At 
1 7 the time of his death, did Alva have any friends that he 
18 saw on a regular basis? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Okay. What were the names of some of the 
2 1 friends that he would see on a regular basis prior to his 
22 death? 
2 3 A. Pete Peterson. 
24 Q. And where did Pete live? 
25 A. Well, he lives about a mile away, a mile and a 
Page 13 
1 half. 
2 Q. Okay. And is Pete still alive? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Any other friends that Alva saw regularly prior 
5 to his death? 
6 A. Well, yes, it was Hammerbeck, but he lives in 
7 Montana now. 





11 A. That was his last name. 
12 Q. Okay. What was his fIrst name? 
13 A. Warren. 
14 Q. And did he live here in Idaho prior to Alva's 
15 death? 
16 A. Yes. 
1 7 Q. Okay. And when did he move to Montana? 
18 A. Must have been several years before Alva's 
19 death. 
20 Q. Okay. 
2 1 A. But he would come and visit. 
22 Q. Okay. Any other friends that Alva saw 
2 3 regularly? 
24 A. Yeah, Pete Javinsky, but I don't know if he's 
2 5 alive yet. 
4 (Pages 10 to 13) 
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Page 14 Page 16 
1 Q. Okay. 1 A. Twelve. Oh, when he moved out? 
2 A. Well, he had many friends. 2 Q. Yes. 
3 Q. Do you know how to spell Pete's last name? 3 A. Or was it -- when he left high school, but I 
4 A. No. 4 don't remember the age. 
5 Q. Okay. And does he live -- you said you didn't 5 Q. Okay. And where did he go to live at the time 
6 know ifhe was even still alive? 6 he left? 
7 A. No, I don't. 7 A. To Pete Peterson's. 
8 Q. Okay. Thelma, do you understand what this 8 Q. He lived with Pete Peterson after he left? 
9 lawsuit's about today? 9 A. Yes. 
10 A. Yes. 10 Q. And what about Marilyn? How old was she when 
11 Q. Okay. Would you explain to me in your own 11 she left your home with Alva? 
12 words what you think it's about. 12 A. Well, she must have been -- I don't remember. 
13 A. Well, I think that -- well, I guess maybe I 13 Q. What were the circumstance of her leaving the 
14 don't. 14 home? 
15 Q. Okay. Do you understand that Jack believes 15 A. Well, she had graduated from high school--
16 that half of the property -- the Middleton property 16 Q. Okay. 
17 belongs to him? 17 A. -- gotten a job and, you know --
18 A. Yes. 18 Q. Ready to live on her own? 
19 Q. Okay. And you understand that he's filed a 19 A. Right. 
20 lawsuit to partition the property so that you'll get a 20 Q. Okay. At the time you married Alva the flTst 
21 portion of it, and he'll get a portion of it? 21 time, what real property did he own? 
22 A. Yes. 22 A. He owned property -- at Willow Creek he owned a 
23 Q. Okay. And it's my understanding that you 23 section. 
24 disagree with that position; is that correct? 24 Q. Okay. 
25 A. Correct. 25 A. And then he owned property at Round Valley. 
Page 15 Page 17 
1 Q. Okay: 1 Q. Did he own any other property at the time you 
2 A. Yes. 2 were married? 
3 Q. At the time you married Alva, did any of either 3 A. Well, the home place. 
4 of your children live with you in the home? 4 Q. And when you say the home place, that's the 
5 A. Yes. 5 place that's involved --
6 Q. Which of the children lived with you and Alva? 6 A. Yes. 
7 A. Marilyn and Jack. 7 Q. -- in this lawsuit--
S Q. Okay. 8 A. Uh-huh. 
9 A. And Cindy. Marilyn, yeah, Jack, and Cindy. 9 Q. -- correct? 
10 Q. How old was Cindy at the time you and Alva 10 A. Yeah. There was 80 there. 
11 married? 11 Q. And that's in Middleton? 
12 A. Sixteen. 12 A. Yes. Well, it was a short 80. 
13 Q. Okay. And did she live with you in the home 13 Q. How large was the Willow Creek property at the 
14 until she graduated from high school? 14 time you were married? 
15 A. She lived there a year-and-a-half. 15 A. A section. 
16 Q. Okay. And when did she move out? What age was 16 Q. Okay. And what about the Round Valley 
17 she when she moved out? 17 property? 
18 A. Well, she was 17 -- 17-1/2. 18 A. Well, that, I don't remember. 
19 Q. Okay. And at the time she moved out -- or what 19 Q. Okay. Did he own any other real property at 
20 were the circumstances of her moving out? 20 the time you were married? 
21 A. Oh, she moved in with a girlfriend and their 21 A. No. 
22 family. 22 Q. Did you own any real property at the time you 
23 Q. And you said Jack lived in the home with you? 23 married Alva? 
24 A. Yes. 24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. How old was he when he moved out? 25 Q. What real property did you own? 
(208)345-9611 
5 (Pages 14 to 17) 
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1 A. I owned a house in Middleton. 
2 Q. And what was the address ofthat property? 
3 A. 14 West Main --, or, wait a minute. No, I'm 
4 sorry, 11 West Main. 
5 Q. 11 West Main? 
6 A. Yeah,l1. 
7 Q. Did you own any other real property at the time 
8 you married Alva? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Did you own a car at the time you married Alva? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Just one? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q, And what kind of car was it? 
15 A. A Dodge, I think. No, I'm sorry. I think it 
16 was a Ford. 
17 Q. Okay. 
18 A. You know, I can't remember for sure. 
19 Q. That's fine. At the time of his death, did 
20 Alva still own that section of property at Willow Creek? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. What happened to it? 
23 A. Well, his son John, he went into real estate, 
24 and he told his dad that, oh, he was going to invest it in 
25 Rexburg property and he was going to make a million 
Page 19 
1 dollars or somethirig like that and we'd never have to 
2 worry about anything. And then, I think, his son lost it. 
3 Q. Do you recall when Alva -- when the property 
4 was lost, when he no longer was the owner of the Willow 
5 Creek property? 
6 A. No, I don't remember the exact date. 
7 Q. Okay. Does he still own any property in 
8 Rexburg that was exchanged for the Willow Creek property? 
9 A. No. Who? Are you talking about --
10 Q. Your husband --
11 A. No. 
12 Q. -- at the time of his death? 
13 A. No, 
14 Q. Okay. What about -- did you talk to Alva at 
15 the time he was going to do whatever was done with the 
16 Willow Creek property about the Rexburg transaction? Did 
17 you and Alva discuss that? 
18 A. No. That was just between him and John. 
19 Q. Did you know it was occurring? 
20 A. Well, except he told me that, you know, he 
21 should -- you know, he said John thought he would be 
22 making money on it. 
23 Q. All right. So he told you that he had 
24 planned -- he planned to do something with the Willow 





















































Q. Okay. Did you object to him doing anything 
with that property? 
A. No. 
Q. The Round Valley property, did Alva own that at 
the time of his death? 
A. No. 
Q. And what happened to the Round Valley property? 
A. Well, John was involved again, 
Q. Okay. 
A. And he just -- they sold lots, But I don't 
know, it just -- it seemed like the minute he was 




A. For like, I don't know, some expenses or 
something. I don't know. So we didn't get very many. We 
only had to -- sold very few, a couple or so, 




A. Yes, it was divided. 
Q. Okay. And is it your understanding that John 
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took some of those lots as payment for the work he'd done 
on the development? 
A. Well, yeah. Yes. 
Q. Did Alva talk to you prior to doing the Round 
Valley subdivision about his intentions in doing that 
project? 
A. No, not much, 
Q. Were you aware that he was doing it? 
A. I didn't really -- wasn't aware exactly what 
was happening, no. 
Q. Were you aware that something was happening? 
A. Well, yes, he said something about John 
subdividing it. 
Q. Approximately what time frame was this 
subdivision development occurring? 
A. I don't remember that. 
Q. Okay. Was it -- do you recall whether or not 
it was before or after 1990? 
A. No, I don't remember. 
Q. Okay. 
A. No, I think it was before. 
Q. Before 1990? 
A. Oh, wait a minute. I don't -- I just don't 
remember. 
Q. That's fme. That's fme. And then the home 
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1 place, that Middleton place that you have now,it was 
2 approximately 80 acres at the time you were married? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And is it still 80 acres today? 
5 A. No. 





A. It's around 27. 
Q. And what happened to the--
A. Tothat? 
Q. -- other 53 acres? 
11 A. Well, after -- we just didn't have any money 
12 from any of the properties that John had dealings with. 
1 3 And Alva had a loan at the bank, and they just said they 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. And that was just to your three children, 
3 correct? 
4 A. Yes. Well, Round Valley, Alva gave his 
5 children five acres -- he gave them the deed of five acres 
6 each at Round Valley. 
7 Q. Was that before or after you married him? 
8 A. Before. 
9 Q. At the time you gave your children the 
1 0 Middleton home, did Alva give anything to his children of 
11 equal value? 
12 A. At that time? 
13 Q. Correct. 
14 were going to come and foreclose on us and that they 14 
15 were -- then they would take the property and sell it, and 15 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Did you give them the Middleton home 
1 6 ifthey got enough out of it to pay the debt, then, you 
1 7 know, we'd be fine. But if they didn't, we'd still owe, 
18 and we wouldn't have a roof over our heads. 
1 9 And so my husband and I, we talked -- we 
20 thought, well, we would just try selling some of it to pay 
2 1 the debt off so we would at least have a roof over our 
22 heads, you know. And so that's what happened to it, to 
2 3 pay the debt. 
24 Q. What was the debt -- the loan of the bank for? 
25 A. Oh, it was for taking -- for a car we had 
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1 purchased. And it was for going back and forth to Texas 
2 with horses and things like that. 
3 Q. What was the amount of the loan at the bank? 
4 A. Eighteen thousand. 
5 Q. Was it for anything -- was it used for anything 
6 other than a car purchase and the trips to Texas for the 
7 horses? 
8 A. Well, it probably -- no, I think that's what it 
9 was mostly for. Yes, that's what it was for. 
10 Q. Okay. Do you still own the Middleton home that 
11 you had when you married Alva? 
12 A. No. 







A. I signed it over to the children. 
Q. To whose children? 
A. To my children. 
Q. Okay. And when did you do that? 
A. Oh, shortly after we were married. 
Q. And do those children own that home equally? 
2 0 Do they still own it? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Okay. Did they sell it? 
23 A. I don't know what they did with it. 
24 Q. All right. Did you give it to them in equal 
2 5 parts as equal owners? 
1 6 because Alva had previously given his children part of 
1 7 that Round Valley property? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Okay. Do you know how Alva became the owner of 
2 0 the home place? 
21 A. He purchased it I think from -- well, I'm not 
2 2 sure. I don't know. 
23 Q. You don't know ifhe purchased it, or inherited 
24 it? 
25 A. No. He purchased -- he said he purchased it. 
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1 I think it was from his mother-in-law. I'm not -- I'm not 
2 sure. I don't know. 
3 Q. Did Alva work on the farm? 
4 A. He was -- he rented it out. 
5 Q. Was he renting it out in -- what year were you 
6 married,1976? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Okay. When you were married in '76, was he 
9 renting the farm out at that time? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Okay. At what price was he renting it out? 
12 A. I don't know. I don't remember. 
1 3 Q. Do you recall to whom he was renting it? 
14 A. Pete Peterson. 
15 Q. Do you recall when he stopped renting the farm 
1 6 to Pete Peterson? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. I understand that at some point Jack began 
19 renting the farm? 
20 A. Yes, and I can't remember when. 
21 Q. Okay. Was there a renter between Pete Peterson 
22 and Jack? Was there somebody that rented it--
23 A. No. 
24 Q. SO it went from Pete renting it to Jack renting 
25 it? 
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1 A. Yes. 1 Q. Was he engaged in the horse business with 
2 Q. Okay. When Jack started renting the fann, do 2 anybody else? 
3 you know whether he was paying more or less than what Pete 3 A. No. How do you -- what do you mean? 
4 was paying for rent? 4 Q. Well, did any -- did he have a partner in the 
5 A. I don't know. 5 horse business? 
6 .Q. Okay. What was the done with the money that 6 A. No. 
7 Alva received for rents on the fann from Pete? 7 Q. Okay. 
8 A. Well, for expenses, for insurances, and living 8 A. He trained. 
9 and so forth. 9 Q. Who owned the horses that he trained? 
10 Q. It just went into your bank account? 10 A. He did. 
11 A. Yes. 11 Q. Okay. Did he train horses owned by anyone 
12 Q. Did Alva treat that income as his separate 12 else? 
13 income that was not to be shared with you at all? 13 A. Yes, at times for his son, for Jack. 
14 A. No. We just shared both our incomes. 14 Q. Okay. All right. Did he train horses for 
15 Q. Okay. Did Alva work at the time you were 15 anybody other than Jack? 
16 married? 16 A. Yes. 
17 A. No. Well, he was running horses. 17 Q. And do you recall the names of any other horse 
18 Q. Okay. He didn't have a 9:00 to 5:00 job? 18 owners that --
19 A. No. 19 A. Harnmerbeck. 
20 Q. Did he do anything other than running horses 20 Q. Okay. 
21 for income? 21 A. Warren Harnmerbeck. 
22 A. No. 22 Q. Any others? 
23 Q. Okay. Did you work at the time you were 23 A. No. 
24 married? 24 Q. When did Alva stop running horses? 
25 A. Yes. 25 A. About four or five years before he passed away. 
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1 Q. And what did you do? 1 Q. All right. So 2002, 2003? 
2 A. I worked at a drapery shop. 2 A. I can't really remember. 
3 Q. Doing what? 3 Q. Okay. What caused him to stop? 
4 A. Making drapes. 4 A. The horses were dragging him instead of him 
5 Q. Okay. Were you a sewer or you -- 5 dragging the horses. 
6 A. A tabler. 6 Q. Okay. 
7 Q. Okay. 7 A. He just couldn't handle them anymore. 
8 A. Well, I did -- we did -- we took tums-- 8 MS. RAINEY: Can we get from the prior 
9 Q. Okay. 9 deposition exhibit -- the promissory note? 
10 A. -- but mostly I tabled. 10 MR. MR. MR. TROUPIS: 3. 
11 Q. Okay. And how long had you been at that job? 11 MS. RAINEY: I think it was 3. 
12 A. Oh, gosh. I don't remember. 12 Q. (BY MS. RAINEY) Thelma, the court reporter has 
13 Q. In addition to the rents that Pete Peterson 13 just handed you what was marked during Jack's deposition. 
14 paid, did Alva get any other income from the fann? Did he 14 Do you recognize this Exhibit 3? 
15 share in profits from crops or anything of that sort? 15 A. No. 
16 A. Not to my knowledge, no. 16 Q. Okay. If you look to the bottom of it, it 
17 Q. You said Alva was running horses at the time 17 appears that it was signed by Alva Garrett and Thelma 
18 you married him. Was he doing anything else for income? 18 Garrett. Do you recognize your signature on the bottom of 
19 A. No. 19 that document? 
20 Q. Can you estimate approximately how much income 20 A. Yes. 
21 he was making off the horses at that time? 21 Q. Okay. Do you believe that that is your 
22 A. Breaking even. 22 signature? 
23 Q. Okay. I've heard that about the horse 23 A. Yes. 
24 business. 24 Q. Okay. This appears to me to be a promissory 
25 A. Yeah. 25 note, it's in the amount of $2,000, and it's dated 
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1 March 21,1990. Do you recall the circumstances under 
2 which--
3 A. No, I don't. 
4 MR. TROUPIS: Wait till she finishes her 
5 question. 
6 THE WITNESS: Okay. I'm sorry. 
7 Q. (BY MS. RAINEY) Okay. I'm going to ask it 
8 again just so we have the full thing. 
9 A. Okay. 
10 Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which 
11 this promissory note was made? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Do you recall that Jack ever loaned you and 
14 Alva any money? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. SO following from that, you wouldn't recall 
1 7 whether or not any of that money had been paid back, 
18 correct? 
1 9 A. Correct. 
20 MS. RAINEY: Okay. Did you do five exhibits? 
21 MR. TROUPIS: Huh? 
22 MS. RAINEY: This is going to be --
23 MR. TROUPIS: Yeah, five. 
24 MS. RAINEY: If anybody has a better copy of 
25 that particular document, I'd be happy to see it. That's 
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MR. TROUPIS: I might have. Let me see. 
MS. RAINEY: The one you produced was worse. 
MR. TROUPIS: Was it? 
MS. RAINEY: Yeah. 
6 MR. TROUPIS: Well, maybe it's my copier. 
7 THE WITNESS: I should go get me a drink. 
8 MS. RAINEY: Oh, that's fine. We can take a 
9 little break. 
10 (Deposition Exhibit No.6 was 
11 marked for identification.) 
12 MS. RAINEY: Back on the record. 
13 Q. (BY MS. RAINEY) I'm handing you, Thelma, 
14 what's been marked as Exhibit No.6. Do you recognize 
15 that document? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Okay. And what do you recognize that 
18 Exhibit No.6 as? 
19 A. The Quitclaim Deed. 
20 Q. And it's a Quitclaim Deed granting, I believe, 
21 the home place, that Middleton property, from Alva L. 
22 Garrett to Alva L. Garrett and Thelma V. Garrett --
23 A. Yes. 
2 4 Q. -- is that correct? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. Can you tell me the circumstances that led to 
2 the making of this Quitclaim Deed? 
3 A. Well, after the property at Willow Creek and 
4 the Round Valley was all cleared and everything and John 
5 took over and we didn't have any money and then -- you 
6 know, he talked his dad into all that. And then we -- and 
7 we had to sell the property to pay our debts. 
8 Alva, you know, was afraid that John might talk 
9 him into doing something with the little property that was 
1 0 left. So he thought by putting my name on the deed then, 
11 you know, I would have to sign it first and we would at 
12 least have a roof over our head. We were worried about 
1 3 losing the roof over our head. 
14 Q. Because of stuff that John had done in the 
15 past? 
1 6 A. Yeah. All this -- because all -- the other 
1 7 property that Alva had owned when we were married, you 
18 know, just disappeared. And we just didn't even have 
19 enough money to pay -- you know, we had to sell 50 acres 
2 0 of it to pay our debt. 
21 Q. Okay. In looking at this Quitclaim Deed -- and 
2 2 granted my copy is very poor, but I don't see that your 
2 3 signature is on this document anywhere. Do you see your 
2 4 signature on there? 
25 A. No. 
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1 Q. Do you know whether you ever signed this 
2 Quitclaim Deed? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Are you aware of a copy that has your signature 
5 on it? 




Q. Okay. Do you think you signed it at any time? 
A. I do not remember. 
Q. Okay. Do you know whether or not you have a 
10 copy that wasn't recorded? This one was recorded in the 
11 land records. Do you know whether there's a copy that was 
12 not recorded? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Okay. No, you're not aware of one? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Okay. At the time this Quitclaim Deed was 
1 7 executed, had there been any talk between yourself and 
18 Alva about possibly giving this property to Jack? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Do you recall any time when you discussed with 
2 1 Alva the possibility of giving the home place to Jack? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. When you married Alva, did you enter into a 
2 4 premarital agreement at all? 
2 5 A. I don't remember. 
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Q. Okay. You know what I mean when I say a 
2 premarital agreement? Or it's sometimes referred to as a 
3 prenuptial agreement. 
4 A. Yes, I don't remember. 
5 Q. Okay. Did you -- do you recall having those 
6 discussions with Alva, discussions regarding whether you 
7 should enter into a prenuptial agreement? 
B 
9 
A. No, I don't remember. 
Q. As we sit here today, are you aware of a 
10 prenuptial agreement between yourself and Alva? 
11 A. I don't remember -- no. 
12 Q. Did you ever have a power of attorney for Alva? 
13 A. I don't remember. 
14 Q. Prior to his death, did he execute -- or did he 
15 grant you a power of attorney for anything? 
16 A. No, I don't remember. 
17 Q. Okay. Do you know whether he granted anybody a 
18 power of attorney for anything? 
19 A. I don't remember. 
20 Q. Did you and Alva ever prepare any sort of 
2 1 agreement where it discussed how your property would be 
22 owned, like community property, or separate property? 
23 A. Well, we -- yes, we had a will. 
24 Q. Okay. Other than the will, did you have any 
2 5 agreements to --
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. -- and you have to let me finish my question. 
3 A. Oh, sorry. 
4 Q. Other than the will, did you have any other 
5 agreements discussing how the property would be owned 
6 between the two of you? 
7 A. No. 
B Q. Okay. Let's talk about that will. Tell me the 
9 circumstances that led to you and Alva going to have this 
1 0 will prepared. 
11 A. Well, we just wanted to have a will. 
12 Q. Okay. Do you recall when you went to have it 
13 prepared? 
14 A. Isn't the will dated? 
15 Q. Yes. 
1 6 A. Yeah, I don't remember. 
17 Q. Okay. Let's look -- we actually used that in 
18 a -- exhibit in the last deposition. 
19 MR. TROUPIS: Yeah, it was No.2. 
20 MS. RAINEY: I just don't want to duplicate 
2 1 exhibits if we don't have to. 
22 MR. TROUPIS: Good idea. 
23 Q. (BY MS. RAINEY) The court reporter is handing 
24 you what was marked Exhibit No.2 in the last deposition. 
2 5 Do you recognize this document? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Okay. And Exhibit No.2 is actually a Contract 
3 For Wills, and then it's got the Last Will and Testament 
4 of Alva Garrett, and the Last Will and Testament of Thelma 
5 Garrett. Do you see all those documents there before you? 
6 A. Uh-huh. Yes. 
7 Q. What made you and Alva do a Contract For Wills 
B as opposed to just doing each your own individual will? 
9 A. I don't know. 
10 Q. Was it recommended to you by an estate planning 
11 attorney? 
12 A. I don't know. 
13 Q. Do you understand what a Contract For Wills is? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Youdonot? 
1 6 A. Not exactly, no. 
17 Q. Okay. At the time you and Alva did your 
18 will -- it appears to me that the will that you prepared, 
19 and the will that Alva prepared are substantially similar. 
2 0 Is that your understanding? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. And can you explain to me why you 
2 3 prepared similar wills. 
24 A. Well, that was the way we wanted it. 
25 Q. Okay. Did you have a will prior to the one 
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1 you executed -- the one that you had prepared in 1995? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Do you know whether Alva had a will prepared? 
4 A. No, I don't. 
5 Q. You don't know whether he did? 
6 A. Huh-uh. 
7 Q. Is that a no? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Okay. Did you have any conversations with any 
1 0 of your children about going to have these wills prepared? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Did you have any conversations with any of 
13 Alva's children about having the wills prepared? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. At the time you had these wills prepared, did 
1 6 Alva indicate to you that he wanted to leave the home 
17 place to Jack? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. In the interrogatory responses -- do you recall 
2 0 that earlier in this lawsuit I provided your attorney with 
2 1 a bunch of questions -- written questions that you 
2 2 assisted him in answering and then sent back? They're 
23 called interrogatories. 
2 4 A. I don't remember. 
25 Q. Okay. Well, earlier in this lawsuit I did send 
(208)345-9611 
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1 a list of questions to your attorney, and I believe that 1 property and --
2 he probably went through those -- and I don't want to get 2 A. Yes. 
3 into any of your discussions, but I want to talk to you 3 Q. Okay. What is your understanding of the term 
4 about some of the answers that you provided. 4 community property? 
5 One of the questions that I asked was for you 5 A. That it was husband's and wife's together. 
6 to give me the name and address and numbers of people who 6 Q. Okay. Did you have discussions with Alva -- or 
7 would have knowledge of information that's relevant to 7 what's your understanding of separate property? 
8 this lawsuit. And one of the responses that you provided 8 A. Well, that what's his is his, and what's mine 
9 was that Garrett Longstreet and Tom Longstreet will 9 is mine. 
10 testifY that they helped their mother and stepfather 10 Q. Okay. Did you have discussions with Alva 
11 arrange for estate planning through Mr. Gigray's office. 11 regarding whether or not the farm was community property, 
12 Do you recall -- does that -- is that an accurate 12 or separate property? 
13 statement? 13 A. Community. 
14 A. Run that by me again. 14 Q. Okay. At the time you were married to Alva, 
15 Q. My question for you is: Did Garrett and Tom 15 was it your understanding that it was community property 
16 help you and Alva arrange for estate planning through 16 even at the time you first married him? 
17 Mr. Gigray's office? 17 A. I don't remember. 
18 A. No. 18 Q. Okay. And my question for you is: Recall that 
19 Q. They did not? 19 Quitclaim Deed that we were just looking at? 
20 A. No. 20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Okay. Were they aware that you were going to 21 Q. Did you discuss with Alva, or was it your 
22 Mr. Gigray's office to do your wills? 22 intention with Alva by him executing that document to 
23 A. No. 23 change the property from his separate property to 
24 Q. Okay. You didn't discuss it with any of your 24 community property? 
25 children at all? 25 A. He wanted to provide for me. 
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1 A. No. 1 Q. Okay. 
2 MR. TROUPIS: You know,just to clarifY, 2 A. And this is what we did. 
3 Counsel. The prior attorney, who was Mr. Lord, he 3 Q. Okay. We've talked a little bit earlier today 
4 prepared the draft answers to those, and then I finished 4 about what happened to some of the real property that you 
5 them up. And I did talk to you about those. But -- so if 5 had, and that Alva had at the time you were married, and 
6 there is some confusion, I'll clarifY that with Tom and 6 where that is now. At the time that Alva died, did he 
7 Garrett. 7 have any signifIcant items of personal property? 
8 MS. RAINEY: Okay. 8 A. Like what? 
9 MR. TROUPIS: Because, to tell you the truth, I 9 Q. Perhaps bank accounts? Life insurance? 
10 didn't even remember that that was in there. 10 A. No. 
11 MS. RAINEY: Okay. 11 Q. Stocks and bonds? 
12 MR. TROUPIS: And I just want to fmd out what 12 A. No. 
13 conversations they may have had with Stephen Lord 13 Q. Did he have any assets other than the real 
14 beforehand - 14 property assets? 
15 MS. RAINEY: Okay. 15 A. No. 
16 MR. TROUPIS: -- and I'll clarifY it for you. 16 Q. Did he have any retirement accounts? 
17 MS. RAINEY: Okay. 17 A. No. 
18 MR. TROUPIS: 'Cause I don't know what -- it 18 Q. Did you have any -- or do you today have any 
19 doesn't ring a bell with me. 19 personal property, anything other than that --
20 MS. RAINEY: Okay. 20 A. No. 
21 MR. TROUPIS: Sorry. 21 Q. -- home place? Wait till I fmish. 
22 Q. (BY MS. RAINEY) Thelma, when I -- a lot of the 22 A. I'm sorry. 
23 discussion in this case centers around whether or not the 23 Q. That's okay. Do you have any assets other than 
24 home place was community property, or separate property. 24 that home place that will be passed on to your children 
25 Do you understand what those terms mean, community 25 through your will? 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. Is it fair to say that the home place 
3 compromises substantially all of yours and Alva's estate? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. What was the cause of Alva's death? 
6 A. I think -- I guess just old age. 
7 Q. How old was he when he passed? 
8 A. Eighty-six. 




Q. For how long? 
12 A. Well, he was in the hospital. Then he was in, 
13 I think it was four separate -- well, like the last 
14 place -- one of the last was at the Behavior Place in 
15 Boise. And then he was in Nampa. He was in, you know, 
16 these places where they take care of people that can't 
17 take care of themselves anymore. 
18 Q. Where was he at the time he died? 
1 9 A. In Caldwell -- well, at -- there by -- at the 
2 0 Karcher Mall Estates. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. Wait a minute. Wait a minute. That's wrong--
23 that's not right either. He was there. But he was over 
24 in Nampa -- I forgot the name of the place -- 'cause he 
2 5 was just there such a short time. 
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1 Q. And prior to that he had been at the Karcher 
2 Estates? 
3 A. Well, no. I think it was prior to that he was 
4 at the Behavior Place. 'Cause the Karcher -- he was 
5 getting too violent at the Karcher. He had to go to the 
6 Behavior Place in Boise there. 
7 Q. Okay. 
8 A. It's called the Behavior Place. I have the 
9 name at home, but -- in fact, I just -- I'm still paying 
lOon that bill. 
11 Q. Could you get the name of that place and 
12 provide it to your attorney for me? 
13 A. Sure. 
14 Q. Okay. And then he went from that Behavior 
15 Placein--
16 A. Yeah. 
17 Q. -- Boise to somewhere in Nampa? 
18 A. Yeah, to Nampa 
19 Q. Okay. And then he passed away while he was at 
20 that place in Nampa? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. And do you recall the name of the place in 
23 Nampa? 
24 A. No, I can't. Sorry. 
25 Q. When did Alva stop living at the home place 
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1 with you? 
2 A. When he went to the hospital. 
3 Q. Do you recall when that was? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. Okay. 
6 A. Not the exact date, no. 
7 Q. Was it one year prior to his death? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Six months prior to his death? 
A. I don't remember exactly. 10 
11 Q. Okay. I really do need to get a time frame. 
1 2 Do you recall whether or not it was more or less than a 
13 year prior to his death? 
14 A. Well, it was -- it was less than a year. 
15 Q. Okay. Less than a year. Can you state with 
1 6 any degree of certainty whether it was less than six 
17 months? 
18 A. I don't -- I don't remember. 
19 Q. Okay. And that's fine. But you are certain 
20 that it was less than a year prior to his death? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. Do you recall what types of treatment 
2 3 Alva was undergoing after he left -- after he stopped 
2 4 living at the home place and started living in various 
25 treatment facilities? Was he under medication? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Do you recall what types of medication? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Prior to going into the treatment centers, was 
5 he taking care of your finances? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Who was taking care of your finances? 
8 A. I was. 
9 Q. Okay. How long had you been taking care of 
1 0 financial matters? 
11 A. I don't remember. 
12 Q. Was there a point where he stopped taking care 
13 of financial matters and you took over? 
14 A. What do you mean? 
15 Q. Let me ask this a different way. During the 
16 time that you were married from 1976 on, did you share 
17 responsibility for handling the family finances, or did 
18 one or the other of you sort oftake charge of that? 
19 A. Well, we kind of shared it. 
20 Q. Okay. Was there a point where he stopped being 
21 involved with the family finances altogether? 
2 2 A. I don't quite understand your question because 
23 I -- I mean, like when we would train horses, I kept the 
2 4 books and things like that. 
25 Q. Okay. 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Okay. Right up until the time that he passed 
3 away, was he able to write checks on your checking 
4 account? 
5 A. Well, no, not after he'd gone to the hospital, 
6 no. 
7 Q. Immediately prior to the time he had gone to 
8 the hospital, could he write checks on the checking 
1 mental functioning? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. He did not? 
4 A. No. I don't think -- no. At least I don't 
5 think -- I don't know. 
Q. Not that you're aware of? 




8 Q. I'm going to go back to these interrogatory 
9 account? 9 answers and questions that we talked about briefly before 
lOA. Yes. 10 and ask you some questions about some of the responses 
11 Q. Okay. Did you trust him to write checks on the 11 that you had provided. And I understand that was -- there 
12 checking account at that time? 12 might have been some confusion in those responses. So 
l3 A. Yes. 13 we'll just talk through these statements. 
14 Q. Okay. Right before he went into the hospital, 14 One of the questions that I had asked was--
IS was Alva able to drive? 15 well, I'm just going to discuss the answer. You state 
16 A. Well, he -- yes, I think so. 16 that Jack Garrett and others working with Jack Garrett 








Q. Did he drive himself during that time? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Most of the time I did. 
Q. Okay. Was there other people that he would 
24 rely on to take him from place to place? 
25 A. No. 
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1 Q. It was generally you? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Okay. Do you recall how long it had been that 
4 he hadn't been driving himself? 
5 A. No, I -- no. 
6 Q. Okay. Do you recall when he stopped driving 
7 himself and you sort of took over driving 
8 responsibilities? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Prior to the time he went into the hospital, 
11 did you have to help Alva take care of himself, bathe 
12 himself, for example? 
l3 A. No. 
14 Q. Could he feed himself? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Okay. How was his memory prior to the time he 
l7 went into the hospital? 
18 A. Well, he could remember real well when he was 
19 younger and things he did, but he would kind offorget, 
20 you know, the present. 
21 Q. Okay. Was he ever diagnosed with Alzheimer's? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Okay. Was he ever diagnosed with dementia? 
24 A. I didn't even really ask the doctor about that. 
25 Q. Okay. Did he take any medications to help his 
18 their father, Alva Garrett, without the knowledge or 
19 consent of Thelma Garrett. Is it your testimony today 
2 0 that you did not have any knowledge that Alva was 
2 1 executing that Quitclaim Deed leaving the home place to 
22 Jack? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Okay. It also states that Alva Garrett did not 
2 5 have the opportunity to consult with and obtain the advice 
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1 of independent counsel. How do you know -- or do you know 
2 that Alva did not see an attorney with regard to that 
3 Quitclaim Deed? 
4 A. I don't. 
5 Q. You don't know? 
6 A. (Nonverbal response.) 
7 Q. SO if Alva had seen an attorney, you would not 
8 be aware of that? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Okay. Alva didn't say anything to you about 
11 seeing an attorney? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. And, in fact, Alva didn't say anything to you 
14 about the fact that he was doing it --
15 A. No. 
16 Q. -- in the fIrst place? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Okay. What was your relationship like with 
19 Jack at the time you -- during the time he lived in the 
20 house with you and Alva right after you were married? 
21 A. Fine. 
22 Q. Okay. Did your relationship with Jack ever 
23 change to where it wasn't fme, or was it always 
24 relatively normal? 
25 A. Normal. 
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1 Q. Okay. Did you have a difficult relationship 
2 with any of Alva's children? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Did Alva have a difficult relationship with any 
5 of your children? 
6 A. What? 
7 Q. Did Alva have a difficult relationship with any 
8 of your children? 
9 A. Oh, no. Huh-uh. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. The Quitclaim Deed that we've been talking 
13 about was executed on February 14th of 2006. Was Alva 
14 living in the home with you at that time? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Was anybody else living in the house with the 
17 two of you? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Was Alva working with Jack at that time? Did 
20 they work together? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Okay. Did they have any more involvement with 
23 each other during that time frame than they had in past 
24 years? 
25 A. No. 
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1 Q. Were you and Alva together handling the 
2 family's finances in February of2006? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Okay. Do you know whether Jack had control 
5 over any aspect at all of Alva's life at that time? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Can you tell me what Alva's mental condition 
8 was in February of2006? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Why not? 
11 A. Well, I -- he was -- I don't know quite how to 
12 answer that. He would kind of not remember sometimes. 
13 Q. What kind of things would he not remember? Did 
14 he always--
15 A. Well, we--
16 Q. Oh. 
l7 A. We would go play pinochle and then he couldn't 
18 remember quite -- the cards, you know, and things like 
19 that. 
20 Q. Okay. Did he always know who you were? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. 
23 A. Yes. He wasn't that bad, no. 























































Q. How was he physically at that time? 
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A. Well, he was -- he was getting tired, you know. 
Q. Right. 
A. He was fine. 
Q. I know it's difficult to put this -- that 
specifically into a time frame, but do you recall whether 
or not he was driving then in 2006? 
A. Yes. I think -- yes. 
Q. You think he was still driving? 
A. Yes. But I know people were complaining about 
that he was kind of allover the road. 
Q. SO he might not have been driving well? 
A. Something like that. 
Q. Okay. How did you find out about the Quitclaim 
Deed? 
A. When we went into probate and then Bill Gigray 
found -- announced it -- found it. 
Q. Okay. And were you surprised? 
A. Shocked. 
Q. Have you talked with any of your children about 
the Quitclaim Deed since you found it? 
A. Yes. 
Page 53 
Q. Okay. And which of your children have you 
discussed it with? 
A. All. 
Q. Okay. Have you discussed it with any of Alva's 
children? 
A. No. 
Q. Why haven't you discussed it with Alva's 
children? 
A. Well, I don't know. 
Q. Okay. Do you still keep in touch with Alva's 
children? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you and Alva did the Quitclaim Deed where 
he granted property to himself and you --
A. Yes. 




Q. He just did that on his own? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know who prepared it? Did he prepare 
A. We prepared it. 
Q. You prepared it together? 
A. Yes. 
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1 Q. In your opinion, do you believe that Jack 
2 coerced Alva into executing that Quitclaim Deed? 
3 A. I don't know. 
4 Q. All right. Do you have any specific examples 
5 of things that Jack had done in the past that would 
6 indicate to you that he might coerce Alva into doing 
7 something like that? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Would you be surprised if Jack coerced him? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. One of the things that's been recommended at 
12 some point in this lawsuit is that the property be 
13 partitioned so that Jack has the land that he's been 
1 4 farming and you have the home place and a few acres with 
15 the outbuildings. Are you familiar with that proposal? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. Has it ever been discussed with you that the 
18 property be divided in that manner? 
19 A. No. 
20 MS. RAINEY: Okay. Would you mark this as 
21 Exhibit 7, please. 
22 (Deposition Exhibit No.7 was 
2 3 marked for identification.) 
24 Q. (BY MS. RAINEY) Okay. I'm showing you what 
2 5 has just been marked· as Exhibit 7. Do you recognize this 
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1 document? 
2 A. Yes. I think I -- didn't you send it to me or 
3 something? 
4 Q. Well, one of your former attorneys, I believe, 
5 should have given this --
6 A. Yeah. 
7 Q. SO you have seen this document before? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Okay. And you -- it appears to me as though 
10 it's been signed by John, Eleanor, and Marilyn; is that 
11 correct? Do you recognize those signatures that are at 
12 the bottom of that document, John A. Garrett--
13 A. Well, I don't know their signatures that well. 
14 Q. Okay. So you wouldn't know if that was their 
15 signatures or not? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. Okay. And the proposal here is -- it says, 
18 number one, farmland to Jack Garrett. Do you see where 
19 I'm reading that from at the bottom? 
20 A. Yes, this number one? 
21 Q. Yes. 
22 A. Yeah. 
23 Q. And number two it says, house, outbuildings, 
24 horse bam to Thelma Garrett. Do you see that? 
25 A. Yes. Uh-huh. 
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1 Q. And you said you have seen this document 
2 before? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Okay. Do you have -- I was told from one of 
5 your former attorneys that you would not agree to this 
6 type of separation of the property; is that accurate? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. And why don't you agree with this type of 
9 separation of the property? 
1 0 A. Well, it doesn't -- it doesn't seem fair. 
11 Q. And it doesn't seem fair to who? 
12 A. Well, all of it doesn't seem fair. I mean, I 
13 like the way we had -- Alva and I had made out the will, 
14 that everybody would share, not just one person. 
15 Q. Okay. And so to you it doesn't seem fair 
1 6 because it's not what you and Alva had done in your will? 
17 A. Right. 
18 MS. RAINEY: I don't think I've got anything 
1 9 else. Do you have anything? 
20 MR. TROUPIS: No, I don't have anything. 
21 MS. RAINEY: All right. Thelma, that's all I 
22 have for you today. 
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
24 (The deposition was concluded at 3:33 p.m.) 
25 (Signature requested.) 
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1 TIIE DEPOSITION OF JACK GARRETT, 
2 was taken on behalf of the Defendant at Troupis Law 
3 Office, PA, 1299 East Iron Eagle, Suite l30, Eagle, 
1 JACK GARRETT, 
2 first duly sworn to tell the truth relating to said 
3 cause, testified as follows: 
Page 4 
4 Idaho, commencing at 12:53 p.m. on Wednesday, May 5, 2010, 4 (Deposition Exhibit Nos. 1,2, 3, 4, and 5 were 
marked for identification.) 5 before Maria D. Glodowski, Certified Shorthand Reporter 5 
6 and Notary Public within and for the State of Idaho, in 6 




11 For Defendant: 
12 
Troupis Law Office, PA 
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TESTIMONY OF JACK GARRETT 
Examination by Mr. Troupis 4 
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PAGE 
8 BY MR. TROUPIS: 
9 Q. Could you please state your name and your 
1 0 address for the record. 
11 A. Jack L. Garrett, at 10231 Purple Sage Road, 
12 Middleton, 83644. Idaho, I guess. Yeah. 
13 Q. Right. I think I figured that out. Okay. 
14 Jack, have you ever had your deposition taken before? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. Okay. I'm sure you've talked to your attorney 
17 and she's explained to you what we're doing here today. 
18 But just so that we have it on the record, I'd like to 
19 just give you a few of the ground rules so that we're all 
2 0 on the same page. 
21 A. Okay. 
22 Q. The court reporter has just given you the same 
2 3 oath that you would be taking if you were to testify in 
2 4 court. And today I'm going ask you some questions 








you and Thelma Garrett. 
And I'll ask you to give me your best 
recollection -- or answers. I don't want you to guess. 
So if I ask a question that you don't know the answer to, 
it's perfectly acceptable to tell me you don't know --
A. Okay. 
7 DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NO.: PAGE 7 Q. -- or I don't recall. 
A. Okay. 8 1. Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum Of Jack L. 4 8 
9 Garrett, dated 04/28/2010 
10 2. Contract For Wills 
11 3. Note, dated 03/2111990 
12 4. Handwritten Pages 































Q. At the same time I also don't want you to guess 
at what my question is. Sometimes I get a little 
convoluted in asking questions. If I ask a confusing 
question or ambiguous question and you don't understand 
it, please ask me to clarify it as opposed to trying to 
guess at what I'm meaning. 
A. Okay. 
Q. The court reporter is taking everything that 
we're saying down in a form of shorthand. It will be put 
in a booklet. You'll be given an opportunity to read it 
and to sign it under penalty of peIjury. And that 
testimony can then be used in court in this proceeding. 
So it's important that you give me your best answers today 
and that you fully understand what I'm asking. 
In addition, the court reporter can only take 
down one person speaking at a time. So please wait till I 
finish my question before you answer, and I'm going to try 
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1 to not ask another question over the top of your answer. 1 Q. Okay. Very good. So can I then take that as 
2 Okay? 2 meaning that -- and I noted that -- and we'll talk about 
3 A. Okay. 3 the notes -- there were some notes that you provided to me 
4 Q. Also, if you have any need to talk to your 4 about work done for your father and for Thelma on the 
5 attorney at any time, you're free to do that. But if 5 ranch property and the value of that work, and a 
6 there's a question pending, I'd ask that you answer that 6 promissory note, and then some -- and I think there were 
7 question before we take a break to do that. 7 some references to some checks in that writing. 
8 A. Okay. 8 Do you have any other records of payments other 
9 Q. But we can take as many breaks as you want. I 9 than that document that relate to the real property that's 
10 don't think it's going to be that long. But if you need a 10 at issue in the case? 
11 break for any reason, just say so. 11 MS. RAINEY: You referenced a number of 
12 A. Okay. 12 documents. 
13 Q. Let's see. Have we covered most everything? I l3 .MR. TROUPIS: Yeah. You provided -- if you'll 
14 don't think there's much more. Is there any -- are you 14 take the stack of papers that I gave you there. Take a 
15 under any medication or anything today -- IS look at No.3 and 4. That's No.3, is the promissory 
16 A. No. 16 note, and then No.4. Now, those are the two documents 
l7 Q. -- that would prevent you from testifYing? 17 that you provided and attached to your discovery 
18 A. No. 18 responses. 
19 Q. Okay. Very good. Like I said, you'll be given 19 MS. RAINEY: I'm going to object. Misstates 
20 the opportunity to review this and make any corrections to 20 facts. 
21 this testimony before signing it. But if you make any 21 .MR. TROUPIS: I'm sorry? 
22 major changes, I can comment on those. So please try to 22 MS. RAINEY: I think we attached more than two 
23 just give me your best answers today. 23 documents. 
24 A. How long do I got to make any changes? 24 .MR. TROUPIS: Oh. No, I mean those are the 
25 Q. Oh, 30 days or more. 25 two --
Page 7 Page 9 
1 A. Oh, okay. 1 MS. RAINEY: Two of them. 
2 Q. SO you'll have plenty of time to -- 2 .MR. TROUPIS: -- that refer to -- two that 
3 A. To read it and -- 3 refer to payments. I'm sorry. 
4 Q. -- read it and -- 4 MS. RAINEY: Okay. 
5 A. I don't have to do it today? 5 .MR. TROUP IS: I don't think there's any other 
6 Q. No, no, no. No, not today. 6 documents attached that refer to --
7 A. Okay. 7 MS. RAINEY: Which discovery request are you 
8 Q. Heaven forbid. 8 ref erring to? 
9 A. Okay. 9 .MR. TROUPIS: Let me just --
10 Q. Okay. I'd like you to take a look at what I've 10 MS. RAINEY: Okay. A specific answer? 
11 marked as Exhibit 1, which is the notice of deposition. 11 .MR. TROUPIS: Yeah. No. See, the documents 
12 And this deposition is being taken pursuant to notice 12 that were attached, what I had -- I asked for records of 
13 under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. And I had l3 payments that relate to the real property. And the 
14 included in the notice a request that you provide certain 14 records that I had here was the note and then this list. 
15 records. 15 I don't think there were any other records. 
16 Now, for your information, these records are 16 MS. RAINEY: Okay. Do you understand the 
17 pretty much the same things that I had asked for in the l7 question? 
18 discovery requests that I had submitted before. Soyou've 18 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
19 already provided me some documents. In fact, some of them 19 .MR. TROUPIS: I'm sorry, it's a little --
20 are attached here. 20 THE WITNESS: Let me look and see -- if that's 
21 Do you have any additional documents that you 21 okay? 
22 didn't previously produce in response to discovery that 22 .MR. TROUPIS: Oh, sure. You know --
23 you would like to produce today in response to this 23 THE WITNESS: 'Cause I don't know what's all 
24 request? Did you fmd any additional records? 24 been passed through, if that's --
25 A. No. 25 Q. (BY .MR. TROUPIS) Can you explain to me what 
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1 you mean by passed through? Maybe we can get -- I don't 1 TIlE WITNESS: Okay. 
2 want to-- 2 MR. TROUPIS: -- and we'll be fine. 
3 A. I sent those -- 3 TIlE WI1NESS: Sure. 
4 Q. -- spend a lot of time on it. 4 MS. RAINEY: Okay. 
5 A. -- to her and she sent it to you guys or -- 5 TIlE WI1NESS: I guess the answer was no. 
6 Q. Okay. 6 Q. (BY MR. TROUPIS) Well, I'm sorry to start out 
7 A. See, there's a tax assessment. 7 with an ambiguous question. All right. Okay. We'll deal 
8 MS. RAINEY: Yeah. I don't know -- 8 with the -- I'll deal with the other listed areas on this 
9 THE WITNESS: I don't know if that got passed 9 during deposition questions. And if we come upon anything 
10 through. 10 else, we'll just deal with it at the time. Okay. Let's 
11 MS. RAINEY: Let's go ahead andjust give him 11 get to the easier stuff. 
12 these. Okay? 12 A. Okay. 
13 THE WITNESS: Okay. 13 Q. SO tell me, what's your birth date? 
14 MR. TROUPIS: Okay. 14 A.  
15 THE WITNESS: I think that's part of the repair 15 Q. Okay. And were you born in Idaho? 
16 and this is part of -- 16 A. Caldwell. 
17 MS. RAINEY: These pages, too. 17 Q. Okay. Oh, that's Idaho. And your father was 
18 THE WITNESS: Okay. Three, four pages. These 18 Alva Garrett? 
19 are bills and stuff that I paid the companies. 19 A. Yes. 
20 MR. TROUPIS: Okay. 20 Q. Who was your mother? 
21 THE WITNESS: I believe that whole pile. 21 A. Edith. 
22 Q. (BY MR. TROUPIS) Well, before we get -- okay. 22 Q. Edith. 
23 Would it be fair to say -- before we go through all this. 23 A. I guess, is her maiden name. If you'd 
24 Would it be fair to say that the other documents which 24 call that one. 
25 you're looking through now is backup material that relates 25 Q. And your mother passed away? 
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1 to payments that are referred to on what I've marked as 1 A. Yes. 
2 Exhibit 4? 2 Q. And when was that, what year? 
3 A. I don't believe so. 3 A. '74, I believe. 
4 Q. Okay. 4 Q. Have you lived in Idaho your whole life? 
5 A. I believe this is -- that's more stuff. 5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Additional? 6 Q. What's the highest level of education that 
7 A. Additional stuff. 7 you've had? 
8 Q. Okay. You know, rather than spend a lot of 8 A. High school. 
9 time today -- 'cause I did want to get to some other 9 Q. And you have three -- what, two sisters, and a 
10 issues, you know -- what I'd ask you to do is go through 10 brother? 
11 that, and if you want to just supplement the response and 11 A. Yes. 
12 attach -- and send me copies of additional documents that 12 Q. And what are their names and ages? 
13 show additional payments, that would be perfectly 13 A. Eleanor Martin. 
14 acceptable. 14 Q. And you can be approximate on the age. That's 
15 MS. RAINEY: We can do that. 15 fine. Not that important. Well, just tell me this: Is 
16 MR. TROUPIS: I think that's -- 16 she older or younger than you? 
17 MS. RAINEY: Okay. 17 A. She's older than me. 
18 MR. TROUPIS: Yeah. Rather than go through a 18 Q. That's fine. And then--
19 lot of this stuff, I think that we -- 19 A. John Garrett, and he's older. And Marilyn 
20 THE WITNESS: Okay. 20 Garrett, and she's younger. 
21 MR. TROUPIS: -- I'd rather get to other issues 21 Q. And is John married? 
22 and -- 22 A. Yes. 
23 THE WITNESS: Okay. 23 Q. And what's his wife's name? 
24 MR. TROUPIS: -- and this is not a big issue. 24 A. Gail. 
25 You can just provide me additional documents-- 25 Q. And do you know where he lives, just town? 
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1 A. I think his mailing address is Meridian. 1 Q. Okay. And in 1976 you would have been 12--
2 Q. Okay. 2 no, 14? 
3 A. His phone number is Star. It's right on the 3 A. Fourteen. 
4 line. I don't know -- can't remember exactly. 4 Q. Fourteen. So were you living at home then? 
5 Q. And then Eleanor, is she married? 5 A. Yes. 
6 A. Yes. 6 Q. And your sister, Marilyn, was she living there, 
7 Q. And what's her husband's name? 7 too? 
8 A. Don Martin. 8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And where do they live? 9 Q. SO did you live with Alva and Thelma for some 
10 A. Caldwell. 10 period of time? 
11 Q. And then Marilyn, is she married? 11 A. Yes. 
12 A. No. And she lives in Nampa. 12 Q. About how long? 
13 Q. And then, Jack, do you have any children? 13 A. Four, five years. 
14 A. No. 14 Q. Could you tell me just in general terms what 
15 Q. Are you married? 15 kind of relationship you had with Thelma during that four-
16 A. No. 16 or five-year period? 
17 Q. And where are you employed? 17 A. Probably the regular stepmom relation. 
18 A. I'm self-employed. 18 Q. Okay. Nothing unusual about it? 
19 Q. What's the type of business? 19 A. Nothing unusual. 
20 A. Agricultural. 20 Q. Okay. Did Thelma -- she has three children, 
21 Q. Now, apart from the property that is the 21 right? 
22 subject of this case, do you have another farm that you 22 A. Yes. 
23 farm? 23 Q. And the youngest, Cindy Swartz -- do you know 
24 A. Yes. 24 Cindy? 
25 Q. Okay. And is that at the 10231 Purple Sage 25 A. Yes. 
Page 15 Page 17 
1 Road address? 1 Q. And was she living with Thelma when she moved 
2 A. Yes, one of them. 2 in with Alva when you were 14, if you remember? 
3 Q. Okay. How many total acres do you farm? Just 3 A. For a short period of time. 
4 roUghly. 4 Q. Okay. Since you moved out, you know, after the 
5 A. Three hundred. 5 four or five years and before this -- let's say before 
6 Q. Okay. Your brother, John, does he have 6 Alva died -- in general terms, could you tell me what kind 
7 children? 7 of -- how you would characterize your relationship with 
8 A. Yes. 8 Thelma. 
9 Q. And how many? 9 A. Oh, I don't know. Just the regular 
10 A. Two. 10 relationship, I guess. 
11 Q. And Eleanor? 11 Q. I guess what I'm asking, just to clarify --
12 A. One. 12 A. Yeah. 
13 Q. And Marilyn? 13 Q. -- is, you know, sometimes people just have a 
14 A. One. 14 real strained relationship where they don't speak to each 
15 Q. SO this case involves -- it's your partition 15 other, or they're angry, they just don't have -- I mean, 
16 claim against your -- I don't know whether you -- do you 16 have you just had a normal relationship, nothing out of 
17 call Thelma a stepmother, or just Thelma, or how do you -- 17 the ordinary? That's what I'm getting from your 
18 A. Usually, just Thelma 18 testimony. Is that about right? 
19 Q. Okay. And I represent Thelma. And so I'm 19 A. Yeah. 
20 going to ask you some questions, both pertaining to this 20 Q. Okay. And how would you characterize your 
21 lawsuit and basically the family relationship, because 21 relationship with dad. 
22 that has some bearing on it. So I'd like to start with, 22 A. Probably the same, normal. 
23 my understanding is that Alva, your father, married Thelma 23 Q. Okay. Right up to the time he died? 
24 in about 1976; is that right? 24 A. Yeah. 
25 A. Yes. 25 Q. Now, during the 34 years that Alva and -- Alva 
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1 and Thelma -- let me it ask this way: Alva and Thelma 
2 were married in 1976 and Alva died in 2008, correct? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Okay. So that's about 32 years, something like 
5 that? 
6 A. Probably. 
7 Q. During that period oftime, do you ever 
8 remember Alva and Thelma having big arguments or problems 
9 between them? 
10 A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Frequently? Infrequently? 
MS. RAINEY: Objection, vague. 
11 
12 
13 Q. (BY MR. TROUPIS) Okay. Can youjust give me 
14 an example of one big argument, if there was one, that you 
15 can recall between Alva and Thelma? Just an example. 
16 A. I really wasn't involved, you know, to --
17 Q. Okay. 
18 A. -- you know, in any of their arguments. 
19 Q. Okay. That's fme. Did Alva ever talk to you 
20 about problems that he had in his marriage at any time? 
21 A. No. 




















Q. Do you know her son Garrett? 
Page 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how long have you known him? 
A. Probably about 37 years. 
Q. Do you have a good relationship with him? 
A. I guess, yes. 
Q. Have you ever done any business with him? 
A. No, not to my recall. 
Q. Okay. And Tom Longstreet, you've known him 
about the same time? 
A. I knew him probably 32 years. 
Q. Okay. Have you ever done any business with 
him? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. What kind? 
A. He bought some cows from me. 
19 
16 Q. Okay. And Cynthia Swartz, I guess you've never 
l7 known her since you were living in the same home for that 
18 period oftime? 
19 A. And I don't believe rve done any business with 
20 her. 
21 Q. Okay. Now, when -- in 1976, do you remember 
22 how many pieces of real estate that your father owned? 
23 A. He had three ranches, basically. 
24 Q. Okay. Could you tell me -- or describe them by 
25 name. 
Page 20 
1 A. The one was the Middleton place, which was 
2 80 acres at that time. 
3 Q. Okay. 
4 A. One called the Willow Creek place. And it was, 
5 I think, rented and deeded ground. It was 1500, 
6 2,000 acres maybe. And then he had the -- what we call 
7 Round Valley property. 
8 Q. Okay. 
A. And it was 80 or a hundred acres. 9 
10 Q. Okay. And when Alva died, he had the -- he had 




Q. All right. Now, I understand that -- it's my 
14 understanding that your brother John had various business 
15 dealings with your father over the years having to do with 
1 6 these parcels of real estate, is that correct, or not? 
17 A. Yeah. 
18 Q. Okay. So could you tell me what happened first 
19 to the Willow Creek property. That's that 1500 to 
20 2,OOO-acre piece you just mentioned. 
2 1 A. They traded it -- or my dad traded it for a 
22 motel. 
23 Q. Okay. 
2 4 A. And rm not sure of the exact details. He 
2 5 put -- he got -- put up the property and got a share of 
Page 21 
1 the motel. My brother put up some property, and he got a 
2 smaller share. And then they had another partner that put 
3 up some property, and he got another small share. 
4 Q. SO your brother John was involved in this trade 
5 with your father of the Willow Creek property and then 
6 some of Jolm's property for an interest in a motel. Was 
7 that in Rexburg? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Okay. And then, do you know any of the 
10 other -- apart from what you've told me, do you know any 
11 details of that transaction? 
12 A. Some of them. 
13 Q. Okay. What do you know? 
14 A. Well, they got -- like I said, I'm not sure of 
15 the shares. But he got the motel -- there was two motels 
16 and a restaurant, and he got four lots, I believe -- three 
l7 or four lots free and clear, and the motel, and they 
18 had -- they owed money on -- they had to make payments on 
19 the motel. 
20 Q. Okay. So was he a -- were he and John partners 
21 in this deal, if you know? 
22 A. Yeah. I believe he owned like three-fourths of 
23 it or two-thirds, something like that, and the other two 
24 guys owned whatever the rest was. 
25 Q. Okay. Now, you weren't involved in that 
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1 transaction, correct? 1 A. It was later on. 
2 A. No. 2 Q. Okay. 
3 Q. Okay. So if! ask John, I'd probably be better 3 A. I don't know. Maybe in the '80s. 
4 to get the details? 4 Q. Okay. 
5 A. Yeah. 5 A. Early '80s. I don't know for sure. 
6 Q. Okay. Do you know whatever happened to that 6 Q. All right. Did John handle the subdividing of 
7 motel and the other -- the restaurant and the other 7 it? 
8 properties in Rexburg? 8 A. Yes. 
9 A. They sold it to another guy -- well, the one 9 Q. And then the properties -- the land was sold --
10 partner and another -- to my understanding, the one 10 the subdivided properties were sold off? 
11 partner and another guy bought my brother and my dad out 11 A. Yes. 
12 and gave them a note and some other property, and then he 12 Q. Did John handle the sale of those? 
13 lost it. And they lost -- they lost the note and -- but 13 A. I believe so. 
14 they had -- they got some other property. 14 Q. Okay. Then with respect to the Middleton 
15 Q. Okay. Sounds pretty complicated. 15 property, at one -- in 1976, at least, it was about 
16 A. Yeah. 16 80 acres; is that right? 
17 Q. All right. The property in Round Valley, can 17 A. Yes. 
18 you tell me what happened to that? 18 Q. And it's now 27; is that right? 
19 A. My father, he subdivided it -- or my brother 19 A. Yes. 
20 did the work. 20 Q. SO 53 acres has been split off. Can you ten 
21 Q. Okay. 21 me what happened to that 53 acres? 
22 A. And they sold it off and my father got the 22 A. They sold it. 
23 money off of it. 23 Q. Okay. 
24 Q. Okay. 24 A. Or --yeah. 
25 A. My father and Thelma, I guess. 25 Q. Okay. Do you know when? Well, let me ask it 
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1 Q. All right. 'Was there 20 acres of that split 
2 offinto five-acre parcels? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Okay. And were those given to -- did you 
5 receive one of those five-acre parcels? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. And did John? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And Eleanor? 
1 this way: Was it before 1990? 
2 A. I'll tell you in a second. 







A. Where's that promissory note? 
Q. Oh, it's No.4 on the stack there. 
A. Oh. 
Q. Oh, I'm sorry, it's No.3. 
A. It was done about 1990, yeah. 
Q. Okay. 
lOA. Yes. lOA. Around in this time of the year. 
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11 Q. And Marilyn? 11 Q. All right. And did Alva ever tell you why they 
12 A. Yes. 12 were selling off -- or got rid of 53 acres? 
13 Q. Okay. And did Thelma's children receive any 13 A. He got into trouble -- or he had borrowed--
14 part of -- any parcels of property off the Round Valley 1 4 he'd borrow money against it --
IS property? 15 Q. Okay. 
16 A. That was -- that property was split in about 1 6 A. -- and was unable -- or getting to the point 
17 1970. 17 where he couldn't make the payments. 
18 Q. Okay. So this was -- 18 Q. Okay. Do you know whether or not the money 
19 A. Done before -- it was when my mother was still 19 that they borrowed had anything to do with the debt on the 
2 0 alive. 2 0 Rexburg property? 
21 Q. Okay. And then the rest -- was the -- when the 21 A. No. 
22 four parcels were split off, the 20 acres and provided to 22 Q. Okay. 
23 each of the four children, was that the time that the rest 23 A. As far as to my knowledge. 
24 of the property, the other 60 or 80 acres was subdivided, 24 Q. Okay. Do you know how he got himself in 
25 or was it later? 25 trouble or how -- this is just whatever you know? 
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1 A. I know one deal he borrowed, I believe -- and I 
2 don't know the exact number -- r believe it was $20,000 
3 and bought cattle. Thelma's son got into trouble. She 
Page 28 
1 with his decisions. 
2 Q. Okay. And that's not unusual between a father 
3 and son? 
4 borrowed money against the cattle without my dad's knowing 4 A. Yeah. 
5 about it. 5 Q. Okay. We've talked about John -- and I know 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 A. When he sold the cows, there was a lien on them 
8 at the sale yard, and they grabbed the money. 
9 Q. Okay. All right. And was that about 1990? 
1 0 A. It was probably in the late '80s. 
11 Q. Okay. Were there any other fmancial 
12 difficulties that you can recall your father being in? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Okay. Now, your brother John, was he a 
15 realtor? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Okay. And was he actively -- was that his 
18 profession when he was involved in the Willow Creek trade? 
19 Was he acting as a realtor in the -- when the Willow Creek 
2 0 property was traded for the motel in Rexburg? 
2 1 A. I believe so. 
22 Q. Okay. And when he subdivided the Round Valley 
23 property, was he a realtor then? 
24 A. I believe so. 
25 Q. Okay. Did John have anything to do with the 
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1 sale ofthe 53 acres of the Middleton property? Again, if 
2 you know. You don't -- please don't guess at it. 
3 A. I believe -- I don't know. 
4 Q. Okay. 
5 A. I mean, he was -- I think it was listed through 
6 a couple offices -- or Thelma's boy had sent people out, 
7 and I believe the sale was through another office that was 
8 not--
9 Q. Okay. 
lOA. -- connected with either one of them. 
11 Q. Okay. 
12 A. I believe. 
13 Q. All right. Did John -- was John also an 
1 4 insurance broker? 
15 A. Early on. 
16 Q. Okay. And did he sell your dad insurance? 
1 7 A. I believe so. 
18 Q. Okay. You watched these transactions from 1976 
1 9 through -- basically all of your life through -- up to the 
2 0 time your father died. And I'm wondering, do you have a 
21 personal opinion as to whether or not your father placed 
22 trust and confidence in John with respect to fmancial 
23 decisions, real estate decisions? Just asking for your 
24 personal opinion, if you have one. 
2 5 A. Yeah. I think he trusted him with his -- yeah, 
6 this is your deposition, Jack. But did you ever have 
7 any -- or make any financial decisions for your father? 
8 MS. RAINEY: Object to form. You can answer 
9 it. 




MS. RAINEY: Go ahead and answer it, yeah. 
THE WITNESS: Oh. 
MR. TROUPIS: Yeah, if you can. If the 
14 question is too vague, then, you know --
15 THE WITNESS: I'm pretty vague. 
16 Q. (BY MR. TROUPIS) Okay. So, for instance, 
1 7 we've talked a little bit about John being involved in 
18 real estate transactions with your dad. Were you ever 
19 involved in a business transaction with your father? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Okay. Could you tell me what business 
22 decision -- business transaction you were involved in with 
2 3 your father? 
24 A. Well, with the livestock -- the racehorses. I 
25 guess livestock. Probably, you know, stuff relating to 
Page 29 
1 the property, small purchases or something, you know. 
2 Q. Okay. With the racehorses or the livestock, 
3 can you explain a little bit to me. What were you 
4 doing -- what kind of business were you doing? 
5 A. He had a cow/calf operation and I was helping 
6 him feed and, you know, everyday duties or whatever. 
7 Q. SO did you share in the expenses and the 
8 profits from that? I mean, was it a business together? 
9 A. No. Ijust -- I just basically helping him. 
10 Q. Okay. 
11 A. I mean, he -- his cows were on his own. 
12 Q. Okay. So did you ever have a business 
13 relationship with your dad where you both owned the 
14 same -- like the same cows, or the same horses, or 
15 something ofthat sort? 
1 6 A. Yeah. We had the same horses together. 
17 Q. All right. And so you worked together with 
18 respect to those horses? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And what did you do, you bought and sold them, 
21 or what kind business was it? 
22 A. His racehorses -- you know, all the duties that 
23 were involved with race horsing, entering them -- or he 
24 was training them. 
25 Q. Okay. 
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1 A. You know, enter them in races. All the duties 
2 that go along with it. 






Q. And you'd enter them in races together? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you'd share in the profits, if there 
8 were profits? 
9 A. Yeah. 
10 Q. All right. And I'm assuming you bought and 
11 sold horses together? 
12 A. Mainly we raised them. 
13 Q. Okay. 
14 A. I don't believe we -- I don't think I ever 
15 bought one with him. 
1 6 Q. Okay. So what period of time are we talking 
1 7 about that you were involved with your dad in the 
1 8 racehorse business? 
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1 That was the first year I started renting. 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 A. And that was to make the payment on the place 
4 because he was behind. 
5 Q. All right. So was this note done before the 
6 53 acres was sold oft? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. SO at this point in time there was 80 acres, 
9 correct? 
1 0 A. Correct. 
11 Q. And so the $8,000 rent was for 80 acres? 
12 A. Yeah. 
13 Q. SO that's roughly a hundred dollars an acre? 
14 A. Yeah. It's actually about 75 acres, 'cause you 
15 got the house, yeah. 
16 Q. Okay. And you were renting the -- so you were 
17 doing the farming -- you were farming this 80 acres -- or 
18 the 75 acres from 1990 -- or in 1990, right? 
19 A. I believe I had horses around 1970 to probably 19 
20 the mid-'90s. 20 
A. Correct. 
Q. Did you continue to farm it from 1990 right up 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. And had -- I didn't -- I just had a few horses. 
23 Q. Okay. 
A. And not continuously. Off and on. 24 
25 Q. Okay. So the last time that you owned horses 
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1 together with your dad would have been about what year? 
2 A. I don't -- late -- I don't know. 
3 Q. Okay. That's fme. It's been a long time. 
4 A. Yeah. 
5 Q. Okay. I may have these a little out of order. 
6 Could you take a look at what I've marked Exhibit 3, which 
7 is the promissory note? No.3. There we go. And could 
8 you identifY this -- it appears to be a promissory note 
9 signed by Alva and Thelma Garrett dated December 31 -- or, 
1 0 no, dated March 21, 1990, payable to you; is that right? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And could you tell me a little bit about the 
1 3 circumstances. How did this note get -- you know, what 
1 4 was the purpose of this note? 
15 A. He needed money to make a payment. And the 
1 6 actual amount I gave him -- yeah, I'm not sure -- 8 to 
17 10,000. 
18 Q. Okay. 
19 A. I believe it was around $10,000. And the 






A. Not the 80. 
25 Q. Okay. Well, the 80 was sold off at some 
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1 point--
2 A. Yeah. 
3 Q. -- around then, '90, '91, something like that, 
4 correct? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Once the 80 was sold off, did you continue to 
7 farm the remaining tillable property? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. All right. Which is 23 -- 20 --
10 
11 
A. Two or three acres. 
Q. -- 2 or 3 acres. And have you done that 
12 since -- I mean, continuously every year since 1990? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And going back to this promissory note. Was it 
15 paid back? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. Okay. I notice there's a note handwritten on 
18 here that says 12/16/91, $1758 paid, with a JG. Are those 
19 your initials? 
20 breakdown of that would have been approximately 8,000 for 20 A. Yes. 
21 rent and then 2,000 -- 21 Q. All right. So did you -- do you -- I know this 
22 Q. Two thousand loan? 2 2 is way long ago, but do you remember receiving that back? 
23 A. Two thousand loan. 23 A. What that was -- yes, it came back to me. 
24 Q. Okay. 24 Q. Okay. 
25 A. The rent was advanced on the -- on the rent. 25 A. That was a -- we raised sugar beets and I told 
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1 him anything above the rent we'd split. And that was a 
2 sugar sale, and it came back from -- so that's what... 
3 Q. Okay. So are you saying that that was not a 
4 payment on the note? 
5 A. Yes, it was a payment on the note. 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 A. But it was not from them, it was from the sugar 
8 company. 
9 Q. Oh, you credited it from the profits on the 
1 0 sale of sugar beets? 
11 A. Yeah. 
12 Q. Okay. So what's the status of this note? Was 
13 it paid off in full? Was it written off? Was it -- you 
14 know, what's the current status of this note? 
15 A. It was not paid off. My understanding of a 
1 6 promissory note, after five years, they're void. 
17 Q. Okay. Did you ever discuss it with Alva, your 
1 8 father, about getting payment on the rest ofthis note? 
1 9 A. I don't recall. 
20 Q. Okay. Now, you've -- take a look, please, at 
21 Exhibit 4. 
MS. RAINEY: It's this one. 
MR. TROUPIS: That's this one. 




25 MR. TROUPIS: And you can actually pull the 
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1 note out ofthefe and put it away, that way you're -- it's 
2 not--
3 THE WITNESS: Oh, okay. 
4 MR. TROUPIS: Just -- yeah, that's fine. 
5 Q. (BY MR. TROUPIS) Could you explain to me --
6 this is a document -- now, this is a document that you 
7 produced in discovery, and it's handwritten, and then it's 
8 got a fax notation from Lindbloom Realty on the top. 
9 First, could you explain to me what is this document? 
lOA. It's expenses and stuff I've done to the 
11 property. 
12 Q. Okay. And did you -- when was this compiled? 
13 When did you put this together? 
14 A. Probably when it was requested from the 
1 5 attorneys. 
1 6 Q. Okay. So the list was put together. Do you 
1 7 have a -- I mean, this year? Last year? 
18 A. Probably last year. 
19 Q. Last year sometime. Okay. Did you put this 
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1 A. Over a period of time. 
2 Q. And can you tell me kind of what the range of 
3 time we're talking about? 
4 A. Probably from, say, 'S5 to 2006. 
5 Q. Okay. And did you put this together from your 
6 memory, or do you have any kind of notes to refer back to? 
7 A. I believe mainly it was from my memory. 
8 Q. Okay. The values that you've listed -- over 
9 here on the right-hand column you have estimated values. 
10 Is that your estimate? I mean, is that just from your 
11 personal opinion, or do you have any other basis to make 
12 an estimate of the values? 
13 A. From my opinion. And there were some other --
14 Q. Okay. 
15 A. -- stuff probably. 
1 6 Q. Okay. Well, for instance -- let me just pick 
17 one here. You've got spray -- about the first page about 
18 eight items down you got spray weeds. You see that, 1700? 
19 MR. TROUPIS: Let's take one moment. 
20 (Off the record.) 
21 Q. (BY MR. TROUPIS) Could you tell me kind of how 
2 2 you estimated the 1700? 
23 A. That was probably so much an acre. 
24 Q. Okay. 
25 A. And I probably guesstimated the acres over the 
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1 period of time. 
2 Q. Okay. That's fair. Now, if you'll take a look 
3 at the -- well, page 3 first. You've got purchases for 
4 fann, 2003 to 200S, and you've got a number, 39,31S. 
5 A. Yeah. 
6 Q. I'm assuming you must have some documents that 
7 helped you to come up with that number? 
8 A. I believe that was -- all this stuff added up. 
9 Q. That's all this? 
1 0 A. I believe. 
11 Q. Okay. That's good. Okay. Then on page 4, 
12 this appears to be a series of checks. And, again, now, 
13 did you actually have a -- do you still have copies of 
14 these checks that you referenced when you made this list 
15 out? 
1 6 A. I must have at the time. 
17 Q. Okay. 
1 8 A. I don't -- I don't recall. 
19 Q. Do you know whether you still have the checks? 
2 0 together from some other documents tDat -- I mean, this is 2 0 A. I don't recall. 
21 a list of a lot of different things. 21 Q. Okay. And these checks --let's take the first 
22 A. No. 22 one here. 10/31/07, you've got -- rent says 2875, and 
23 Q. Okay. So when were these items provided -- 23 then less water 1246. Could you kind of explain to me 
24 when did you provide these various items that are listed? 24 what this is, this check, 2578 dated 10/31/07? Just 
25 I mean, is it over a period oftime? 25 explain the entry to me. What does it mean? 
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1 A. I believe the rent was $2875. I paid them 
2 1246, I think, which is less the water bill. 
3 Q. Okay. So did you pay the water bill yourself? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. SO you basically paid -- was it your agreement 
6 that you paid so much per acre less whatever the water 
7 bill was? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Okay. And that's what this check in 
10 October 31, '07, was for? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And so the check would be payable to Alva--
13 A. Yes. 




Q. Okay. Which one, Alva, or Alva and Thelma? 
17 A. Alva. 
18 Q. Okay. And then the same on check number 2512 
1 9 dated 10/26/06, would that have been a rent check as well 
20 of 1422? 
21 A. Yeah. Yes, I believe so. 
22 Q. Okay. And then with the check for 10/23/05, 
23 that 2941 it looks -- or 2951 for 1,095, that would have 
24 been a rent check? 
25 A. I believe so. 
Page 39 
1 Q. And we're talking about rent for your rental of 
2 the farm acreage that you're farming, right, on the 
3 Middleton property? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. You testified already that you did -- you had 
6 business with your dad with respect to the horses to 
7 training -- training and racing horses, right? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And then you had -- you farmed this property --
10 you basically rented the farm from your father; is that 
11 right? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. And we've previously talked about -- you gave 
14 me an opinion you thought your father had trust and 
15 confidence in John with respect to some fmancial affairs. 
16 Would you have the same opinion -- what do you think your 
17 father's opinion was of you with respect to fmancial 
18 affairs? Did he have trust and confidence in you? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Okay. Did he ever ask you for advice about the 
21 racing business -- I mean, horse racing business, or 
22 anything dealing with agriculture business? 
23 MS. RAINEY: Object to fonn. 
24 Q. (BY MR. TROUPIS) Let's just start with the 
25 horse racing business. During the time that you were 
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1 racing horses together, did your father ever ask you for 
2 advice? 
3 A. Probably. 
4 Q. Okay. Okay. So now I'd like you to take a 
5 look at -- actually, I haven't marked it yet. You don't 
6 have to take a look at it yet. That's fine. We'll look 
7 at that in a minute. In about 1990 Alva deeded the 
8 Middleton property to himself and Thelma. Are you aware 
9 of that in about 1990? The property -- before 1990 --
10 A. Be specific. 
11 Q. Okay. Before 1990 the Middleton property was 
12 titled only in Alva's name; is that right? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Okay. And about 1990 -- and this is at least 
15 with respect to the 27 acres that remained -- it's my 
1 6 understanding that Alva deeded the property that he owned 
1 7 separately to himself and Thelma; is that right? 
18 A. Yeah. 
19 Q. Okay. So my question is: When did you first 
20 become aware of that fact, that the property -- that the 
2 1 27 remaining acres had been deeded from Alva to Alva and 
22 Thelma? 
23 A. Probably around 2000. 
24 Q. Okay. And how did you become aware of it? 
2 5 A. He was wanting to sign the property over to me 
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1 at that time. 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 A. And we -- anyhow we looked -- or I believe John 
4 looked at the records or something. I don't -- I don't 
5 recall how it -- I found out. 
6 Q. Okay. When you say that Alva wanted -- in 2000 
7 Alva wanted to sign over the property to you, can you be a 
8 little more specific? What did -- how did this come 
9 about? What did Alva tell you? 
10 A. He just came over, said he's wanting to sign it 
11 overtome. 
12 Q. Okay. And how was John involved in that? 
13 A. He wasn't. 
14 Q. Okay. But did -- somehow John got involved in 
15 looking at the property to determine how it was held --
16 how title was held? 
17 A. Yeah. We went -- seemed -- seems like we went 
18 to Thelma and she wouldn't sign it over or something -- or 
19 wouldn't sign her interest over. 
20 Q. Okay. Did he tell you why he wanted it signed 
21 over? 
22 A. At that time, or in the future? 
23 Q. Yeah, in 2000. When you first -- when you had 
24 the first conversation with Alva and he said that he 
25 wanted to sign over the property, did he give you an 
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1 explanation? 1 A. Only on, I believe, two times I was present. 
2 A. He said I've been farming it and that I'd 2 Q. Okay. Could you tell me when the flISt of 
3 helped him make payments on it. 3 those was? 
4 Q. Okay. Did he intend to move off of the 4 A. First time was in about 1990. 
5 property? 5 Q. Okay. And can you describe for me -- was 
6 A. No. 6 anybody else there? You and Alva and Thelma, and anybody 
7 Q. SO he intended to stay on it? 7 else? 
8 A. Yes. 8 A. Yes. I believe it was just us. 
9 Q. Even though he wanted to give it to you? 9 Q. Okay. And where did that take place? 
10 A. Basically, he wanted to give me like 25 acres 10 A. At their home. 
11 or 24 acres and Thelma could have the house and an acre or 11 Q. All right. And how did -- tell me what 
12 so. 12 conversation you had -- or they had. 
13 Q. Okay. Did he want it to take effect 13 A. That's when it was in 80 acres and they owed --
14 immediately? 14 they owed on it. 
15 A. We didn't get that far. 15 Q. Okay. 
16 Q. Okay. So you don't know whether he wanted it 16 A. And I was to pick -- to take over the debt. 
17 to -- you to have it now, or when he died? Do you know 17 Q. Okay. 
18 that? 18 A. And they're going to have like a life estate in 
19 A. I believe he wanted me to have it then. 19 the property. 
20 Q. All right. Did he tell you that? 20 Q. Okay. 
21 MS. RAINEY: Can you clarifY the time frame? 21 A. In the home. 
22 MR. TROUPIS: We're talking in 2000. 22 Q. And then you would get it -- get everything 
23 MS. RAINEY: Okay. 23 when they died? 
24 MR. TROUPIS: This is in 2000, 'cause this is 24 A. Yes, I guess. 
25 the fIrst conversation. 25 Q. Okay. What happened after that conversation? 
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1 MS. RAINEY: Okay. 1 A. Thelma didn't want me to have it. 
2 THE WITNESS: What was the question again? 2 Q. Okay. Now, that was when they had the 
3 Q. (BY MR. TROUPIS) In 2000, did your father tell 3 80 acreS. And you said that you -- said there were two 
4 you that he wanted you to have that 24 acres right then? 4 times that you had -- that they had a conversation 
5 A. Yes. 5 regarding the property in your presence. So when was the 
6 Q. Okay. Now, for some reason that didn't -- it 6 second one? 
7 never got completed in 2000, right? 7 A. The other one was in about -- was in the 
8 A. Correct. 8 2000 --
9 Q. And it wasn't until 2006, six years later, that 9 Q. Okay. 
10 you actually got a deed from your father, right? 10 A. -- or around 2000. 
11 A. Correct. 11 Q. All right. And did that happen at their home? 
12 Q. SO what happened in the intervening six years 12 A. Yes. 
13 that delayed you getting that deed? 13 Q. Was anyone else present besides you and Thelma 
14 A. Thelma basically wouldn't let him do anything. 14 and Alva? 
15 Q. Okay. So were you -- did Alva tell you that he 15 A. Just us three, I believe. 
16 and Thelma talked about this? 16 Q. Okay. And what was the substance of that 
17 A. Yes. 17 conversation? 
18 Q. Okay. And on more than one occasion did he 18 A. He said that -- let's see. He said that he 
19 tell you that? 19 wanted me to have the property. 
20 A. Yes. 20 Q. Okay. The entire property? 
21 Q. Could you tell me how many times Alva told you 21 A. I believe it's just -- I believe it was just 
22 that he and Thelma talked about him deeding away 24 acres 22 the 25 acres, and she was to have the house. 
23 to you? 23 Q. And you had this discussion with her present? 
24 A. I imagine he talked to her eight, ten times. 24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. Okay. Were you present? 25 Q. And I'm assuming she said no? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Okay. So in the intervening six years from 
3 2000 to 2006 when the quitclaim deed was signed, did you 
4 have any other conversations with Alva about this 
5 property? 
6 A. Numerous times. 
7 Q. Okay. Did he initiate those, or did you 
8 initiate those? 




Q. Okay. And can you remember any of those? 
A. He just said he wanted me to have the place. 
Q. Okay. 
13 A. And I knew Thelma would say no. 
14 Q. All right. Now, could you take a look at what 
15 I've marked as Exhibit 2. Have you ever seen this 
1 6 document before? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And when was the first time you saw it? 
19 A. About probably January 2008. 
2 0 Q. Okay. So you didn't see this before -- well, 
21 January '08. Was that before Alva died? 
22 A. Yeah. 
23 Q. All right. And how did -- who showed it to 
24 you? 
25 A. Bill Gigray gave my brother a copy of it. 
1 
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Q. And did he do that for any particular reason? 
2 A. There was something on the power of attorney --
3 they asked him if they had power of attorney. 
4 Q. Did your father need some help with his --
5 handling of his affairs? Is that the question? 
6 A. At that time. 
7 Q. Okay. When you -- did you have any 
8 conversation with Mr. Gigrayor John about this document 
9 when you fust saw it? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. Did you ever have a conversation with your 
12 father about it? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Okay. And he died in March of'08, a few 
1 5 months later, right? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Okay. Did your father ever tell you that he 
18 had entered into a Contract For Wills with Thelma? 
1 9 A. I don't recall. 
20 Q. Okay. When you had the conversation in 2000 
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1 Q. (BY MR. lROUPIS) Did your father have any --
2 make any conversation -- or have any -- did your father 
3 mention having any -- did he make any reference to this 
4 document, or any other agreement that he had with Thelma? 
5 A. Not to this, no. 
6 Q. Okay. When your father in 2000 -- in 2000 --
7 or take a look -- I'm sorry. Take a look at Exhibit 5, 
8 which is the Quitclaim Deed. Now -- and you've seen this 
9 document before, right? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And is it signed by your father, Alva Garrett? 
12 A. Looks like it. 
13 Q. Was it signed on or about February 14, 2006? 
14 A. To the best of my knowledge. 
1 5 Q. And is this the Quitclaim Deed that John, your 
1 6 brother, prepared? 
1 7 A. I wasn't there. 
18 Q. Okay. Do you know whether or not -- do you 
1 9 know who prepared it? 
2 0 A. I believe it was John. 
21 Q. Okay. Would you recognize his printing? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Okay. When your father signed this -- were you 
2 4 present when he signed this instrument? 
25 A. No. 
Page 49 
1 Q. No. Who was, if you know? 
2 A. I wasn't there. 
3 Q. Okay. When did you first learn that your 
4 father had signed a Quitclaim Deed to you -- signed this 
5 Quitclaim Deed to you? 
6 A. Shortly after it was signed. 
7 Q. Okay. So sometime in February of2006 you 
8 found out about it? 
9 A. I believe it was longer than that, but I don't 




Q. Sometime in 2006? 
A. Yes. 




A. First it was from John. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever -- when did you -- were you 
1 7 ever given the actual original Quitclaim Deed by your 
18 brother John? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Did your father ever give you the Quitclaim 
21 when your father and Thelma and you were present, did your 21 Deed? 
2 2 father make any mention that he had entered into any kind 22 
23 of contract with Thelma about the property, or about the 23 
24 wills? 24 
25 MS. RAINEY: Objection, misstates evidence. 25 
A. No. 
Q. SO was it ever in your possession? 
A. Kind of 
Q. Could you explain. 
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A. And the file was at my brother's house. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And it had been at my house. And then it 
6 was -- he had it. 
7 Q. Okay. So it was in your brother's possession? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. All right. You never asked your brother for it 
10 while your father was living? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Okay. And my understanding is it was -- it 
13 bears a recording date of March 5, 2008; is that right? 
14 It's right down here. 
15 A. March -- yes. 
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1 Q. Well, that's normal. Okay. Is it fair to say 
2 that when this Quitclaim Deed was signed, there was no 
3 money changing hand between you and your father? 
4 A. That's correct. 
5 Q. Okay. You didn't make any payment to him to 
6 get this deed, correct? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. And the monies that are referred to on 
9 Exhibit 4, the value of work that you did on the farm, did 
1 0 you provide this work with the expectation that you would 
11 get the farm? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Okay. So did you have an agreement with your 
14 father that in exchange for doing this work you're going 
15 to give me this farm? 
16 Q. And your father died two days earlier, March 3, 16 A. Yes. 
17 2008? 
A. Correct. 18 
19 Q. Okay. So it was recorded two days after your 





Q. Did you take it in for recording? 
A. No. 
24 Q. Do you know whether your brother John did? 
25 A. Yes, I believe it was him. 
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1 Q. Okay. Do you think -- do you have an opinion 
2 as to whether or not in 2006 when your father signed this 
3 Quitclaim Deed, that he had the ability to think clearly 
4 and make up his own mind about important decisions? 
5 A. Yes, I believe it. 
6 Q. Okay. At that time, was he still handling the 
7 horse racing business? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Okay. When was the -- when did he quit doing 
1 0 the horse racing business? 
11 A. I believe it was in about -- I'm not sure. 
12 Q. A couple years earlier? 
13 
14 
A. A couple years earlier. 
Q. All right. Was your father -- in 2006, did 
15 your -- were you acquainted with your father's mental and 
1 6 physical condition? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. How would you describe it? 
1 9 A. He was still -- mentally, he was still good. 
20 Physically, he was -- his legs was giving him problems and 
21 stuff. 
22 Q. Okay. 
2 3 A. He couldn't travel. 
24 Q. Okay. 
25 A. Or as well -- as well as a 40-year-old. 
17 
18 




Q. Was it a verbal agreement with your dad? 
A. Yes. 
21 Q. Okay. And do you know when you entered into 
22 that agreement? 
23 A. Probably around 1990. 
2 4 Q. Okay . Would you characterize that as a firm· 
2 5 agreement, or kind of a loose understanding that you had 
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1 between you and your dad, or something else? 
2 A. I'd say it was a firm understanding. 
3 Q. Okay. But he didn't set a specific price, I 
4 want this much in exchange for this property? Did you 
5 agree on a price? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Okay. When this deed was -- well, you didn't 
8 have this deed prepared. Did you ever meet with your 
9 father at an attorney's office to discuss the transfer of 
10 the property to you? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. In the answer to interrogatory number five you 
13 said that there was an appointment made at the Deford Law 
14 Office in Nampa? 
15 A. That's correct. 
16 Q. And was your father -- were the Defords 
1 7 representing your father in any other matters? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Were they representing you in any matters? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. John? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Did any of you have any prior relationship with 
2 4 the Defords -- Deford Law Office? 
25 A. No. 
(208)345-9611 
14 (Pages 50 to 53) 
M & M COURT REPORTING (208)345-8800 (fax) 
0001.82 1 b1 b20ca-81 bd-44c5-ae91-c62bdc36e3d9 
Page 54 




A. The recommendation? 
Q. Yes. 
5 A. Was made -- Dr. Kerrick -- or attorney--
6 Kerrick's Law Office. 
7 Q. Okay. 
8 A. I called him when he come -- when he approached 
9 me to sign the property -- or I called Kerrick and he said 
10 he was too busy. So he recommended this Deford gal. 
11 Q. Okay. So you made the appointment? 
12 A. I made the appointment. 
13 Q. Okay. As it turns out, nobody saw an attorney 
1 4 to have a deed prepared? 
15 A. This is correct. 
16 Q. Okay. And when this deed was prepared, you 
17 didn't discuss -- when you had the conversation in 2006 
18 that resulted in the deed being prepared, you didn't 
1 9 discuss that with Thelma, correct? 
2 0 A. Correct. 
21 Q. And to your knowledge, did John discuss it with 
22 Thelma? 
23 A. Not to my knowledge. 
24 Q. And do you know whether Alva discussed it with 
25 Thelma? 
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1 A. I do not know. 
2 Q. Okay. So as far as you know, Thelma didn't 
3 consent to Alva signing this deed as far as you know? 
4 A. That's correct. 
5 Q. Okay. Now, when you became aware of the fact 
6 that the -- that this deed had been signed, which was 
7 sometime in 2006, you didn't ask Alva and Thelma to move 
8 out of the farm property, right? 
9 A. That's correct. 
10 Q. And you continued to pay rent for farming the 
11 property through 2007; isn't that right? 
12 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. And you didn't collect any rent from either 
1 4 Thelma or Alva for their continued possession of the farm, 
15 correct? 
16 A. That's correct. 
17 Q. Would you agree with me that you felt that as 
18 long as Alva was living he was entitled to continue to 
19 treat the land as his own regardless of this deed being in 
20 existence? 
2 1 A. Yes, I guess. 
22 Q. Okay. I mean, you weren't trying to take 
23 Alva's property, you were trying to keep Thelma from 
2 4 getting this 24 acres when Alva died; is that fair? 
25 MS. RAINEY: Object to form. 
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1 MR. TROUPIS: I mean, if that's your 
2 understanding. Well, I'll withdraw the question. It's a 
3 little bit argumentative. 
4 Q. (BY MR. TROUPIS) Okay. Did you ever get a 
5 chance -- you said that you saw this Contract For Wills, 
6 which was Exhibit 2, in January of 2008, a couple months 
7 before your father died. And attached to it as exhibits 
8 are wills. They're not the signed ones, but they're a 
9 form of the will of Alva Garrett and Thelma Garrett. Did 
1 0 you read through that before -- or when you saw the 
11 document, if you remember? 
12 A. I only seen part of the document. 
13 Q. Okay. 
14 A. And that was my father's -- just my father's 
15 will. 
16 Q. Okay. 
1 7 A. I never seen the Contract Of Wills till -- or 
18 let's see -- till it came out in litigation. 
19 Q. Okay. Well, my question then is, in looking at 
20 Alva's will -- and this is the 1995 will -- this will in 
2 1 paragraph 6 -- well, in paragraph fifth it says that 
22 everything at the time of his death goes to his wife 
2 3 Thelma. And then in paragraph 6 it says: In the event 
2 4 that Thelma predeceases or dies as a result of a common 
2 5 accident, everything appears to go to all seven children 
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1 in equal shares. Do you see that? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And my question is -- a couple of questions. 
4 First, do you know of any reason that Alva would give you 
5 the property in the Quitclaim Deed that in his earlier 
6 will he said he wanted to divide up among all seven of his 
7 children -- seven children equally, that is, Thelma's 
8 children and his children? Do you know of any reason that 
9 Alva would make that distribution? 
10 MS. RAINEY: Object to form. 
11 MR. TROUPIS: Just asking for your knowledge, 
12 if you have any, from whatever source. 
13 THE WITNESS: I don't really have any knowledge 
14 of it. 
15 Q. (BY MR. TROUPIS) Did Alva ever explain to 
16 you -- or did he ever talk about what his earlier will 
17 said? 
18 A. He never talked to me about the will. 
19 Q. Okay. Do you know whether Alva was estranged 
20 from any of these seven children? I mean, did he have a 
2 1 bad relationship with any of the other -- your other 
22 siblings, or Thelma's children? 
2 3 A. I know he had a problem with Garrett a time or 
24 two. 
25 Q. Okay. Anything else -- any ofthe others? 
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1 A. I don't believe the others. 
2 MR. TROUPIS: Okay. Okey-doke. I don't have 
3 any further questions. I would like you to take a look 
4 through your file, and if you have other documents that 
5 show payments, or that we talked about earlier that you'd 
6 like to supplement your response with, if you could do 
7 that, I'd appreciate that, and otherwise, I have no other 
8 questions. Do you have any? 
9 MS. RAINEY: I don't have any questions for 
10 him. 
11 MR. TROUPIS: Very good. 
12 (The deposition was concluded at 2:15 p.m.) 
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Alva and Thelma Garrett were married in 1976. They remained 
married for 32 years, until Alva's death on March 3, 2008. Affidavit of Christ T. 
Troupis ("Troupis Aff."), Ex. A.(Deposition of Thelma V. Garrett, May 5, 2010 
("Thelma Depo.") at 25:5-7; 4:9 - 5:1. 
2. Thelma Garrett and Alva Garrett were both married prior to their 
marriage to each other. Each of them had children of a prior marriage. Alva had four 
DefendantiCounterclaimant's Memorandum 
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children from a prior marriage, and Thelma had three children from her prior 
marriage. Troupis Aff., Ex A (Thelma Depo at 6:13-15; 7:6-12; 9:14-22). 
3. The members of the combined family had a normal and cordial step-
family relationship. Troupis Aff., Ex A (Thelma Depo at 49:22 - 50: 11). 
4. At the time that Alva and Thelma were married, Alva held title to 
three significant parcels of real property: (1) the Middleton property, comprised at 
that time of approximately 80 acres (the subject real property in this action); (2) the 
Willow Creek property, comprised of between 640 - 2000 acres; and (3) the Round 
Valley property, consisting of 80-1 00 acres. He owned all of these properties free 
and clear. Troupis Aff., Ex A (Thelma Depo at 16:20 - 17:21); Troupis Aff., Ex B 
(Deposition of Jack Garrett, May 5, 2010 ("Jack Depo.") at 19:21 - 20:12). 
5. Alva and Thelma lived in a home on the Middleton property during 
their entire 32 year marriage, and Thelma continues to reside there. Troupis Aff., Ex 
A (Thelma Depo at 4:9 - 5:1). 
6. Prior to 1990, Alva entered into business transactions with his son 
John Garrett, who was a real estate broker, with respect to the Willow Creek and 
Round Valley properties. John Garrett traded Alva's Willow Creek property for an 
interest in a motel in Rexburg. John ran the motel which was eventually lost through 
foreclosure. Troupis Aff., Ex A (Thelma Depo at 18:9 - 22:23); Troupis Aff., Ex B 
("Jack Depo.") at 20:13 - 24:13). 
7. Prior to 1990, John subdivided Alva's Round Valley property into 
residential lots. Alva conveyed four five-acre parcels to each of his four children, 
DefendantiCounterclaimant's Memorandum 
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John, Jack. Eleanor, and Marilyn. John sold the remaining 60 subdivided acres. 
Troupis Aff., Ex B ("Jack Depo.") at 23:1 - 12). 
8. John took some of the Round Valley lots as payment for his 
development work. Troupis Aff., Ex A (Thelma Depo at 20:25 - 21 :3); 
9. In 1990, following his various business transactions with John 
Garrett, Alva Garrett had borrowed on the Middleton property. He was unable to 
make his payments and threatened with foreclosure. Troupis Aff., Ex A (Thelma 
Depo at 21 :25 - 22:23). 
10. In order to pay off his debts, Alva sold approximately 53 acres of the 
Middleton property, leaving the 26 2/3 acres that are the subject of this lawsuit. 
Troupis Aff., Ex A (Thelma Depo at 21 :25 - 22:23). 
11. On June 20, 1990, after selling a portion of the Middleton property, 
Alva deeded the remaining property to himself and his wife, Thelma. Troupis Aff., 
Ex A (Thelma Depo at 32: 1 - 32:20); Rainey Aff. Ex. C. 
12. Alva deeded the remaining Middleton property to himself and 
Thelma because he was afraid that John might talk him into doing something with it 
and they would lose the little property they had left. Troupis Aff., Ex A (Thelma 
Depo.,32:1-20). 
13. When Alva deeded the Middleton property to himself and his wife, 
Thelma, in 1990, he intended to change the property from separate to community 
property. Troupis Aff., Ex A (Thelma Depo., 40:3-41 :2). 
14. In 1995, Alva and Thelma entered into a contract for wills and 
executed wills containing mutual provisions leaving their entire estate to the 
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surviving spouse, and upon the death of the survivor, in equal shares to all seven (7) 
children of their combined family. At the time that these instruments were executed, 
the only real property owned by Alva and Thelma was the remaining 26 2/3 acres of 
the Middleton property. Troupis Aff., Ex A (Thelma Depo., 35:4-36:24). 
15. On February 14,2006, Alva executed a quitclaim deed purportedly 
conveying his interest in the Middleton property to his son, Jack Garrett. Rainey 
Aff., Ex. E. 
16. Jack had a conversation with his father, Alva, that resulted in the 
preparation of the quitclaim deed. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 54:6-20). 
17. Jack made an appointment at the Deford Law Office for his father 
Alva to sign the quitclaim deed, but the appointment was not kep. Troupis Aff., Ex 
B (Jack Depo., 53:12 - 54:14). 
18. In addition to renting the farm from his father, Jack was involved in 
business with his father training and racing horses. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 
28:16- 30:20; 39:1-12). 
19. Alva had trust and confidence in both of his sons, John and Jack, 
with respect to his financial affairs. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 27:18-28:1; 
39:13-40:3). 
20. The quitclaim deed that Alva signed was prepared by Alva's son, 
John Garrett. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 48: 18 -20). 
21. Jack did not provide Alva any present consideration for the quitclaim 
deed. He claimed he had an agreement to receive the farm in exchange for past work 
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he did for him in 1990, although there was no written agreement and they never 
agreed on a price. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 52: I - 53:6). 
22. As early as 2000, Jack Garrett knew that the property was titled in 
the names of both Alva and Thelma. Troupis Aff., Ex. B, (Jack's Depo., 40:14-
41: 19) 
23. Neither Jack nor John Garrett discussed Alva's execution ofthe 
quitclaim deed with Thelma, and she did not consent to Alva's execution of the 
quitclaim deed. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 54:16 - 55:4). 
24. Thelma Garrett did not have any knowledge of the quitclaim deed 
until after it was recorded after Alva died. Troupis Aff., Ex A (Thelma Depo., 48:14 
23; 52:17-22). 
25. Jack Garrett never took possession of the quitclaim deed while Alva 
Garrett was living. John Garrett kept the deed in a file at his home. Troupis Aff., Ex 
B (Jack Depo., 49: 16 - 50: 11). 
26. Jack Garrett did not take possession of the Middleton property after 
Alva executed the quitclaim deed. Troupis Mf., Ex B (Jack Depo., 55:5 -10). 
27. After Alva executed the quitclaim deed, Jack continued to pay Alva 
and Thelma annual rent in October for farming the Middleton property. He made 
these payments in October, 2006 and October, 2007. Alva died in March, 2008. 
Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 37:21 - 39:4). 
28. Jack never collected rent from either Thelma or Alva for their 
continued possession of the Middleton property. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 
55:13 -16). 
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29. The quitclaim deed from Alva to Jack was not recorded until March 
5,2008, two days after Alva's death. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 50:12 - 21). 
30. Jack did not record the quitclaim deed. John Garrett took the deed in 
for recording. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 50:22 - 25). 
31. Jack felt that as long as Alva was living he was entitled to continue to 
treat the Middleton property as his own notwithstanding the quitclaim deed. Troupis 
Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 55:17 - 21). 
32. In a conversation with Jack about the property, Alva told him he 
would deed 24 acres to Jack, with Alva and Thelma retaining a life estate in the 
property. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 43:21 - 44:24). 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment is appropriate where the record shows no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
oflaw. LR.C.P. 56(c). The principal purpose of the summary judgment rule is to 
isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims. Sparks v. St. Luke's Regional 
Medical Center, 115 Idaho 505, 768 P.2d 768 (1988). Once a moving party submits 
evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party to come forward with its own evidence to show that there is a 
genuine issue as to a material fact. LR.C.P. 56( e ) "[A] mere scintilla of evidence or 
only slight doubt as to the facts" is not sufficient to create a genuine issue for 
purposes of summary judgment. Harpole v. State, 131 Idaho 437, 439,958 P.2d 594, 
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596 (1998). The nonmoving party "must respond to the summary judgment motion 
with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Samuel v. Hepworth, 
Nungester, and Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 87,996 P.2d 303 (2000). The 
nonmoving party "must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of 
material fact exists to withstand summary judgment." Jenkins v. Boise Cascade, 141 
Idaho 233, 238, 108 P.3d 380,385 (2005); Blickenstaffv. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 
577,97 P.3d 439,444 (2004). "Summary judgment is appropriate where a 
nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to its case when it bears the burden of proof." Id. 
B. Alva and Thelma held title to the Middleton Property as 
Community Property. 
I.C. § 32-903 provides that: "(1) All other property acquired after marriage 
by either husband or wife is community property." The conveyance of real 
property during marriage from one spouse to both spouses constitutes the 
acquisition of property by one of the spouses during the marriage and transmutes 
the property from separate to community property. On June 20, 1990, Alva 
Garrett quitclaimed his interest in the Middleton property to himself and his wife, 
Thelma Garrett. Thelma Garrett acquired her interest in the property during the 
marriage. 
In Dunagan v. Dunagan, 147 Idaho 599, 213 P.3d 384 (2009), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that when Kelly Dunagan (Kircher) and her husband Chris 
Dunagan kept all of their finances and property separate during their marriage. 
However, the bank required Kircher to quitclaim her interest in her home as a 
condition of refinancing. In the subsequent divorce proceeding, the Court ruled 
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that the house had become part of the marital community by Kircher's quitclaim 
deed. Kircher argued that the only reason she executed the quitclaim deed was to 
comply with the bank's financing condition. Dunagan argued that "when Kircher 
executed the quitclaim deed, she transmuted the house from separate to 
community property; the transmutation complied with the statutory requirements 
of the Idaho Code and therefore the district court properly affirmed the 
magistrate's decision to treat the house as an asset of the community rather than 
as Kircher's separate property." 
The Idaho Supreme Court cited I.C. §32-906 noting: 
"All property that is acquired after marriage by either husband or wife is 
community property, including property that is owned separately by one 
spouse who then deeds such property to the marital community." Id at 
387. 
The Court further noted that: 
"Here the deed is unambiguous and transmuted Kircher's separate 
property to community property ... " Id at 388. 
In his motion for summary judgment, Jack Garrett admits that a husband or 
wife may transmute property from separate to community at any time during the 
marriage, so long as they conform with statutory formalities in doing so, citing Reed 
v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 59,44 P.3d 1108 (2002). The deed from Alva to Thelma and 
Alva did comply with all statutory formalities for such a conveyance. It described 
the real property, named the grantor and grantees, was signed, notarized and 
recorded in the County in which the property was situated. 
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The Plaintiff argues erroneously that the only means of transmuting separate 
property to community property is by execution of a formal marriage settlement agreement. 
The statute he cites, I.e. §32-916, does not support his argument. It states: 
The property rights of husband and wife are governed by this chapter, unless 
there is a marriage settlement agreement entered into during marriage 
containing stipulations contrary thereto. (emphasis added) 
Alva and Thelma did not have a marriage settlement agreement. 
Therefore, their rights are governed by the provisions of Title 32, Chapter 9, 
Idaho Code, and as set out above, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a deed 
from one spouse of his separate property to both spouses during the marriage 
transmutes that property to community. IC §32-906. Moreover, the quitclaim deed 
executed by Alva would satisfy the formality requirements for a marital 
settlement agreement. Those requirements were listed in Reed v. Reed, supra, at 
59: 
The formalities required of a valid marriage settlement are that it be in 
writing, that it be executed and acknowledged in the same manner as 
conveyances ofland, and if it affects real property, that it be recorded in 
the county in which any affected real property is located. I.C. §§ 32-917 
and 32-918. 
In his summary judgment motion, Jack Garrett also incorrectly asserts that 
I.e. §32-906(2) creates a presumption that Alva's deed to himself and Thelma 
created a separate estate in each of them. That is a clear misreading of the statute, 
which applies only to a deed from one spouse to the other, and not a deed from one 
spouse to both spouses. It states: 
"2) Property conveyed by one spouse to the other shall be presumed to be the 
sole and separate estate of the grantee and only the grantor spouse need execute 
and acknowledge the deed or other instrument of conveyance notwithstanding the 
provisions of section 32-912, Idaho Code;" (emphasis added) 
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Alva did not convey his property from himself to Thelma as her sole and separate 
property. He did not divest himself of his interest in the property. Instead, he conveyed 
his property to himself and Thelma, his wife. 
Mr. Garrett's contention that the "default rules" in Title 55 govern this 
conveyance conflicts with I.e. §32-916, which provides that the property rights of a 
husband and wife are governed by that chapter. Moreover, I.C. §55-104 specifically 
excludes property acquired as community property from the presumption of a tenancy in 
common. It states: 
"Every interest created in favor of several persons in their own right is an interest 
in common ... unless acquired as community property." 
Mr. Garrett's arguments also ignore the additional evidence in the record 
that the conveyance was intended to create community property. The only 
evidence in the record about this conveyance apart from the deed itself is Thelma 
Garrett's testimony. She testified that her husband intended by this conveyance to 
change this property from separate to community. Troupis Aff., Ex A (Thelma 
Depo., 40:3-41 :2). 
She also testified that Alva intended to provide her with a community 
interest in the property so that she would be protected from the influence of John 
Garrett on Alva to deed away the property. Troupis Aff., Ex A (Thelma Depo., 
32:1-20). 
The specific provisions ofIdaho's Community Property law govern this 
conveyance. Alva intended to create a community interest in his real property by 
conveying it to himself and his wife during their marriage. 
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C. Alva's purported conveyance of his interest in community property 
is void because it was in violation ofIC §32-912. 
I.C. §32-912 states: 
"Either the husband or the wife shall have the right to manage and control the 
community property, and either may bind the community property by contract, 
except that neither the husband nor wife may sell, conveyor encumber the 
community real estate unless the other joins in executing the sale agreement, deed 
or other instrument of conveyance by which the real estate is sold, conveyed or 
encumbered, ... " 
The Court declared in Lovelass v. Sword, 140 Idaho 105,90 P.3d 330, 333 (Idaho 
2004): 
"I.C. §32-912 provides the general rule that an attempted conveyance of 
community real estate by one spouse, without the written consent of the other, is 
void. See I.C. § 32-912; Fuchs v. Lloyd, 80 Idaho 114, 120,326 P.2d 381, 384 
(1958) (citations omitted)." 
As early as 2000, Jack Garrett knew that the property was titled in the names of 
both Alva and Thelma. Troupis Aff., Ex. B, (Jack's Depo., 40:14 - 41: 19) Thelma 
Garrett did not consent to Alva's conveyance to Jack of his interest in the Middleton 
property. No one even talked to her about it, and Jack admitted that when it was 
discussed on prior occasions, she wouldn't consent to it. Troupis Aff. Ex. B, ("Jack's 
Depo., 44:25 - 45:1). 
D. Both Jack and John were in a confidential relationship with Alva when 
he executed the quitclaim deed, and therefore must prove clearly and 
unequivocally that he intended a complete inter vivos gift of his property. 
Jack testified that both he and his brother John had business relationships with 
their father, Alva, and that Alva reposed trust and confidence in both of them with respect 
to financial decisions. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 27:18-28:1; 39:13-40:3). John was a 
real estate broker and was involved in extensive transactions with Alva resulting in the loss 
of all of his real estate holdings except a portion of his homestead property. In fact, to 
DefendantiCounterc1aimant's Memorandum 
In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
000195 
11 
protect this last property from John's influence, Alva deeded it into the names of himself 
and his wife, Thelma. 
In Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 240 P.2d 833, 840, (1952) this court said: 
"A fiduciary relationship does not depend upon some technical relation created by 
or defined in law, but it exists in cases where there has been a special confidence 
imposed in another who, in equity and good conscience, is bound to act in good 
faith and with due regard to the interest of one reposing the confidence." 
Jack and John were fiduciaries with respect to their father's execution of a 
quitclaim deed to Jack. Therefore, as the Court declared in Claunch v. Whyte, 73 Idaho 
243,249,249 P.2d 915, 917 (Idaho 1952): 
" ... where the gift is to executrices who are shown to be fiduciaries the burden of 
proof is upon such donees to clearly and unequivocally prove a gift in the first 
instance, and to so prove it that there would be no uncertainty as to the intent (and 
other requisite concomitants) on the part of the donor nor any question of undue 
influence exerted by the donee upon or over the donor or advantage taken of the 
confidential relationship existing between the parties.' In re Estate of Randall, 64 
Idaho 629, at page 640, 132 P.2d 763, 768, 135 P.2d 299. 
And in Blake v. Blake, 69 Idaho 214, 205 P.2d 495, 498, where the 
respondents were found to be fiduciaries, it was said: 
' ... the burden of proof was on respondents to prove a gift or transfer of appellant's 
one-sixth share in the estate to Mrs. Jessie M. Blake by clear, satisfactory, 
convincing and unequivocal evidence. '" 
In his summary judgment motion, Jack Garrett argues that he did not have the 
ability to exert undue influence over Alva, and that there are no indicia of fraud or undue 
influence in the facts of the conveyance. But we only know Jack's story as to how this 
transpired. Moreover, we have circumstantial evidence to support the inference of undue 
influence. This includes the fact that Jack and his brother John willfully concealed the 
existence of the deed from Thelma until after Alva died. Jack continued to rent the fann 
from Alva and Thelma until it was safe to record the deed once Alva passed away and 
was no longer able to cancel it. In addition, John had a long history of real estate and 
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financial transactions with Alva, all of which resulted in financial gains for John and 
disastrous losses for Alva. Jack was involved in financial dealings with his father as well. 
John also prepared the deed. He had Alva execute it secretly, without the advice of an 
attorney, or the counsel of his wife. Jack said he made an appointment with an attorney to 
have a deed executed, but that appointment was never kept or rescheduled. Although Jack 
claims that he didn't personally oversee the preparation and execution of the deed, he did 
attempt to procure it by making an appointment for Alva to meet with an attorney. He 
also attempted to obtain such a deed over the course of many years. He spoke to Alva 
about it repeatedly from 1990 through 2006. 
In 2000, Jack had John obtain title information on the Middleton property, 
ostensibly so that he would have the legal description to prepare a deed for his father to 
sign. In the process, he learned that Alva and Thelma held title to the property together. 
Jack knew that Alva and Thelma were happily married for many years, and that John had 
dissipated all of his father's other assets by convincing him to give John control over his 
other real estate holdings. Jack also knew that Thelma objected to transfer of the 
property. Notwithstanding all of these facts, Jack allowed and facilitated John's actions in 
obtaining a deed and then concealing its existence from his step-mother. Jack may have 
allowed John to obtain the deed and keep it in his file rather than give it to Jack during 
his father's life precisely in order to distance himself from a questionable transaction that 
he knew would result in a dispute following his father's death. 
These facts raise serious questions as to the fairness of the transaction and 
whether it was the product of undue influence. It is Jack's burden to dispel all of the 
questions and doubts by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. He could have met 
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this burden ifthe issue had been raised during Alva's life. That was entirely within John 
and Jack's control since they alone knew of the existence of the deed. This could have 
been sorted out with Alva able to support or disaffirm the conveyance. But Jack and John 
chose to wait until after Alva died to reveal the conveyance, perhaps because they knew 
he would disavow it. Now, since Alva's testimony is no longer available, Jack cannot 
sustain his evidentiary burden to overcome the presumption of undue influence, and the 
deed must be set aside. This burden was discussed in Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571,575, 
759 Pold 77 (Idaho App. 1988): 
"If a grantor is unduly influenced, he or she does not have the requisite intent to 
execute a deed. The deed is voidable. See generally 23 AM.JURolD, Deeds § 203 
(1983). A prima facie case of undue influence consists of four elements: (1) a 
grantor who is subject to influence; (2) an opportunity to exert undue influence; 
(3) a disposition to exert undue influence; and (4) a result indicating undue 
influence. Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho 1,592 P.2d 57 (1979). Whether improper 
influence has been exercised must usually be inferred from circumstantial 
evidence. Id. Factors to be considered include the age and physical and mental 
condition of the grantor, whether he or she received disinterested advice in the 
transaction, the providence or improvidence of the decision, the amount or 
adequacy of consideration for any contract made, distress of the person 
influenced, his or her predisposition to make the transfer in question, the extent of 
the transfer in relation to his or her whole worth, failure to provide for one's 
children in the event of a transfer, active solicitation by the grantee, and the 
relationship of the parties. Id. 
Normally, the party asserting that a deed was procured by means of undue 
influence has the burden of proving such influence. McNabb v. Brewster, 75 
Idaho 313, 272 P.2d 298 (1954). However, if the person alleging undue influence 
can first produce evidence that the parties to the transaction occupied a 
confidential relationship, and that the grantee was the dominant spirit in the 
transfer, a rebuttable presumption of undue influence arises, which the proponent 
of the transaction must refute. Bongiovi v. Jamison, 110 Idaho 734, 718 Pold 1172 
(1986). This principle is consonant with the general rule regarding presumptions 
enunciated in LR.E. 301." 
There are sufficient facts surrounding Alva's execution of the quitclaim deed to 
raise an inference of undue influence against Jack Garrett. 
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E. The quitclaim deed is void because it was an incomplete inter vivos gift. 
In 2006, Alva Garrett executed a quitclaim deed to his son, Jack Garrett. No 
consideration was given for the deed. According to Jack, Alva wanted him to have this 
property when he died. Troupis Aff., Ex B, ("Jack's Depo., 44: 11 - 44:24). Jack believed 
that when Alva executed the quitclaim deed in 2006, he intended for it to take effect only 
when he died. Troupis Aff., Ex B, ("Jack's Depo., 55:17 - 21). 
Five elements must be present in order for a valid inter vivos gift to exist. These 
were set out in Estate of Lewis 97 Idaho 299,302,543 P.2d 852 (Idaho 1975): 
(1978): 
"The essential elements of a 'gift inter vivos' are: (1) A donor competent to 
contract; (2) freedom of will of donor; (3) the gift must be complete and nothing 
left undone; (4) the property must be delivered by the donor and accepted by the 
donee; (5) the gift must go into immediate and absolute effect.' 
Elements (4) and (5) are missing in the present case. 
(4) delivery and acceptance of the property: 
As the Court held in Estate o/Courtright, 99 Idaho 575, 579, 586 P.2d 265,269 
This court has consistently held that in order for a deed to be adequately delivered 
it must be voluntarily "surrendered" by the grantor, Bowers v. Cottrell, 15 Idaho 
221, 96 P. 936 (1908), with an intent to pass immediate and present title. Hartley 
v. Stibor, 96 Idaho 157,525 P.2d 352 (1974); Williams v. Williams, 82 Idaho 451, 
354 P.2d 747 (1960); Brett v. Dooley, 80 Idaho 237, 327 P.2d 355 (1958); 
Claunch v. Whyte, 73 Idaho 243, 249 P.2d 915 (1952); Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 68 
Idaho 470, 199 P.2d 264 (1948). This intent is indispensable to valid delivery. Id." 
The property was not delivered to and accepted by Jack. In fact, he admits that he 
never received the quitclaim deed while Alva was alive. John procured the deed from his 
father and kept it in his file at his horne until after Alva died in 2008. At that time, John 
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had it recorded. The deed was never delivered to Jack and was not recorded until after 
Alva died. 
(5) the gift must go into immediate and absolute effect. 
Neither Alva nor Jack intended that the purported gift of Alva's interest in the 
Middleton real property go into effect until Alva died. Jack's testimony and his actions 
confirm this fact overwhelmingly. These undisputed facts include the following: 
1. Jack Garrett did not take possession of the Middleton property after Alva 
executed the quitclaim deed. Alva and Thelma continued to live on the 
property. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 55:5 - 10). 
2. After Alva executed the quitclaim deed, Jack continued to pay Alva and 
Thelma annual rent in October for farming the Middleton property. He 
made these payments in October, 2006 and October, 2007. Alva died in 
March, 2008. Troupis Afl, Ex B (Jack Depo., 37:21 - 39:4). 
3. Jack never collected rent from either Thelma or Alva for their continued 
possession of the Middleton property. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 
55:13 - 16). 
4. During Alva's life, Jack never told Thelma about the existence of the 
quitclaim deed. Troupis Aff., Ex A (Thelma Depo., 48:14 23; 52:17-22). 
5. The quitclaim deed from Alva to Jack was not recorded until March 5, 
2008, two days after Alva's death. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 50:12 
-21). 
6. Jack did not record the quitclaim deed. John Garrett took the deed in for 
recording. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 50:22 - 25). 
7. Jack felt that as long as Alva was living he was entitled to continue to 
treat the Middleton property as his own notwithstanding the quitclaim 
deed. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 55:17 - 21). 
8. In a conversation with Jack about the property, Alva told him he would 
deed 24 acres to Jack, with Alva and Thelma retaining a life estate in the 
property. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 43:21 - 44:24). 
The Court held in Claunch v. Whyte, 73 Idaho 243,249-250, 249 P.2d 915, 917 
(Idaho 1952): 
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This court has held that 'The intention of the parties, particularly the grantor, is an 
essential and controlling element of delivery of a deed. It has been called 'the 
essence of delivery". Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 68 Idaho 470, 199 P.2d 264, 266. 
This is the generally accepted rule. Flynn v. Flynn, 17 Idaho 147, 104 P. 1030; In 
re McConkey's Estate, 33 Cal.App.2d 554, 92 P.2d 456; Dinneen v. Younger, 57 
Cal.App.2d 200, 134 P.2d 323; Huth v. Katz, 30 Ca1.2d 605, 184 P.2d 521; 
Szekeres v. Reed, 96 Cal.App.2d 348, 215 P.2d 522; Seibert v. Seibert, 379 Ill. 
470, 41 N.E.2d 544, 141 A.L.R. 299, note 305; 56 A.L.R. note 746; 16 Am.Jur., 
Deeds, § 115." 
"Manual delivery of a deed by the grantor to the grantee with the understanding 
that it is not to become effective until the death of the grantor is not such a 
delivery as will pass the title. Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, supra; Zimmerman v. 
Fawkes, 70 Idaho 389, 219 P.2d 951; Counter v. Counter, 104 Cal.App.2d 786, 
232 P.2d 551; Cavett v. Pettigrew, 182 Ark. 806, 32 S.W.2d 808; Basket v. 
Hassell, 107 U.S. 602, 2 S.Ct. 415, 27 L.Ed. 500." 
In addition, because the grantee in Claunch was in a confidential relationship with 
the grantor, the Court stated: 
"The gi-antee stood in a confidential relationship to the grantor. Hence, the finding 
must be supported by 'clear, satisfactory, convincing and unequivocal evidence' 
that the deed was delivered with the present intention on the part of the grantor to 
divest herself of the title and transfer it irrevocably to the grantee. 
Actual transfer ofthe possession of the subject of the gift is an important and 
often controlling factor in establishing the intent of the donor. Maynard v. Taylor, 
185 Okl. 268, 91 P.2d 649; Johnson v. Hilliard, 113 Colo. 548, 160 P.2d 386; 
Yarbrough v. Bellamy, 197 Okl. 493, 172 P.2d 801; In re Hamilton's Estate, 26 
Wash.2d363, 174 P.2d 301; Gulleyv. Christian, 198 Okl. 167, 176P.2d812; 
Stenwall v. Bergstrom, 405 Ill. 281,90 N.E.2d 778; Cavett v. Pettigrew, 182 Ark. 
806,32 S.W.2d 808; 129 A.L.R., note 35; 16 Am.Jur., Deeds, §§ 132, 133. Here 
the respondents, being in possession of the property as tenants, continued to attorn 
to the donor and on their own volition terminated the relationship and 
relinquished possession of the property before recording the deed or by any other 
word or act asserting their claimed title. Nor did they during the year 1950 claim 
any right to control the property or any of the proceeds therefrom. So far as the 
record shows, both parties continued to treat the land as the property of the 
plaintiff until February, 1950. 
The clear weight of the evidence is against the finding. It follows that the 
finding is not supported by the evidence and will not support the judgment. 
The judgment is reversed with directions to cancel the deed and quiet title 
in the plaintiff." 
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F. If the quitclaim deed was an attempted testamentary devise, it should be 
declared void because it violates the terms of Alva's Contract for Wills. 
In 1995, Alva and Thelma Garrett entered into a Contract for Wills and executed 
wills with mutual provisions disposing of all of their property first to the surviving 
spouse, and thereafter, in equal shares to all seven (7) children of their combined family. 
A contract to make a mutual will is enforceable. Ohms v. Church of Nazarene, 64 Idaho 
262, 130 P.2d 679 (Idaho 1942) 
As noted above, the quitclaim deed was not an enforceable inter vivos transfer 
and it should be cancelled by this Court pursuant to its equitable jurisdiction over the real 
property. But if the Court finds that it was intended to be a testamentary devise, it clearly 
violated the contract between Alva and Thelma to dispose of their combined estate 
through their mutual wills. The Court has the equitable power to set aside the instrument 
in that event. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set out above, DefendantiCounterclaimant Thelma Garrett's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted and PlaintiffiCounterdefendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. 
Dated: May 17,2010 TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, P .A. 
{!h/1}-= 
Christ T. Troupi 
Attorney for DefendantiCounterclaimant 
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COMES NOW Plaintif£'Counterdefendant Jack L. Garrett ("Jack"), by and 
through undersigned counsel of record, and hereby files this combined reply memorandum in 
support of Jack L. Garrett's motion for summary judgment and in opposition to Thelma V. 
Garrett's motion for summary judgment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In response to Jack's motion for summary judgment, defendantlcounterclaimant 
Thelma V. Garrett ("Thelma") has brought her own motion for summary judgment on the 
grounds that (i) Thelma and Alva Garrett ("Alva") held title to the Middleton Property as a 
community property asset, (ii) that the Quitclaim Deed executed by Alva granting his interest in 
the Middleton Property to Jack (the "2006 Quitclaim Deed") is invalid as it was the product of 
undue influence, (iii) that the 2006 Quitclaim Deed is invalid because it constituted an 
incomplete intervivos gift, and (iv) that the 2006 Quitclaim Deed is invalid as a purported 
testamentary gift because it violated the contract for wills between Alva and Thelma. None of 
these theories invalidates the 2006 Quitclaim Deed whereby Alva conveyed his interest in the 
Middleton Property to his son, Jack. Accordingly, Thelma's motion for summary judgment 
should be denied and this Court should enter summary judgment in favor of Jack declaring that 
Jack and Thelma hold title to the property as tenants in common and appoint a referee to conduct 
an equitable partition of such property. 
II. STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS 
Jack offers the following statement of disputed facts in opposition to Thelma's 
motion for summary judgment ("Jack's SDF"): 
REPLY MEIVIORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JACK L. GARRETT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO THELMA V. 
GARRETT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 Client:16629881 
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1. In the years preceding his death, Alva spoke openly on numerous 
occasions about his desire to transfer his interest in the Middleton Property to his son, Jack 
Garrett. Affidavit of John Garrett in Support of Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's Response to 
DefendantiCounterdefendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("John Aff.") ~ 4; Affidavit of 
Christ Troupis in Support of DefendantiCounterclaimant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Troupis Aff."), Ex. B (Deposition of Jack L. Garrett, taken on May 5, 2010 ("Jack Depo."), 
45:2 - 46:13). 
2. Prior to the time Alva executed the 2006 Quitclaim Deed conveying his 
interest in the Middleton Property to Jack, Alva made representations that he already considered 
the property to belong to Jack because Jack had been farming and tending to the upkeep of the 
Middleton Property for so long. John Aff., ~ 5; Troupis Aff., Ex. B (Jack Depo., 52:1 - 53:6). 
3. Alva's intent in executing the 2006 Quitclaim Deed was to make the 
transfer of his interest in the Middleton Property to Jack official. John Aff., ~ 6. 
4. At Alva's request, John assisted Alva in the preparation of the 2006 
Quitclaim Deed. John Aff., ~ 6. 
5. Thelma was aware that Alva intended to convey his interest in the 
Middleton Property to Jack. John Aff., ~~ 7-8; Troupis Aff., Ex. B (Jack Depo. 45:2 - 46:13). 
6. Despite Thelma's objections to Alva's decision to transfer his interest in 
the Middleton Property to Jack, Alva went forward with the execution of the 2006 Quitclaim 
Deed. John Aff., ~~ 8-10. 
7. Alva delivered the 2006 Quitclaim Deed to John and placed no restrictions 
on the delivery of the quitclaim deed to Jack. John Aff., ~~ 11-13. 
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8. Alva asked that John not have the 2006 Quitclaim Deed recorded prior to 
his death because he knew that Thelma would be upset with him for having executed it. John 
Aff., ~ 11. 
9. Alva intended for the 2006 Quitclaim Deed to have immediate effect. 
John Aff., ~ 13. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Thelma and Alva Held Title to the Middleton Property as Tenants in 
Common. 
Both parties recognize that the critical question regarding whether the Middleton 
Property was held by Alva and Thelma as community property (Thelma's characterization) or as 
separate property as tenants in common (Jack's characterization) depends entirely on the effect 
of the deed whereby Alva conveyed his sole and separate property interest in the Middleton 
Property to "Alva L. Garrett and Thelma V. Garrett." It is well settled under Idaho law that the 
only two inquires relevant to this determination are (i) when the property was acquired and 
(ii) how the property was acquired. See Kraly v. Kraly, 208 P.3d 281, 285, 147 Idaho 299,303 
(2009). There are no disputed issues of material fact regarding either of these two inquires. 
1. When was the Middleton Property acquired. 
Alva acquired his interest in the Middleton Property prior to his marriage to 
Thelma. Memorandum in Support of PlaintiffiCounterdefendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Statement of Undisputed Facts ("Jack's SOF") ~ 6. Accordingly, Alva's interest in 
the property at the time of his marriage to Thelma was his sole and separate property. IDAHO 
CODE § 32-903 ("All property of either the husband or the wife owned by him or her before 
marriage ... shall remain his or her sole and separate property"). 
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Thelma acquired her interest in the Middleton Property during her marriage to 
Alva, when Alva quitclaimed the Middleton Property to himself and Thelma. Jack's SOF ~16. 
While Thelma asks this Court to stop there and declare the Middleton Property to be a 
community asset, such request ignores the rest of the story: i.e., how was the property acquired. 
2. Thelma's interest in the Middleton Property was acquired as a gift. 
The question of how property was acquired looks to whether property was 
acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent, in which case it is separate property (Idaho Code 
Section 32-903) or, if consideration was paid, what was the source of funds used to purchase the 
property_ If separate property funds were used to purchase property, then such property (though 
acquired during the marriage), will remain separate property of the spouse whose funds were 
used to purchase it. IDAHO CODE § 32-903 (" ... that which either he or she shall acquire with 
the proceeds of his or her separate property, by way of moneys or other property, shall remain 
his or her sole and separate property.") Alva's interest in the 1990 Quitclaim Deed came either 
as a gift to himself or should be considered as an interest in property acquired with the proceeds 
of his separate property. Under either characterization, Alva's interest in the 1990 Quitclaim 
Deed is properly characterized as his sole and separate property. 
The only possible characterization for how Thelma obtained her interest in the 
1990 Quitclaim Deed is that it was a gift to her from Alva. There is no statutory authority for the 
proposition that a gift from a husband to a wife changes the operation of Idaho Code 
Section 32-903. To the contrary, Idaho Code Section 32-906(2)' expressly provides that 
, This code provision was improperly cited as Idaho Code Section 32-902(2) in the 
Memorandum in Support of PlaintiffiCounterdefendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
proper reference is, and should be, 32-906(2). 
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"Property conveyed by one spouse to the other shall be presumed to be the sole and separate 
estate of the grantee .... " This is consistent with the statutory mandate in Idaho Code Section 
32-903 that provides all gifts (whether they come from a spouse or an unrelated third party) are 
properly characterized as the sole and separate property of the recipient. Accordingly, because 
Thelma acquired her interest in the 1990 Quitclaim Deed as a gift-even though such gift came 
from her husband-such interest is properly characterized as her sole and separate property. 
3. The form of the 1990 Quitclaim Deed does not control the 
characterization of the Middleton Property. 
Thelma relies heavily on the case of Dunagan v. Dunagan, 147 Idaho 599, 213 
P.3d 384 (2009), for the proposition that a deed conveying one spouse's separate property 
interest to both spouses necessarily creates a community property interest. Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant/Counterclaimant's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Thelma's Combined Brief') at 8. 
In so doing, Thelma reads too much into the Dunagan decision and overlooks statutory authority 
directly contradicting such proposition. 
First, it must be noted that the passage upon which Thelma relies is merely dicta. 
The community/separate property characterization of the residence at issue in Dunagan was 
made at the magistrate court level. It was not an issue on appeal to the district court and it was 
not an issue on appeal to the Supreme Court. Barrett v. Barrett, 2010 WL 1632871, *4 (Idaho 
S. Ct. Apr. 23, 2010) ("In Dunagan, there was no challenge on appeal to this Court from the 
determination that the execution of a quitclaim deed in favor of husband and wife during 
refinancing transmuted the wife's separate property."). Accordingly, the statement that "All 
property that is acquired after marriage by either husband or wife is community property, 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JACK L. GARRETT'S lVI0TION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO THELMA V. 
GARRETT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6 Client:1662988.1 
000209 
including property that is owned separately by one spouse who then deeds such property to the 
marital community" is dictum. Second, it must be noted that in the present case, Alva did not 
deed the property to the marital community; he deeded it to "Alva L. Garrett and Thelma V. 
Garrett." There is no express language in the deed showing that the grant was intended to create 
any interest other than that of tenants in common. Accord IDAHO CODE § 55-508 ("Every 
interest in real estate granted or devised to two (2) or more persons ... constitutes a tenancy in 
common, unless expressly declared in the grant or devise to be otherwise.") (emphasis 
added). 
If the Idaho Supreme Court had engaged in an analysis regarding whether the 
community/separate property characterization was correct, it would likely have come to the same 
conclusion, but on facts that are consistent with Idaho's statutory authority and on facts which 
are distinguishable from this case. The facts in Dunagan are similar to this case only with 
respect to the timing of the quitclaim deed: it was executed during the marriage. The similarities 
end there. 
The question of how the interest was acquired unearths materially different facts. 
In Dunagan, the husband acquired his interest in the property because the couple was refinancing 
the house, and the bank looked to the community (i.e., both the husband and the wife) for 
repayment obligations on the loan. Dunagan at 603, 213 P.3d at 388 ("The only reason that 
Dunagan has a community interest in the home is because the bank required Dunagan to be on 
the loan."). While the home was clearly the wife's separate property prior to the refinance, the 
fact that the community was obligated to repay the debt meant that the husband's interest was not 
acquired as a gift. Rather, it was acquired as a community asset because the community gave 
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good and valuable consideration (in the form of its obligation on the loan) for its interest in the 
property. Accord Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 673 P.2d 411 (1983). Conversely, in this case 
the transfer of the property from Alva L. Garrett to "Alva L. Garrett and Thelma V. Garrett" was 
not supported by any consideration and, therefore, constitutes a gift bringing the interest acquired 
squarely within the provisions of Idaho Code Sections 32-903 and 32-906(2); i.e., the sole and 
separate property of each spouse, holding their respective undivided one-half interests as tenants 
mcommon. 
The community's obligation on the note that refinanced the property gave the 
Dunagan court sufficient bases to characterize the home as a community asset (as well as the fact 
that neither party challenged that characterization on appeal). However, the Dunagan court 
could also rely on the form of the deed itself as additional evidence to support the community 
property characterization of that home. In Dunagan, the quitclaim deed identified the grantees as 
"Kelly Dunagan and Chris Dunagan, wife and husband." Id. at 600, 213 P.3d at 385. Given this 
express language, the Dunagan court had a basis to look to Idaho Code Section 55-508, which 
provides, "Every interest in real estate granted or devised to two or more persons ... constitutes a 
tenancy in common, unless expressly declared in the grant or devise to be otherwise." 
Accordingly, the quitclaim deed in Dunagan, which expressly identified the parties as "wife and 
husband" provided some basis for not treating them as tenants in common. Conversely, in this 
matter, there is no designation in the 1990 Quitclaim Deed of Alva and Thelma as husband and 
wife and there is no indication that the deed intended to create a community property interest. 
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Absent such express declaration, as required by Idaho Code Section 55-508,2 there is no basis for 
this Court to characterize the property interest created by the 1990 Quitclaim Deed as anything 
other than the interests of tenants in common, which interests were held by Alva and Thelma as 
their respective sole and separate property. 
B. Thelma Has Not Introduced Any Admissible Evidence to Support Her 
Defense of Undue Influence. 
In the First Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim 
("Thelma's Pleadings"), Thelma raised a number of equitable defenses to Jack's interest in the 
Middleton Property. These defenses included fraud, duress, undue influence, unclean hands and 
other alleged inequitable conduct. In his motion for summary judgment, Jack argued that 
Thelma did not have sufficient evidence to support any of these equitable defenses. In her 
opposition, Thelma argues only that the 2006 Quitclaim Deed is a product of undue influence, 
apparently abandoning her other equitable defenses. Accordingly, the only remaining equitable 
defense is that of undue influence. With respect to such defense, Thelma has failed to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact sufficient to withstand Jack's motion for summary judgment. 
A party responding to a motion for summary judgment is required to "respond to 
the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." 
Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 996 P.2d 303, 307 (2000). 
Thelma has simply failed to meet that burden. Thelma's Combined Brief does not cite a single 
2 While the Barrett Court held that parol evidence could be used to alter or vary the 
terms of an unambiguous deed, the holding in that case was limited to divorce actions: "[W]e 
conclude that the language of a deed executed in the course of refinancing does not conclusively 
determine the character of property for purposes of a divorce action." Barrett v. Barrett, 2010 
WL 1632871, *3 (Idaho S. Ct. Apr. 23, 2010). 
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fact to support any of the elements of undue influence. Rather, without factual basis or legal 
authority, Thelma conclusory asserts that Jack and his brother, John Garrett, were "fiduciaries 
with respect to their father's execution of a quitclaim deed to Jack." Thelma's Combined Brief 
at 12. From that unsubstantiated premises, she goes on to speculate that Jack and John "willfully 
concealed the existence of the deed from Thelma" until after Alva died, that Jack's continued 
rental payments on the farm were a ruse to trick Thelma into believing no transfer had been 
made, and that the brothers refrained from recording the deed so that Alva would not be able to 
cancel ie Thelma's Combined Brief at 12. These unsubstantiated speculations are belied by 
Thelma's own testimony wherein she stated, under oath, that she had no specific facts indicating 
that Jack had the disposition to exert undue influence and that she'd be surprised if Jack had 
coerced Alva in any way. Jack's SOF ~ 30. 
Thelma goes on to speculate that suspicion should be drawn from Alva's failure 
to consult an attorney or his wife regarding the execution ofthe 2006 Quitclaim Deed. Thelma's 
Combined Brief at 13. However, evidence shows that when Alva executed the 1990 Quitclaim 
Deed he did not consult an attorney (Jack's SOF ~~ 16-18) (interestingly, Thelma has no 
objection to Alva's failure to consult an attorney in that instance), and the evidence is conflicting 
regarding whether Alva consulted Thelma in connection with the execution of the 2006 
Quitclaim Deed. While Thelma denies any knowledge of the plan to convey the property to Jack 
(Thelma'S Combined Brief, Statement of Facts ("Thelma'S SOF" ~ 24), both Jack and John have 
3 Not only is this fact mere speculation, it is legally incorrect. After having executed the 
2006 Quitclaim Deed and delivered the same to John with no restrictive instructions, Alva 
divested himself of any interest in the Middleton Property and would have had no legal basis to 
cancel the deed. 
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offered testimony that Thelma was aware of the plan and strenuously objected to the same and 
Alva elected to go forward with the transfer despite her objections (Jack's SDF ~~ 5 and 6), 
despite the fact that the couple still lived together and-by all accounts-had a happy marriage 
(Jack's SOF ~ 27), and despite the fact that the both Alva and Thelma were involved in the 
management of the couple's finances at that time (Jack's SOF at 25). These undisputed facts do 
not give rise to a presumption of undue influence; to the contrary, they conclusively establish 
that Alva had a mind of his own and, despite his wife's protestations, elected to convey his 
interest in the Middleton Property to his son, Jack. These undisputed facts also show that Alva 
was of sufficient mind to know that Thelma would not be happy about the transfer and had the 
presence of mind to request that John not record it until after Alva passed. 
Based on the undisputed facts of this case, one could just as easily make 
unsubstantiated speculations that Alva was under the undue influence of Thelma. However, a 
motion for summary judgment cannot survive on unsubstantiated speculation. The undisputed 
facts evidence that Alva sought advice from multiple people-including his sons and his wife-
and that he independently reached decisions regarding important matters. When Thelma herself 
has testified that she never witnessed Jack do anything to coerce Alva into taking actions Alva 
did not want to take and that she would be surprised if Jack exercised undue influence over Alva 
(Jack's SOF ~ 30), it is too much of a stretch to think that reasonable jurors could conclude 
otherwise. Accordingly, based on the undisputed facts of this case, it is appropriate for this 
Court to deny Thelma's motion for summary judgment on the issue of undue influence. 
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C. Thelma Failed to Plead Incomplete Intervivos Gift and the Issue Is Not 
Properly Before This Court on Her Motion for Summary Judgment. 
As Thelma's third attempt to attack the transfer of Alva's interest III the 
Middleton Property to Jack by the 2006 Quitclaim Deed, Thelma asserts and argues that the 2006 
Quitclaim Deed was an incomplete intervivos gift. Thelma's Combined Brief at 15-17. This 
Court should disregard this theory because it was not raised by the pleadings. It is well settled in 
the law that "[aJ court does not have jurisdiction to grant relief beyond the issues tendered by the 
pleadings." Martin v. Soden, 81 Idaho 274, 281, 340 P.2d 848, 852 (1959) ("It is, of course, 
fundamental that a judgment must be responsive, not only to the prayer, but to the issues 
tendered by the pleadings. This idea underlies all litigation.") (citations omitted). The sum and 
substance of Thelma's Pleadings is that the Middleton Property was community property of Alva 
and Thelma and that Alva had no right to convey his interest in the property to Jack. There is no 
indication in Thelma's Pleadings regarding the claim or defense that the 2006 Quitclaim Deed 
was an incomplete intervivos gift. Accordingly, this Court does not have authority to grant 
summary judgment on this theory and should refuse to consider Thelma's arguments regarding 
the same. 
D. Thelma Has Not Met Her Burden of Proof Regarding Incomplete Intervivos 
Gift. 
Even if this Court elects to consider the theory of incomplete intervivos gift, 
Thelma's motion for summary judgment regarding the same should be denied because genuine 
issues of material fact exist regarding (i) whether the transfer of property was, indeed, a gift and 
(ii) if the transfer was a gift, whether such transfer was complete prior to Alva's death. 
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First, Thelma has failed to conclusively prove that the transfer from Alva to Jack 
was a gift. While Thelma characterizes the facts of the case as establishing that no "present 
consideration" was given for the transfer (Thelma's SOF ~ 21), the testimony of both Jack and 
John demonstrate that the consideration given for the farm was the years of maintenance, 
upkeep, rental or lease payments, and other expenditures that Jack put towards the Middleton 
Property during all of the years that he was farming the property (Jack's SDF ~ 2). The evidence 
suggests, therefore, that there was substantial consideration given for Alva's transfer of his 
interest in the farm property to Jack. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the transfer from Alva to Jack is properly characterized 
as a gift, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the transfer was complete prior 
to Alva's death and whether Alva intended the transfer to take immediate effect. The facts 
presented by Thelma-that John held the 2006 Quitclaim Deed and refrained from recording it 
until after Alva's death-are not relevant or material to the inquiry of whether delivery of the 
deed was complete. Under Idaho law, it is not required that the grantor deliver the deed to the 
grantee. Unconditional delivery to a third party will satisfy the delivery element. 
What constitutes delivery of a deed, and when title passes by deed, 
has often been before the courts of this country, and the decisions 
are quite uniform on this question. "As no particular form of 
delivery is required, the question whether there was a delivery of a 
deed or not so as to pass title must, in a great measure, where it is 
not clear that an actual delivery has been effected, depend upon the 
peculiar circumstances of each particular case. The question of 
delivery is one of intention, and the rule is that a delivery is 
complete when there is an intention manifested on the part of the 
grantor to make the instrument his deed." 1 Devlin on Deeds, 
§ 262. 
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Bowers v. Cottrell, 15 Idaho 221, 96 P. 936 (1908). "In order to constitute a sufficient delivery 
of a deed, the grantor must part with control over it and not retain a right to reclaim it." Williams 
v. Williams, 82 Idaho 451, 455, 354 P.2d 747, 749 (1960). Parol evidence is admissible 
regarding the issue of the grantor to deliver the deed. "It is a settled principle of law that the 
evidence of delivery of a deed must come from without the deed. In other words, a deed does not 
upon its face show delivery, and therefore parol evidence is admissible to show such fact." 
Bowes v. Cottrell, 15 Idaho 221, 96 P. 936 (1908). "Where the issue is whether or not the 
grantor delivered the deed with the intent that it should convey title, declarations and acts of the 
grantor made and done either before or after the alleged delivery are admissible to show the 
grantor's intention." Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 68 Idaho 470, 477, 199 P.2d 264,268 (1948). 
In this matter, the undisputed evidence shows that Alva delivered the deed to John 
for Jack's benefit. Jack's SDF ~ 7. John was not given any limiting instructions regarding the 
deed and Alva did not retain a right to reclaim the 2006 Quitclaim Deed. Jack's SDF ~ 7. John 
called Jack and informed him of the execution of the deed, John's possession of the deed, and 
informed Jack where the deed was located with no limitations restricting Jack's right to take 
physical possession of the deed. Jack's SOF ~ 21; Jack's SDF ~ 7. These acts are sufficient to 
constitute both delivery and acceptance of the 2006 Quitclaim Deed and nothing more was 
required. 
Additionally, the fact that Alva and Thelma remained in posseSSIOn of the 
property is not conclusive evidence that Alva did not intend title to pass nor that the gift did not 
go into immediate and absolute effect. "Where there is a valid delivery of the deed, with the 
requisite intent on the part of the grantor, the fact that the grantor retains possession of the 
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premises does not necessarily invalidate the deed." Hartley v. Stibor, 96 Idaho 157, 160, 525 
P.2d 352,355 (1974) (citations omitted). 
It is not, of course, inconsistent with the passage of a present title, 
particularly in a father-son relationship, that the incidents of 
management be retained by a grantor. While such facts are 
material to our consideration, they are not conclusive and must be 
weighed with all others pertinent to the problem. Such constitute 
the 'circumstances surrounding the transaction.' 
Id. Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the transaction in this case are consistent with the 
transfer of present title. First, John has testified that, prior to executing the 2006 Quitclaim 
Deed, Alva already considered the Middleton Property to belong to John and the 2006 Quitclaim 
Deed was executed to "make it official." Jack's SDF ~ 3. Second, in prior discussions between 
John and Alva, Alva mentioned that, in transferring his interest in the property to John, he 
wanted to retain a life estate for himself. Thelma's SOF ~ 32. Jack's testimony that as long as 
Alva was living, he was entitled to treat the Middleton Property as his own is consistent with an 
informal agreement that Alva retained a life estate. While the retention of a life estate was not 
expressly provided for in the deed, the parties' conduct was consistent with Alva's desires; this is 
not evidence of no present intent to transfer the property. The fact that Jack continued to pay 
"rent" on the farm (Thelma's SOF ~ 27) does not necessarily mean that there was no intent for a 
present transfer. Rather, conflicting evidence shows that part of the consideration for the farm 
was all of the expenditures-including rents-that Jack had paid on the farm dating back to 
1990. Jack's SDF ~ 2. It was neither unreasonable nor inconsistent for Jack to continue making 
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such payments to Alva until Alva's death as additional consideration for Alva's interest in the 
property. 4 
E. Jack Does Not Maintain That the 2006 Quitclaim Deed Was a Testamentary 
Gift. 
Jack does not maintain that the 2006 Quitclaim Deed was intended to be a 
testamentary gift. Rather, as explained above, Jack and Alva both had the understanding and 
intent that the 2006 Quitclaim Deed passed present title of Alva's interest in the property from 
Alva to Jack. Accordingly, Thelma's argument that, if the 2006 Quitclaim Deed was intended to 
be a testamentary gift it was made in violation of Alva and Thelma's contract for wills, is 
irrelevant. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Jack respectfully requests that this Court find that the 
2006 Quitclaim Deed effectively conveyed Alva's one-half separate property interest in the 
Middleton Property to Jack and that Jack and Thelma now hold the Middleton Property as 
tenants in common. Jack further requests that this Court appoint a referee for the purposes of 
causing ajust and equitable partition of the Middleton Property. 
DATED this 4th day of June, 2010. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By 'I2-e- ~ 
Rebecca A. Rainey - Of the E' 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Coun 
4 Indeed, this evidence supports Jack's contention that the transfer of Alva's interest in 
the Middleton Property to him was not a gift. 
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John Garrett, having been duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the son of the decedent, Alva Garrett and the brother of the 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Jack Garrett, in the above-captioned matter and, as such, have 
personal knowledge of the facts contained herein. 
2. Prior to his death, Alva Garrett and his wife, my step-mother, Thelma 
Garrett lived on property consisting of approximately 26 2/3 acres located in Middleton, Idaho 
(the "Middleton Property"). 
3. Prior to my father's death, my brother, Jack Garrett, had farmed several 
acres of the Middleton Property for several years. 
4. In the years proceeding Alva's death, and while Jack Garrett was farming 
the Middleton Property, Alva Garrett indicated to me that he intended to give the Middleton 
property to Jack Garrett. He spoke openly about the same on numerous occasions. 
5. Prior to the time Alva Garrett executed the Quitclaim Deed conveying his 
interest in the Middleton Property to my brother, Jack Garrett, Alva represented to me that he 
already consiclered the property to belong to Jack because Jack had been farming and tending to 
the upkeep of the Middleton Property for so long. 
6. Alva also represented to me that it was important to him that he put Jack's 
name on the r,.,1iddleton Property to make Jack's ownership of the property official. To that end, 
Alva asked me to assist him in preparing a Quitclaim Deed conveying Alva's interest in the 
Middleton Property to Jack. 
7. I arrived at the home of Alva and Thelma Garrett on the morning of 
February 14,2006. 
8. Thelma Garrett acted as though she knew and was informed that I was 
taking Alva to execute a Quitclaim Deed conveying Alva's interest in the Middleton Property to 
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Jack. Specifically, Thelma asked Alva and me what we were doing and stated that there was no 
need for Alva to take any action regarding the Middleton Property because Alva and Thelma had 
wills in place that would take care of everything and that any additional actions regarding the 
Middleton Property was unnecessary. 
9. Alva Garrett represented to me that he knew and understood that Thelma 
did not approve of his transfer of his interest in the Middleton Property to Jack. However, Alva 
wanted to make it official that his interest in the Middleton Property would be conveyed to Jack 
before Alva's death. 
10. I witnessed Alva execute the Quitclaim Deed conveying his interest in the 
Middleton Property to Jack and took Alva to have the Quitclaim Deed notarized. 
11. After the Quitclaim Deed was executed and notarized, Alva asked that I 
not record it until after his death so that Thelma would not become upset with him for executing 
the same. 
12. Alva did not place any other restrictions on my handling of the Quitclaim 
Deed and did not instruct me to refrain from delivering it to Jack. 
13. Alva intended for the Quitclaim Deed to have immediate effect. 
Further your affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this -c3=-__ day of June, 2010. 
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correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN GARRETT IN SUPPORT OF 
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A. Alva and Thelma held title to the Middleton Property as 
Community Property. 
The 1990 deed from Alva Garrett to himself and his wife, Thelma Garrett, 
transmuted his separate real property to their community property. It did not create a 
tenancy in common. The Plaintiff cited Kraly v. Kraly, 147 Idaho 299, 208 P.3d 281 
(2009), for the proposition that the only two factors relevant to the issue whether the 
property is separate or community are (l) when the property was acquired and (2) 
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how the property was acquired. As to the first, the 1990 deed vested title in Alva and 
his wife, Thelma, during their marriage. The Court in Kraly declared that: 
Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be community property. Reed 
v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 58,44 P.3d 1108, 1113 (2002). The presumption can be 
overcome if the party asserting the separate character of the property carries his 
burden of proving with reasonable certainty and particularity that the property 
acquired during marriage is separate property. Id. at 59-60, 44 P.3d at 1114-15. 
Idaho law has a public policy in favor of community property. This was 
pointed out by the Court in Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 815, 673 P.2d 411,415 
(1983): 
Principally, we remain mindful of the overarching policy in favor of community 
property, as evidenced by the general presumption and the strong standard of 
proof necessary to rebut the presumption. 
The Plaintiff, Jack Garrett, has the burden to overcome this general 
presumption that Alva and Thelma held title to their real property as community 
property and not tenants in common. " ... [T]he determination whether property 
has been transmuted is a question of fact turning on intent. In making this factual 
determination, trial courts are free to consider all relevant evidence regarding that 
intent." Barrett v. Barrett, 2010 WL 1632871 (Idaho S. Ct., Opinion No. 43, 
4/23/10). 
The second factor cited from Kraly by the Plaintiff is "how the property 
was acquired." (Plaintiffs Reply Memo, p. 4) Thelma Garrett testified that Alva 
made a gift of the property to the community. She testified: 
"Q: Did you discuss with Alva, or was it your intention with Alva by him 
executing that document to change the property from his separate property to 
community property? 
A: He wanted to provide for me. 
Q: Okay. 
A: And this is what we did." 
DefendantiCounterclaimant's Reply Memorandum 
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(Troupis Aff., Ex. A ("Thelma Depo" 40:21 - 41 :2) 
The fact that Alva gave his separate property to the marital community 
distinguishes our case from Kraly. In that case, the Court noted: 
The magistrate court additionally found that Stan did not gift any part of the 
property to Susan. Therefore, the district court properly reversed the magistrate 
court's determination that the property was community property and correctly 
held that the Lightning Creek property was Stan's separate property. Id at 285. 
Alva's subsequent act of entering into a contract for wills (Exhibit B to 
Defendant's Answer; ("Thelma Depo." 35:8 - 36:24) and executing a will (Rainey Aff., 
Exh. D) that bequeathed all of the real property to Thelma further confirms his intention 
to gift this real property to the community. 
The Plaintiff seems to argue that the absence of the phrase 'husband and 
wife as community property' is dispositive of the title issue, and that this court 
need look no further than the absence of that phrase in the 1990 deed to reach a 
conclusion. That position is untenable. 
We need to make this crucial observation. In all of the cases in which the 
Court was asked to determine whether the addition of a spouse's name to the title 
transmuted the property from separate to community, none of the deeds or other 
instruments of title could have included the statement that Mr. Garrett claims is 
conclusive on the issue, the recitation that the property was to be held "by 
husband and wife, as community property." If that phrase was included in the 
deeds or documents oftitle in any of those cases, the Court's inquiry would have 
abruptlY ended. See Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 174,898 P.2d 1081 (Idaho 
1995) (" ... where a deed is plain and unambiguous, the intention of the parties 
must be determined from the deed itself.") 
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Because this language is missing from the deed, the deed is ambiguous. It 
is ambiguous because it is subject to more than one interpretation. If the language 
of the deed is ambiguous, the court will consider relevant evidence to determine 
the actual intent ofthe parties. Thus, the Court declared in Porter v. Bassett, 146 
Idaho 399, 195 P.2d 1212 (2008): 
"In interpreting and construing deeds of conveyance, the primary goal is to seek 
and give effect to the real intention of the parties." Benninger v. Derifield, 142 
Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006). When an instrument conveying land 
is unambiguous, the intention of the parties can be settled as a matter of law using 
the plain language of the document. Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497, 499, 112 
P.3d 785, 787 (2005). However, if the language of the deed is ambiguous, 
ascertaining the parties' intent is a question of fact and may therefore only be 
settled by a trier of fact. See Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 508, 65 P.3d 525, 
530 (2003). " Ambiguity may be found where the language of the deed is subject 
to conflicting interpretations." Read, 141 Idaho at 499, 112 P.3d at 787. The trier 
of fact must then determine the intent of the parties according to the language of 
the conveyance and the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Neider, 138 
Idaho at 508,65 P.3d at 530. 
In each of the divorce cases or estate proceedings involving the issue of 
transmutation, the deeds or other documents of title could not have included 
unambiguous language declaring that title was held by husband and wife as 
community property. Instead, the transmutation dispute arose because title was 
held by a husband and a wife in the absence of that unambiguous written 
statement. 
The deed from Alva to Alva and Thelma is ambiguous because it does not 
include that same statement, "husband and wife, as community property." This 
makes the 1990 Garrett deed no different than the deeds or documents of title in 
the other cases in which the courts have been asked to determine if there was a 
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transmutation. In each ofthose cases, the Courts have considered relevant 
evidence to determine the actual intent of the parties. 
Mr. Garrett carries his erroneous assumption further by arguing that under 
Idaho Code §55-508, the 1990 quitclaim deed from Alva to Alva and Thelma 
must have created a tenancy in common because the deed did not recite that title 
was to be held by husband and wife as community property. That conclusion is 
not sustainable, both because it conflicts with the general presumption for 
community property, and because it is at odds with our court's reasoning in all of 
the prior cases in which the court has looked at the same wording on deeds or 
documents of title, and then considered other relevant evidence to determine the 
"intent of the parties" and rule on whether a transmutation had occurred. 
In the present case, the claim that Alva gifted his separate property to the marital 
community is uncontradicted. Moreover, there is strong additional evidence of Alva's 
intent to transmute this parcel of separate property into community property. This 
evidence includes the following facts: 
1. Alva was clearly aware of the separate nature of his real property. He retained 
as separate three other parcels of real property, which he sold, traded or gifted 
to his children with the participation of his son, John Garrett. He did not add 
Thelma to the title on any of these properties, or to the properties and business 
interests he acquired through his investment dealings with his son, John. (Def. 
Statement of Undisputed Facts, #'s 4,6-8) 
2. Alva only changed the title to this real property after he lost his other 
properties and got in financial trouble due to his son John's real estate 
investment decisions. (Def. Statement of Undisputed Facts, #'s 10-12) 
3. Alva drafted the quitclaim deed and did not state in that deed that he intended 
to take title as tenants in common, or as separate property. (Answer, Ex. A; 
"Thelma Depo" 31: 13 - 32:20; Ex. 6) 
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4. Alva made the decision to add Thelma's name to the deed. Thelma testified 
that he did it because he "wanted to provide for her." The Plaintiff has not 
presented any evidence to challenge the fact this was Alva's intentional and 
voluntary act. (Troupis Aff., Ex. A ("Thelma Depo" 40:21 - 41 :2) 
5. Alva did not have any financial reason or requirement for adding Thelma's 
name to the title. He was not required by a third party lender to add her name 
to the title. He was not refinancing the property when the deed was signed and 
recorded. In fact, he had previously refinanced the property without adding 
her name to the title. (Troupis Aff., Ex. A ("Thelma Depo" 32:1 - 201) 
6. Five years after recording the 1990 quitclaim deed, Alva and Thelma executed 
mutual wills and a contract for wills in which they both dealt with this 
property as their community property. It was included in their joint estate, 
with a provision that on Alva's death, the entire estate would pass to Thelma, 
and vice versa. (Def. Statement of Undisputed Facts, #'s 14) 
7. Alva did not deal with this property in his will as his separate property, nor 
did he attempt to bequeath any interest in the property as a 'tenant in 
common.' (Def. Statement of Undisputed Facts, #'s 14) 
8. Alva did not revoke the will prior to his death. The Court may take judicial 
notice of the probate proceeding filed by Thelma Garrett. (Def. Answer, Ex. 
D, Canyon County Probate Case No. CV 08-3732 C; Complaint, ~ 7) 
The Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to rebut these compelling facts that 
support of Thelma Garrett's community property interest in this real property. 
B. Thelma did not acquire a separate property interest from Alva. 
The Plaintiff argues that Thelma's interest in the real property is her separate 
property because she acquired it as a gift from her husband. That claim is based on a 
misapplication ofIdaho Code §32-906(2). That statute, which states "property conveyed 
I "Q: Can you tell me the circumstances that led to the making of this Quitclaim Deed? 
A: Well, after the property at Willow Creek and the Round Valley was all cleared and everything and 
John took over and we didn't have any money and then - you know, he talked his dad into all that. And 
then we - and we had to sell the property to pay our debts. 
Alva, you know, was afraid that John might talk him into doing something with the little property 
that was left. So he thought by putting my name on the deed then, you know, I would have to sign it fIrst 
and we would at least have a roof over our head. We were worried about losing the roof over our head. 
Q: Because of stuff that John had done in the past? 
A: Yeah. All this - because all - the other property that Alva had owned when we were married, you 
know, just disappeared. And we just didn't even have enough money to pay - you know, we had to sell 50 
acres of it to pay our debt." 
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by one spouse to the other .. . ," applies only to a deed that divests one spouse's interest in 
real property in order to vest it in the other spouse. It does not apply to a deed from one 
spouse to both spouses, the marital community. For the application of this statute, see Bliss 
v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 174,898 P.2d 1081 (Idaho 1995) 
c. Alva's purported conveyance to Jack of his interest in community 
property is void because it was in violation ofIC §32-912. 
Alva and Thelma Garrett held title to their real property as community 
property, and therefore the purported conveyance by Alva to his son, Jack, ofa one-
half interest in that property should be declared void because it violated Idaho Code 
§32-912. 
D. Jack Garrett concedes the fact that both he and his brother, John, were 
in a confidential relationship with Alva when he executed the quitclaim 
deed. He therefore must prove clearly and unequivocally that his father 
intended a complete inter vivos gift of his property and the transaction 
was free from undue influence by Jack or John Garrett. 
In his reply brief, Jack Garrett argues that no evidence has been introduced on the 
defense of undue influence. (Plaintiffs Reply Brief, p. 9) That is not true. As we pointed 
out from Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571, 575, 759 P.2d 77 (Idaho App. 1988): 
A prima facie case of undue influence consists of four elements: (1) a grantor who 
is subject to influence; (2) an opportunity to exert undue influence; (3) a 
disposition to exert undue influence; and (4) a result indicating undue influence. 
Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho 1,592 P.2d 57 (1979). 
Thelma Garrett has presented evidence supporting all of these elements. (1) Alva 
was subject to his son, John's influence. (Def. St. of Facts, #6-12; "Thelma Depo. 32:1-
20). (2) John had the opportunity to exert undue influence and acted on behalf of his 
brother, Jack, in procuring the quitclaim deed from Alva. (Aff. of John Garrett, ~7-11; 
Troupis Aff. Ex B. "Jack Depo. 48: 18 - 20). (3) John and Jack both had a disposition to 
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In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
000231. 
7 
exert undue influence because they were aware of the fact that Alva had deeded the 
property to the marital community and left all of his property under wills that Alva and 
Thelma had signed. (Aff. of John Garrett, ~ 8; Def. St. of Facts, #22 - 23.) Moreover, 
Jack's prior business dealings with his father demonstrated Jack's disposition to take 
control of all of his father's properties. (Def. St. of Facts, #'s 6-12). (4) The result of the 
quitclaim deed to Jack is a disproportionate disposition of the community estate. Under 
Alva and Thelma's mutual wills, all of their property eventually is distributed in equal 
shares to all seven (7) children of the combined family. The quitclaim deed divests 
Thelma of Yz of the property immediately and vests it in Jack. The remaining Yz would be 
divided among the seven (7) children of the combined family pursuant to the mutual wills 
on Thelma's death. If the quitclaim deed is upheld, Jack would eventually receive 8114ths 
of the estate and the other six (6) children would each receive 1114th of the estate. This 
result indicates undue influence because it is undisputed that Alva was not estranged 
from any ofthe seven (7) children, and only had a problem with Garrett, a time or two. 
(Troupis Aff. Ex. B "Jack Depo. 56:19 - 58:1) 
Mr. Garrett has not responded to any of these facts. What is also noticeably absent 
from the reply brief is any refutation of the fact that Jack and his brother were in a 
confidential relationship with their father when the deed was executed. 
Jack testified that both he and his brother John had business relationships with 
their father, Alva, and that Alva reposed trust and confidence in both of them with respect 
to financial decisions. Troupis Aff., Ex B (Jack Depo., 27:18-28:1; 39:13-40:3). John was a 
real estate broker and was involved in extensive transactions with Alva resulting in the loss 
of all of his real estate holdings except a portion of his homestead property. In fact, to 
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protect this last property from John's influence, Alva deeded it into the names ofhirnself 
and his wife, Thelma. (Defendant's Combined Brief, Statement of Undisputed Facts, #'s 
6-12, 16-20) 
In the presence of this admitted confidential relationship, and Jack and John's 
mutual involvement in procuring the deed from his father, the burden of proof shifts to 
him to prove that the deed was not the result of undue influence. We cited Krebs v. 
Krebs, supra, at 515, for this proposition: 
Normally, the party asserting that a deed was procured by means of undue 
influence has the burden of proving such influence. McNabb v. Brewster, 75 
Idaho 313, 272 P.2d 298 (1954). However, if the person alleging undue influence 
can first produce evidence that the parties to the transaction occupied a 
confidential relationship, and that the grantee was the dominant spirit in the 
transfer, a rebuttable presumption of undue influence arises, which the proponent 
ofthe transaction must refute. Bongiovi v. Jamison, 110 Idaho 734, 718 P.2d 1172 
(1986). This principle is consonant with the general rule regarding presumptions 
enunciated in LR.E. 301." 
Mr. Garrett claims that the consideration for his father's agreement to deed the 
farm to him in 2006 was Jack's work on the family farm from 1985 - 2006. He admitted 
however, that he only carne up with a statement of his estimated value of his alleged 
services when his attorney requested it from him during this lawsuit, long after his father 
died. Troupis Aff., Ex B, ("Jack's Depo., 35:5 - 36:7 Past consideration in the form of a 
family member's services rendered gratuitously at the time is not consideration for a 
future promise to convey real property. See Collord v. Cooley, 92 Idaho 789, 451 P.2d 
535 (1969) 
E. The quitclaim deed is void because it was an incomplete inter vivos gift. 
1. This Court has jurisdiction to set aside the 2006 quitclaim deed as 
an inter vivos gift. 
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Mr. Garrett argues that this court doesn't have jurisdiction to set aside the 2006 
quitclaim deed as an incomplete inter vivos gift because that "defense" was not 
specifically pleaded, citing Martin v. Soden, 81 Idaho 274, 340 P.2d 848 (1959). That 
claim has no merit. Jack Garrett sued under Idaho Code §6-501 for partition of property 
he claims is jointly owned by himself and his step-mother, Thelma Garrett. One ofthe 
required elements of proof of Jack Garrett's partition claim is his ownership of the real 
property. The issue of Jack's ownership by virtue of the 2006 quitclaim deed was raised 
by the allegations in his complaint and Thelma Garrett's denial of those allegations. See ~ 
4 of Defendant's Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim.2 Proof ofthe 
invalidity of the deed, for whatever reason, is encompassed within the denial, and is not 
an affirmative defense that must be separately pleaded. 
As the Supreme Court declared in Troupis v. Summer, 148 Idaho 77, 218 P.3d 
1138, 1142 (2009) (a case brought for the partition of partnership business property), in 
a partition suit brought under Idaho Code §6-501, the Court exercises subject matter 
jurisdiction over the entire case that provides the Court with equitable power to grant full 
relief to the parties, whether or not set out in the pleadings or prayer for relief. The Court 
stated: 
This Court has long recognized" that equity having obtained jurisdiction of the 
subject matter of a dispute, will retain it for the settlement of all controversies 
between the parties with respect thereto and will grant all proper relief whether 
prayed for or not." Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551, 563, 381 P .2d 802, 809 
(1963); see also Kessler v. Tortoise Dev., Inc., 134 Idaho 264, 270, 1 P.3d 292, 
298 (2000); Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., 108 Idaho 602, 606, 701 P.2d 222, 
226 (1985). This principle allows the court flexibility in adjudicating cases, which 
is necessary because not all cases are presented in precisely the same fashion. 
2 "4. With respect to the allegations of Paragraph 7 of the Complaint, Defendant admits that the 
deed referred to was recorded, but denies the remaining allegations, including the purported legal 
effect of the deed." 
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InState v. Armstrong, 195 P.3d 731, 733 -734 (2008), the Idaho Supreme 
Court defined subject matter jurisdiction. The Court stated: 
"Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the right of the court to exercise judicial 
power over that class of cases, not the particular case before it, but rather the 
abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending; and not 
whether the particular case is one that presents a cause of action, or under the 
particular facts is triable before the court in which it is pending, because of some 
inherent facts which exist and may be developed during the triaL 
Such jurisdiction the court acquires by the act of its creation, and possesses 
inherently by its constitution; and it is not dependent upon the sufficiency of the 
bill or complaint, the validity of the demand set forth in the complaint, or 
plaintiffs right to the relief demanded, the regularity of the proceedings, or the 
correctness of the decision rendered. Citing Boughton v. Price, 70 Idaho 243, 249, 
215 P.2d 286,289 (1950) 
In addition to the Court's inherent equity jurisdiction to adjudicate the property 
rights of the parties in a partition action, in this case, Thelma Garrett filed a Counterclaim 
to quiet title as against the 2006 quitclaim deed. This Court's equitable jurisdiction in the 
quiet title action is also sufficient to rule upon the validity of the 2006 quitclaim deed, no 
matter what legal theory is argued. The Court's equitable jurisdiction in a partition action, 
together with a Counterclaim for Quiet Title provide subject matter jurisdiction over the 
entire title dispute. Martin is distinguished from our facts because in the Martin case, 
"[t]he answer contained no prayer for affirmative relief and no counterclaim or cross 
complaint was filed by the husband in response to the wife's action for separate 
maintenance." For that reason, "[t]he court had only such jurisdiction of the property as 
was incident to its jurisdiction in a separate-maintenance action." Id at 282 
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2. The purported conveyance from Alva to Jack was an incomplete 
inter vivos gift because there was no intent to make a present 
complete gift and there was no delivery. 
Contrary to Mr. Garrett's contention, the undisputed evidence proves that the 
purported conveyance from Alva to Jack Garrett was an incomplete inter vivos gift. First, 
there was no intent to make a present gift that took immediate and absolute effect. By his 
own admission, Jack believed that when Alva executed the quitclaim deed in 2006, he 
intended for it to take effect only when he died. Troupis Aff., Ex B, ("Jack's Depo., 55:17 
- 21). John Garrett's affidavit corroborates this fact. He testifies that Alva did not want this 
deed to take effect until after he died. (Aff. of John Garrett, ~11. "After the Quitclaim Deed 
was executed and notarized, Alva asked that I not record it until after his death so that 
Thelma would not become upset with him for executing the same." Until Alva died, he 
could have voided the unrecorded quitclaim deed by executing a deed transferring the 
property out of his name, or he could have asked John to give the deed back to him. John 
has testified that he was doing what his father wanted him to do. Consistent with that 
testimony, if Alva had asked for the deed to be destroyed or returned to him unrecorded, 
John would have done what his father wanted. 
Nor was there delivery and acceptance of the property by Jack. The testimony of 
John Garrett does not alter the undisputed fact that Jack Garrett never took possession of the 
property or the deed until after his father died. (Def. St. of Facts, #25-31) Moreover, John 
basically admits in his Affidavit that he acted as his brother's agent or surrogate in procuring 
and holding the quitclaim deed unrecorded until their father died. This admission bolsters 
the evidence of undue influence because it shows that Jack and John acted in concert in 
procuring the deed, with knowledge that Thelma not only opposed it, but that Thelma and 
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Alva had already dealt with their property by wills, and kept the execution ofthe deed a 
secret until after Alva died "so that Thelma would not become upset." (John Garrett Mf. ~ 
11) All of these elements of a complete inter vivos gift are absent -- the intent to make a 
present gift, immediate and absolute effect ofthe gift, and present delivery of the property to 
the donee. The absence of any one of these elements is fatal to Jack Garrett's title claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The real property that is the subject ofthis lawsuit was the community property of 
the decedent Alva Garrett and his wife, Thelma Garrett. The deed to Jack Garrett is void 
as violative ofIdaho Code §32-912. In addition, the deed was the product of undue 
influence by Jack and John Garrett. Finally, the deed is void because it was an incomplete 
inter vivos gift. 
F or the reasons set out above and in DefendantfCounterclaimant Thelma Garrett's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the DefendantfCounterclaimant's Motion for Summary 
Jugdment should be granted and Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be denied. 
Dated: June 8, 2010 TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, P.A. 
c~ 
Attorney for DefendantfCounterclaimant 
DefendantfCounterclaimant's Reply Memorandum 
In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
-,=~ ~ ~~ £~-
,,- -C>~~" 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAN¥"-{)N~,-'~'L~ Q~ __ ;tt~. 
JACK 1. GARRETT, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THELMA V. GARRETT, an individual, 
Defendant. 
THELMA V. GARRETT, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
JACK 1. GARRETT, 
Counter defendant. 
Case No. CV-09-8763-C 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
MAY 19 2011 
1. Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Partition on August 21, 2009, seeking a 
partition of real property located in Canyon County, Idaho, more 
particularly described as follows: 
The West Twenty-six and two-thirds (26 2/3) Acres of and 
located in the Southwest Quarter of the South East Quarter, 
(SW 1/4 of SE 1/4) Township Five North, Range Two 
West, Section 32, Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho. 
Described more fully, as follows: Commencing at the 
Southwest Comer of the Southeast Quarter, Section 32, 
Township Five North, Range Two West, Canyon County, 
Idaho: 53 113 Rods East, 80 Rods North, 53 113 Rods 
West, 80 Rods South, in above described land, together 
with their appurtenances. 
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Hereinafter referred to as the "Middleton" property. 
2. Defendant answered the Complaint for Partition on September 21, 2009. 
Such Answer constituted a general denial of the allegations set forth in the 
complaint for partition and asserted affirmative defenses of (i) fraud, 
duress, undue influence or other inequitable means; (ii) violation of the 
contract for wills; (iii) inequity; and (iv) unclean hands. 
3. By leave of the court, Defendant filed a First Amended Answer, 
Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim (the "Amended Answer"). The 
Amended Answer asserted the affirmative defenses of (i) fraud, duress, 
and undue influence; (ii) unclean hands; and (iii) statutory invalidity of 
quitclaim deed, based on Idaho Code Section 32-912. The Amended 
Answer also set forth a counterclaim for Quiet Title. 
ISSUES FOR TRIAL 
1. Whether the 1990 Quitclaim Deed from Alva Garrett to Alva Garrett and Thelma 
Garrett created a community property interest in the Property. 
2. Whether the 2006 Quitclaim deed from Alva Garrett to Jack Garrett was a valid 
conveyance of Alva Garrett's interest in the Property. 
a. Whether Alva Garrett was subject to fraud, duress or undue influence at 
the time he executed the 2006 Quitclaim Deed from Alva Garrett to Jack 
Garrett. 
b. Whether the 2006 Quitclaim Deed from Alva Garrett to Jack Garrett was 
the product of Jack Garrett's unclean hands. 
c. Whether delivery of the 2006 Quitclaim Deed from Alva Garrett to Jack 
Garrett was completed prior to Alva Garrett's death in 2008. 
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Conclusions reached in these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
1. This Court concludes, based on clear and convincing evidence, that when Alva 
deeded the Middleton property to himself and his wife, Thelma, in 1990, he intended 
to transmute the property from his separate property to community property. 
2. The 1990 quitclaim deed from Alva Garrett to Alva Garrett and Thelma Garrett 
created a community property interest in the Middleton property. 
3. Because Alva Garrett's 2006 quitclaim deed transferring his interest in the Middleton 
property to Jack Garrett did not include the written consent of his wife, Thelma 
Garrett, the transfer is void. 
4. Alternatively, because the delivery of the 2006 quitclaim deed from Alva Garrett to 
Jack Garrett was not completed before Alva Garrett's death, it was not a valid 
conveyance of Alva Garrett's interest in the Middleton property. 
Findings of Fact 
1. Alva and Thelma Garrett were married in 1976. They remained married for 32 years 
until Alva's death on March 3, 2008. 
2. Thelma Garrett and Alva Garrett were both married prior to their marriage to each other. 
Each of them had children of a prior marriage. Alva had four children from a prior 
marriage, John, Jack, Marilyn, and Elenore; and Thelma had three children from her 
prior marriage, Garrett, Thomas, and Cynthia. 
3. The members of the combined family had a normal and cordial step-family relationship. 
4. At the time Alva and Thelma were married, Thelma owned a home free and clear in 
Middleton, Idaho, referred to as the "Town" property. 
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5. At the time that Alva and Thelma were married, Alva held title -to three significant 
parcels of real property free and clear: (1) the "Middleton" property, located near 
Middleton, Idaho, comprised at that time of approximately 80 acres (the subject real 
property in this action); (2) the "Willow Creek" property, comprised of an unspecified, 
but significant number of acres, and (3) the "Round Valley" property, located in Valley 
County, Idaho, consisting of approximately 60 acres. 
6. Alva and Thelma lived in a home on the Middleton property during their entire 32 year 
marriage, and Thelma continues to reside there. 
7. Prior to 1990, Alva entered into certain business transactions with his son John Garrett, 
who was a real estate broker, with respect to the Willow Creek and Round Valley 
properties: 
7.1. The Willow Creek property: The Willow Creek property was sold off in two 
parcels, with at least a portion of the proceeds invested in, or traded for, the 
purchase of a motel in Rexburg, Idaho. Alva's son, John, was involved in these 
transactions in some capacity. It is not clear how Alva ultimately came to part with 
the motel, but eventually he no longer owned either the motel or the Willow Creek 
property. 
7.2. The Round Valley property: Prior to Alva and Thelma's marriage, the Round 
Valley property consisted of approximately 80 acres. With Alva's approval, his 
son John subdivided Alva's Round Valley property into residential lots. Alva then 
conveyed separate five-acre parcels of the Round Valley property to each of his 
four children, John, Jack, Eleanor and Marilyn. At some time after Alva and 
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Thelma were married, but prior to 1990, the remaining 60 subdivided acres were 
sold, and the sales were managed by Alva's son, John. 
8. Just as Alva owned all his real property free and clear at the time of their marriage, 
Thelma's "Town" property was also owned free and clear at the time of the marriage. In 
August of 1983, Thelma took out a $22,000 mortgage on the "Town" property in her 
name only, and secured it with a deed of trust to Idaho First National Bank (later known 
as West One Bank). This deed of trust was modified or amended in 1984 and again in 
1985. The history of this "Town" property, as well as the service of any debt on the 
property, presents itself as a confusing history. It appears that the property became a 
vehicle for Thelma's children to obtain financing for their own business ventures. 
8.1. In September of 1989, Thelma transferred her "Town" property to her son, Thomas 
Longstreet, by quitclaim deed signed by both Thelma and Alva as "husband and 
wife." 
8.2. Defendant's Exhibit BB, which contains Alva and Thelma's annual fmancial 
records kept from 1984 through 1999 for tax purposes, reflects that Alva and 
Thelma continued to make payments on the interest due on the mortgage until 
1990, after which it does not appear that they continued to make payments on the 
mortgage, or at least no further such interest payments to West One Bank are 
reflected in Exhibit BB after 1990. This fact tends to support that the payments 
towards the 1983 mortgage were being made by one of her children who was the 




8.3. Exhibit BB reflects that Thelma and Alva continued to receive rent on her "Town" 
property, as well as continued to pay and deduct the taxes, water assessment, repairs 
and insurance through 1999. This apparently occurred with Thomas' approval. 
8.4. Thomas eventually conveyed a one-third interest in the "Town" property to his 
brother, Garrett Longstreet, and one-third interest to his sister, Cynthia Schwartz. 
Eventually, Cynthia's interest was conveyed to Garrett. Throughout the remaining 
years of Alva and Thelma's marriage, Thomas continued to defer all rental income 
received from the "Town" property to Alva and Thelma, who, as previously noted, 
also continued to list certain deductions against that income which were incurred 
for the taxes, water assessments, repairs and insurance. Whatever the motive was 
for this arrangement, both Alva and Thelma were active and joint participants. 
8.5. Garrett Longstreet also made certain payments to Alva and Thelma during the same 
period, which are reflected in Exhibit BB as income received from Garrett in 1994, 
1996, and 1998. (Exhibit BB does not provide any records after 1999). Garrett 
apparently began these payments to pay back a debt to Thelma arising out of the 
loan proceeds from the 1983 mortgage on the "Town" property, and eventually 
continued to assist Alva and Thelma by sending them up to $400 per month. 
8.6. The evidence reflects that on December 21,2007, Thomas and Garrett encumbered 
the "Town" property with a deed of trust to Bank of the Cascades to secure a 
promissory note of$156,775. 
8.7. On December 27, 2007, the 1983 mortgage on the "Town" property (originally 
taken out by Thelma) was finally paid off, but it is not clear by whom. 
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8.8. The Bank of Cascades debt owed by Thomas and Garrett went into default and the 
property was sold in a foreclosure sale on September 21, 2009. Shortly before the 
"Town" property was foreclosed, Thomas and Garrett deeded it back to Thelma by 
quitclaim deed, unbeknownst to her, however. 
9. The "Middleton" property: By the year 1990, the only remaining real property that Alva 
still owned was the 80-acre Middleton property. 
9.1. In 1977, Alva took out a $29,000 mortgage on the Middleton property in his name 
only, and in 1980, he took out a $24,000 mortgage in his name only. 
9.2. By 1990, he was unable to make his payments and was threatened with foreclosure. 
9.3. In order to payoff his debts, Alva sold approximately 53 acres of the Middleton 
property in April of 1990, leaving the 26 2/3 acres that are the subject of this 
lawsuit. 
9.4. It appears from the evidence that from the proceeds of that sale, Alva retired some 
of his mortgage obligation on these two mortgages, as evidenced by the partial 
release of the 1977 mortgage that was issued on April 20, 1990, which was the 
same day that he closed the sale of the 53 acres. 
9.5. Approximately two months later, June 18, 1990, Alva signed a quitclaim deed, 
transferring the remaining 26 2/3 acres of the Middleton property to "Alva Garrett 
and Thelma Garrett." The deed had been prepared by both Alva and Thelma, 
without assistance of any of their children, nor with any assistance of legal counsel. 
(An amended deed was issued in October of 1990, in which Alva corrected an error 




9.6. On June 19, 1990, the day following the issuance of the original quitclaim deed 
from Alva to Alva and Thelma, both Alva and Thelma took out a new mortgage on 
the Middleton property in the sum of $20,000, in which they were identified as the 
mortgagors, "Alva L. Garrett and Thelma V. Garrett, husband and wife." This 
obligation was paid off by Alva and Thelma on October 19, 1992. 
Facts relevant to determining Alva's intent regarding the 1990 quitclaim deed: 
10. Thelma contends that Alva's intent was to convey the property to the marital 
community, partially in order to protect himself from being persuaded by his son, John, 
to part with any more of his remaining real property, which by that time had shrunk 
from several hundred acres to approximately 26 acres, and further, to protect and 
provide for Thelma and Alva, as this was the only remaining real property asset left to 
either of them. 
11. It is clear that while Thelma's testimony appears to be truthful, other portions of her 
testimony reflect that her memory of events has faded over time, and even she 
acknowledged certain memory errors in her testimony when she was presented with 
more accurate historical records. 
12. However, the 1990 transfer by Alva of his remaining 26 2/3 acres to both himself and 
Thelma, which included their mutual residence, must be viewed in context of the other 
actions taken by the parties with regard to the separate property that they each owned 
prior to the marriage, and in context of their dealings with each other generally. 
12.1. As previously noted, Alva encumbered his separate "Middleton" property in 
1977 and again in 1980. 
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12.2. As previously noted, by the spring of 1990, Alva was in financial difficulty 
and in danger of defaulting on the two mortgages that were secured by the 80-acre 
Middleton property, causing him to sell off 53 acres to retire a portion of the debt. 
12.3. Both Alva and Thelma had parted with all other separate real property that 
they had brought into the marriage, and it appears that each of those transfers 
involved some venture with, or accommodation to, their respective children from 
their first marriages. 
12.4. It is inescapable that one reason for Alva to transfer his remammg 
property to both Alva and Thelma was to effectuate obtaining another mortgage 
on the property. 
12.5. It is also clear that Alva intended the transfer of title to both Thelma and 
himself, as evidenced by the language of the deed and supported by language of 
the mortgage that they took out the following day in their names as "husband and 
wife" (resulting in a community debt). While the evidence reflects that Alva did 
not include additional language that could have further clarified the nature of the 
transfer evidenced by the quitclaim deed (i.e., as "husband and wife" or as 
"tenants in common," etc.), the evidence reflects that the deed, as opposed to the 
mortgage document, was prepared by both Alva and Thelma, without the 
assistance of counselor their children, and that the only testimony regarding 
Alva's intent at the time comes from Thelma, who is the only witness that was 
privy to their discussions. 
12.6. During their marriage, Alva and Thelma comingled their income. 
Although they maintained two checking accounts, one was primarily used in the 
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operation of Alva's race horse training and racing business, which had been his 
separate business before they were married. The other account was generally 
where they comingled their other income. Exhibit BB generally reflects a 
comingling of incomes from a variety of sources, including, but not limited to, 
farm rental income received on the Middleton property, rental income received 
on the "Town" property, both Alva and Thelma's social security income, any 
other agricultural or livestock profits, and any other payments from Thelma's 
children. 
12.7. It appears from the evidence in the case that a portion of the original 
mortgages on the Middleton property were retired by proceeds from the 1990 
mortgage. It also appears that the 1990 mortgage taken out by Alva and Thelma 
on the Middleton property was paid off out of community funds. 
12.8. On the other hand, and contradictory to the contention that Alva intended 
to transmute the Middleton property to the community, between 1991 and 2006, 
Alva had occasional discussions with his son, Jack Garrett, about transferring an 
interest in the Middleton property to Jack, who began farming the property in 
1990. While there is no reason to doubt that Alva and Jack had these 
conversations, the discussions never resulted in any written effort to transfer any 
interest in the property by Alva until 2006, sixteen years after he transferred the 
property to himself and Thelma. It is clear that despite what Alva was telling 
Jack, his actions indicate that he was vacillating on the issue. At one point after 
Alva again indicated his desire to transfer his interest in the Middleton property 
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to Jack, Jack made an appointment at a lawyer's office to address such a transfer, 
but Alva failed to attend the meeting and no transfer occurred. 
12.S.1. It was not until February of 2006 that Alva finally presented a quitclaim 
deed to Jack's brother, John Garrett, transferring his interest in the 
Middleton property to Jack. Thereafter, the deed was not recorded until two 
days after Alva's death in March of200S, which apparently was pursuant to 
Alva's direction. 
12.9. However, in the interim, both Alva and Thelma entered into a mutual 
contract for wills on January 27, 1995, and simultaneously executed wills 
containing mutual provisions that left their entire estate to the surviving spouse, and 
upon the death of the survivor, in equal shares to all seven (7) children of their 
combined family. Even though those documents do not expressly prohibit Alva 
from transferring his interest in the Middleton property, the nature and substance of 
the contract for wills, and the wills themselves, are consistent with Thelma's 
recollection that Alva intended to transfer the property to their marital community. 
13. This Court finds that when Alva deeded the Middleton property to himself and his 
wife, Thelma, in 1990, he intended to transmute the property from his separate 
property to community property. 
Facts surrounding the issuance of a quitclaim deed from Alva to Jack: 
14. At some time prior to or in 1990, but before Alva sold off 53 acres of the Middleton 
property, Alva's son, Jack Garrett, proposed to purchase the Middleton property by 
assuming the debt against it and granting a life estate to Alva and Thelma. In support of 
that offer, he sought a determination whether he could assume the debt on the SO-acre 
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Middleton parcel. Jack, Alva, and Thelma met with a loan officer at the mortgage 
holder, Federal Land Bank's offices, but Jack was unable to effectuate such an 
assumption, as he did not quality for refinancing. No agreement was reached. 
15. Also In 1990, Jack Garrett began farming the Middleton property and leased the farm 
land from Alva and Thelma. 
16. When Jack began farming the Middleton property, he gave his father approximately 
$10,000.00. 
17. Of that $10,000.00, the sum of $8,000.00 constituted an advance on rent that Jack 
was to pay for farming the Middleton property, which was the rate of approximately 
$100.00 per acre. 
18. The remaining $2,000.00 was a loan, and Alva and Thelma executed a promissory 
note to Jack, dated March 21, 1990, to evidence such loan. 
19. On December 16,1991, Alva and Thelma paid Jack $1,758.00 toward the principle of 
the debt, leaving $242.00 still owing as of that date. 
20. Jack entered a written farm lease with Alva and Thelma in March of 1992, which was 
signed by all three of them. 
21. Jack continued farming the remaining 262/3 acres, and continues to do so today. 
22. Jack paid rent on the farm ground up until 2008, and ceased payment after Alva died. 
23. In approximately 2000, Alva spoke to Jack about giving him the farm ground, and 
discussed the idea of splitting the Middleton property. 
24. In 2005, Jack made an appointment at an attorney's office for his father Alva to sign a 
quitclaim deed, conveying Alva's interest in the Middleton property to Jack, but the 
appointment was not kept by Alva. 
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25. Jack first became aware that Thelma was part owner of the Middleton property in 2000. 
Other than when Thelma met with Alva and Jack at the Federal Land Bank offices in 
1990, Thelma was never a present when any of the conversations occurred between 
Alva and Jack regarding Alva assigning his interest in the property to Jack. Jack was 
aware that Thelma would not agree to such a transfer. 
26. Other than the $2,000 loan that Jack made to Alva and Thelma, the evidence does not 
reflect any other record of financial assistance by Jack to Alva or Thelma to make the 
payments on the Middleton property. Jack testified that despite the lack of any record 
currently, prior to 1990, he loaned Alva $2,000 and $2,500 on separate occasions to help 
make payments on the Middleton property. This would be consistent with the fact that 
Alva was having trouble making the payments on the two mortgages on the Middleton 
property, but no such loans were reflected in Exhibit BB (Alva and Thelma's financial 
records for tax purposes from 1984 through 1999). 
27. On February 14, 2006, Alva executed a quitclaim deed "for value received," which 
conveyed his interest in the Middleton property to his son, Jack Garrett. As previously 
noted, Alva presented the quitclaim deed to Jack's brother, John. Pursuant to Alva's 
instructions not to record the deed until after his death, the deed was not recorded by 
John until two days after Alva's death. 
28. Despite the earlier communications between Jack and Alva regarding the proposed 
conveyance of Alva's interest in the Middleton property, Jack was not active in the 
eventual preparation or the recording of the 2006 Quitclaim Deed. 
29. There was no direct evidence presented at the trial to indicate whether Alva had 
completely divested himself of the deed by giving it to John, or if Alva still 
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maintained sufficient dominion and control over John's handling of the deed to 
request it be returned to him if he so decided. 
30. In the present case, therefore, the intent of the grantor and grantee are best reflected in 
the facts surrounding the delivery, and those facts reflect that Alva did not intend for 
the deed to take effect according to its terms until after his death. The facts reflect 
that Alva did not intend to divest himself of his interest in the Middleton property 
until his death. 
30.1. As noted, Alva did not want the deed recorded until after he died. 
30.2. Jack did not take possession of the Middleton property after Alva executed 
the quitclaim deed. 
30.3. After Alva executed the quitclaim deed, Jack continued to pay Alva and 
Thelma annual rent in October of 2006 for farming the Middleton property. He 
made this annual rent payment again in October of2007. 
30.4. Alva continued to accept the rent on the Middleton property farmland for 
both 2006 and 2007, all of which was paid after he executed the 2006 quitclaim 
deed. 
30.5. Jack was not aware of the deed initially, but sometime after the 2006 
quitclaim deed was executed, Jack became aware that quitclaim deed had been 
executed. Jack actually saw the deed sometime in 2007, which was before Alva 
died. 
30.6. Other than having seen the deed in 2007, Jack Garrett never took physical 
possession of the quitclaim deed while Alva Garrett was living. 
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30.7. Neither Alva, Jack Garrett, nor John Garrett discussed Alva's execution of 
the quitclaim deed with Thelma, and she did not consent to Alva's execution of the 
quitclaim deed. 
30.8. Jack never collected rent from either Thelma or Alva for their continued 
possession of the Middleton property. 
31. Alva Garrett passed away on March 3, 2008, and as previously noted, the quitclaim 
deed from Alva to Jack was recorded by Alva's son, John Garrett, on March 5, 2008, 
two days after Alva's death. 
32. Even though the previously mentioned mutual contract for wills, entered between Alva 
and Thelma in January of 1995, did not expressly prohibit Alva from transferring his 
interest in the Middleton property during his lifetime, the contract specifically provided 
that upon either spouse's death, that spouse agreed to "give, devise and bequeath his or 
her property in accordance with the provisions of his or her will attached hereto." 
32.1. Alva's Last Will and Testament that was attached to the contract for wills 
provides that "[a]fter the payment of ... all my just debts and obligations ... I 
hereby give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my property 
of every kind and nature, real, personal and mixed, ... owned by me at the time of 
my death, to my wife, Thelma V. Garrett." (Defendant's Exhibit B, page 2 of the 
will, "FIFTH" paragraph). 
32.2. It is clear from the evidence before the Court that the deed from Alva to Jack 
was not executed based upon any contractual obligation between Alva and Jack, but 
rather as a gratuitous expression of Alva's appreciation for Jack's effort in farming 
the land, loaning Alva and Thelma money, and having been the child of Alva's who 
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was the most connected to the farm and would benefit the most from the farm. 
Notwithstanding that sentiment, it is clear that Alva did not intend for the deed to 
take effect, nor to divest himself of the property, until after his death. 
33. Thelma Garrett did not have any knowledge of the quitclaim deed until after it was 
recorded after Alva died. She first became aware of the deed during the probate of 
Alva's estate, when her attorney advised her that it had been recorded. 
34. Two independent witnesses, and long time acquaintances of Alva, testified that 
Alva's mental condition had deteriorated by 2006 (and earlier) to the extent that his 
memory was noticeably affected. 
35. However, Alva's memory never deteriorated to the point where he did not remember 
his wife and family. 
36. At the time Alva executed the 2006 Quitclaim Deed, he and Thelma were still living 
together at the Middleton property. 
37. Thelma and Al va never executed a formal marriage settlement agreement. 
Conclusions of Law 
Regarding Thelma V. Garrett's claim that the 1990 quitclaim deed from Alva 
Garrett to Alva Garrett and Thelma Garrett created a community property interest 
in the Middleton property: 
1. The character or nature of property acquired during marrIage as community or 
separate property vests at time of acquisition. Estate of Freeburn, 97 Idaho 845 
(1976); Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811 (1983). 
2. Income from all property, separate or community, is community property, unless the 
conveyance by which it is acquired or spouses, by written agreement, provide 
otherwise. I.e. §32-906(1). 
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3. Net rents and profits from separate property are community property. Malone v. 
Malone, 64 Idaho 252 (S.C. 1942); Gapsch v. Gapsch, 76 Idaho 44 (S.C. 1954); 
Martsch v. Martsch, 103 Idaho 142 (1982). 
4. Social Security benefits are separate property and the issue is pre-empted by federal 
law. Bowlden v. Bowlden, 118 Idaho 89 (Ct. App. 1990). 
5. Where parties commingle, blend and confuse separate funds with community 
property, and treat and handle their separate and community funds in one bank 
account as one fund, all such funds become community property. Gapsch v. Gapsch, 
76 Idaho 44 (1954). 
6. Transmutation is an arrangement between spouses which changes the character of 
property from separate to community or vice versa. Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215 
(Ct. App. 1983). 
7. The determination whether property has been transmuted, from separate to 
community property or vice versa, is, as we have long stated, a question of intent. 
Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 459, 80 P.3d 1049, 1060 (2003); Suchan v. 
Suchan, 106 Idaho 654, 664, 682 P.2d 607, 617 (1984); In re Bogert's Estate, 96 
Idaho 522, 526, 531 P.2d 1167, 1171 (1975); ... The party asserting transmutation 
must prove the claim by clear and convincing evidence. 
Barrett v. Barrett, 149 Idaho 21, 232 P.3d 799,801-802 (2010). 
8. Although the Barrett case arose in a divorce action, the holding of the Court is 
applicable to the issues of this case: 
[W]e conclude that the language of a deed executed in the course of 
refinancing does not conclusively determine the character of property for 
purposes of a divorce action. Rather, the intention of the party or parties 
executing the deed is dispositive. Thus, neither I.C. § 55-606 nor the 
statute of frauds governs because the pertinent question is not the 
effectiveness of the deed. Although the trial judge, as the finder of fact, 
may consider a deed as evidence in determining intent, it is not the only 
evidence available to a judge considering the question of transmutation. 
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Barrett v. Barrett, 149 Idaho 21, 24, 232 P.3d. 799, 802 (2010). 
9. [T]he determination whether property has been transmuted is a question of fact 
turning on intent. In making this factual determination, trial courts are free to consider 
all relevant evidence regarding that intent. Barrett v. Barrett, 149 Idaho 21, 25, 232 
P.3d. 799, 803 (2010). 
10. [I]n Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 673 P.2d 411 (1983), involving a property 
purchase concluded some months after the marriage using separate property of the 
husband, the Court considered a variety of factors to be considered in the absence of 
the parties' "actual, articulated intent": (1) whether the community was liable for 
payment on the loan; (2) the source of the payments toward the loan; (3) the basis of 
credit upon which the lender relied in making the loan; (4) the nature of the down 
payment; (5) the names on the deed; and (6) who signed the documents of 
indebtedness.ld. at 814-15, 673 P.2d at 414-15. This Court explained: 
[t]he presence or absence of any or all of the above listed factors is 
relevant in determining the character of the credit by which a loan is 
obtained. None is conclusive. We deliberately refrain from selecting one 
item as dispositive. Such an approach is too rigid in light of our ultimate 
purpose of determining the likely intent of the spouses and in 
consideration of the highly individualistic and often complex fact 
situations presented. 
Id. at 815, 673 P.2d at 415. 
Barrett v. Barrett, 149 Idaho 21,24,232 P.3d 799,802 (2010). 
11. The characterization of property as either community or separate involves mixed 
questions of law and fact. Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571, 573, 759 P.2d 77, 79 
(Ct.App.1988). The manner and method of acquisition of property are questions of 
fact for the trial court. Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 391, 17 P .3d 889, 892 
(Ct.App.2001). The characterization ofan asset in light of the facts found, however, is 
a question oflaw over which this Court exercises free review. Id. 
Kraiy v. Kraiy, 147 Idaho 299, 208 P.3d 281 (2009). 
12. All property that is acquired after marriage by either husband or wife is community 
property, including property that is owned separately by one spouse who then deeds 
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such property to the marital community. See I.e. § 32-906. Dunagan v. Dunagan, 
147 Idaho 599, 602, 213 P.3d 384,387 (2009). 
13. Thelma V. Garrett has established by clear and convincing evidence that when Alva 
deeded the Middleton property to himself and his wife, Thelma, in 1990, he intended 
to transmute the property from his separate property to community property. 
Regarding Jack L. Garret's claim that the 2006 quitclaim deed from Alva Garrett to 
Jack Garrett was a valid conveyance of Alva Garrett's interest in the Middleton 
property: 
14. I.e. §32-912 provides the general rule that an attempted conveyance of community 
real estate by one spouse, without the written consent of the other, is void. See I.e. § 
32-912; Fuchs v. Lloyd, 80 Idaho 114, 120,326 P.2d 381,384 (1958) (citations 
omitted). Lovelass v. Sword, 140 Idaho 105, 108-109,90 P.3d 330, 333 - 334 (2004). 
15. Because Alva's 2006 quitclaim deed, transferring his interest in the Middleton 
property to Jack Garrett did not include the written consent of his wife, Thelma 
Garrett, the transfer is void. 
16. Mutual and reciprocal wills are revocable, even after the acceptance of benefits by 
one of the testators, absent an agreement or contract between the parties to make the 
wills irrevocable. Even then, strictly speaking, it is the contract, and not the wills, 
which is irrevocable. In re Isaacson's Estate, 77 Idaho 12, 285 P.2d 1061 (1955); 
(citations omitted). Collord v. Cooley, 92 Idaho 789, 794,451 P.2d 535, 540 (Idaho 
1969). 
a. The contract for mutual execution of wills did not prohibit Alva from 
transferring his separate property before his death, but did prohibit him 
19 
000257 
from transferring or devising his separate property outside the terms of his 
will upon his death. 
17. Regarding delivery of a deed, the Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
"Delivery is merely a symbol indicating, as interpreted by the courts, 
complete and fixed relinquishment of title by the grantor to the grantee." 
Johnson v. Brown, 65 Idaho 359, 369, 144 P.2d 198, 203 (1943). "Such 
delivery may be actual or constructive." Id at 365, 144 P.2d at 201; 
Hartley v. Stibor, 96 Idaho 157, 525 P.2d 352 (1974). 
Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 556, l30 P.3d 1087, 1094 (2006) 
18. A deed "does not take effect as a deed until delivery with intent that it shall operate. 
The intent with which it is delivered is important. This restricts or enlarges the effect 
of the instrument." Bowers v. Cottrell, 15 Idaho 221, 228, 96 P. 936, 938 (1908) 
(internal quotations omitted). In addition, "[ e ]ven where the grantee is in possession 
of the deed, though that may raise a presumption of delivery, still it may be shown by 
parol evidence that a deed in possession of the grantee was not delivered." Id 
(internal quotations omitted). The "controlling element in the question of delivery" is 
the intention of the grantor and grantee. Id "The question of delivery is one of 
intention, and the rule is that a delivery is complete when there is an intention 
manifested on the part of the grantor to make the instrument his deed." Id (internal 
quotations omitted). "[T]he real test of the delivery of a deed is this: Did the grantor 
by his acts or words, or both, intend to divest himself of title? If so, the deed is 
delivered." Estate of Skvorak, 140 Idaho 16, 21, 89 P.3d 856, 861 (2004) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 344-345, 179 P.3d 303,307 - 308 (2008). 
19. "Delivery in some form is absolutely essential" to the validity of a deed. Bowers v. 
Cottrell, 15 Idaho 221, 228, 96 P. 936, 938 (1908). "[D]elivery includes surrender 
and acceptance, and both are necessary to its completion." Estate of Skvorak v. Sec. 
Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16, 20-21, 89 P.3d 856, 860-61 (2004) (quoting 
Bowers, 15 Idaho at 228,96 P. at 938) .... The mere placing ofa deed in the hands of 
the grantee does not necessarily constitute a delivery. The question is one of 
intention: whether the deed was then intended by the parties to take effect according 
to its terms." Estate ofSkvorak, 140 Idaho at 21,89 P.3d at 861 (quoting Crenshaw v. 
Crenshaw, 68 Idaho 470, 475, 199 P.2d 264,267 (1948)). 
Riley v. WR. Holdings, LLC, 143 Idaho 116, 123, 138 P.3d 316, 323 (2006). 
20. This Court has consistently held that in order for a deed to be adequately delivered it 
must be voluntarily "surrendered" by the grantor, with an intent to pass immediate 
and present title. This intent is indispensable to valid delivery .... [T]he real test of the 
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delivery of a deed is this: Did the grantor by his acts or words, or both, intend to 
divest himself of title? If so the deed is delivered. 
Matter of Estate of Ashe, 114 Idaho 70, 77, 753 P.2d 281,288 (Ct. App. 1988), (Citing 
In re Estate of Courtright, 99 Idaho 575, 579-580, 586 P.2d 265, 269-270 (1978)). 
21. The doctrine regarding delivery of a deed to a third party is addressed in CJ C Deeds 
§89: 
A grantor legally may transfer a deed to a third person with instructions to 
deliver it to the grantee after the grantor's death. 
A grantor legally may transfer a deed to a third person with instructions to 
deliver it to the grantee after the grantor's death. Under such circumstances 
the deed takes effect from the first delivery. On the other hand, the grantor 
must surrender dominion and control over the title, and, if a power to 
recall the deed is reserved by him or her, there is no effectual delivery and 
the deed cannot take effect, even though it comes into the manual custody 
of the grantee and is recorded without authorization. 
The intention of the grantor to part with the title, as evidenced by the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction, affords the true test. Such 
intention must be established as of the time of delivery to the depositary. It 
follows that, if the grantor intends to pass title, the deed is not invalidated 
by the fact that the depositary is uncertain as to the effect of the delivery 
and does not consider it irrevocable. Even though the grantor retains 
control over the deed and the depositary is his or her agent, the grantor 
may by express declarations or acts, such as giving the grantee the 
memorandum receipt from the depositary, make an effectual delivery. 
Also, if delivery to a depositary is properly made, the grantor's mental 
reservation contrary to that expressed by his or her words or deeds, or his 
or her subsequent change of intention, or his or her regaining possession 
of the deed, or destruction of the deed, does not affect the validity of the 
transfer. However, the grantor and grantee may by common consent avoid 
the effect of a completed delivery to a third person by withdrawing the 
deed from his or her control, and in such case the grantee cannot claim 
title. 
CJS DEEDS § 89 
22. With regard to inter vivos gifts, the Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
In Zimmerman v. Fawkes, 70 Idaho 389, 219 P.2d 951 (1950), this Court 
enunciated the essential elements which must be present before a valid inter 
vivos gift will be found to exist: 
,* * * The essential elements of a 'gift inter vivos' are: (1) A donor 
competent to contract; (2) freedom of will of donor; (3) the gift must be 
complete and nothing left undone; (4) the property must be delivered by 
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the donor and accepted by the donee; (5) the gift must go into immediate 
and absolute effect.' 
Id. at 391,219 P.2d at 952. 
Respondents do not dispute the existence of the first three of these elements. 
Rather they contend there was no present delivery because the property did 
not pass beyond the dominion and control of the donor. A necessary element 
of an enforceable gift be it inter vivos or causa mortis is: 
' ... present donative intent, that is the giver's purpose or motive to 
transfer immediately to the donee dominion over the object given.' 
Christiansen v. Rumsey, 91 Idaho 684, 686, 429 P.2d 416, 418 (1967). 
Such transfer or delivery need not necessarily be to the donee in person. It 
may be to a third party agent acting in the donee's behalf. Boston 
Insurance Co. v. Beckett, 91 Idaho 220, 419 P.2d 475 (1966); Bunnell v. 
Iverson, 147 Colo. 552,364 P.2d 385 (1961). 
The question before this Court is whether McCoy was acting as the decedent's 
agent; i. e., whether Ova Lewis still exercised dominion over McCoy to 
request return of the deed to her. If she could have, then she did not relinquish 
all dominion, and no effective transfer was made. On the other hand, if the 
decedent had divested herself of control over the deed, then McCoy was 
acting, in effect, as appellant's agent. This is a question of intent as of the time 
the deed was given to McCoy. 
Matter of Lewis' Estate, 97 Idaho 299, 302,543 P.2d 852, 855 (1975). 
23. As previously addressed in the Findings of Fact, Alva did not intend to divest himself 
of title to the Middleton property until after his death. He still leased the land to Jack 
per the written lease agreement, accepted the rents, and otherwise continued to 
exercise dominion and control over the property until his death on March 3, 2008. 
24. Therefore, delivery of the 2006 quitclaim deed from Alva Garrett to Jack Garrett was 




1. This Court concludes, based on clear and convincing evidence, that when Alva 
deeded the Middleton property to himself and his wife, Thelma, in 1990, he intended 
to transmute the property from his separate property to the marital community. 
2. The 1990 quitclaim deed from Alva Garrett to Alva Garrett and Thelma Garrett 
created a community property interest in the Middleton property. 
3. Because Alva Garrett's 2006 quitclaim deed, transferring his interest in the Middleton 
property to Jack Garrett did not include the written consent of his wife, Thelma 
Garrett, the transfer is void. 
4. Alternatively, because the delivery of the 2006 quitclaim deed from Alva Garrett to 
Jack Garrett was not completed before Alva Garrett's death, it was not a valid 
conveyance of Alva Garrett's interest in the Middleton property. 
Order 
1. Jack L. Garrett's claim for partition of the Middleton property is denied. 
2. Thelma V. Garrett's claim to quiet title in the Middleton property is granted. 
Thelma V. Garrett is the adjudged the sole owner of the Middleton property. 
3. Ms. Garrett's counsel is directed to submit a proposed judgment that is consistent 
with this decision. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Order were forwarded to the following 
persons on the \:\ day of May, 2011: 
, 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Attorney at Law 
2627 W. Idaho St. 
Boise, 1083702 
Chris Troupis 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
District Clerk 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Attorney for DefendantlCounterclaimant 
F , LEe 
.:$ ') ~ ... .A.M ___ --..P·M. 
JUN 0 1 2011 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIllRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CANYON COUNTY 
JACK L. GARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THELMA V. GARRETT, 
An individual, 
Defendant. 
THELMA V. GARRETT, 
Counterclaim ant, 
vs. 



























Case No: CV : 09-8763-C 
JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE 
THIS MATTER having come on for trial before the above-entitled Court on the Plaintiffs 
Complaint for Partition and the Defendant's Counterclaim to quiet title. Based upon the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in May 19,2011, the Court enters the following Judgment: 
1. This action concerns the title and ownership of the following real property, hereinafter 
referred to as the "subject real property": 
Judgment 000263 1 
"The West Twenty-Six and two-thirds (26 2/3) acres ofland located in the Southwest 
Quarter of the South East Quarter, (SW 1I4 ofSE 1I4) Township Five North, Range Two 
West, Section 32, Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho. 
Described more fully as follows: Commencing at the Southwest comer of the Southeast 
Quarter, Section 32, Township Five North, Range Two West, Canyon County, Idaho: 53 
113 Rods East, 80 Rods North, 53 113 Rods West, 80 Rods South, in the above described 
land, together with their appurtenances." 
2. Plaintiff Jack L. Garrett's claim for partition of the subject real property is denied. 
Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant, Thelma V. Garrett on the Plaintiff Jack L. 
Garrett's claim for partition of the subject real property. 
3. Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant, Thelma V. Garrett quieting title to the 
subject real property in her name. Thelma V. Garrett is hereby adjudged to be the sole 
owner of the subject real property. 
Dated: hr 1 ( Vi {( 
7 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 24th day of May, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Judgment Quieting Title, by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed 
to the following: 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Attorney at Law 
2627 W. Idaho St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Judgment 
(J4:i) 1/ 
Christ T. Troupir 
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Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525 
REBECCA A. RAINEY, P.A. 
2627 West Idaho Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone (208) 559-6434 
Facsimile (208) 473-2952 
rar@rebeccaraineylaw.com 13 2011 
COUNTY CLERK 
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/ Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
JACK L. GARRETT, an individual, 
Case No. CV -09-8763-C 
Plaintiff! Appellant, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. 
THELMA V. GARRETT, an individual, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
THELMA V. GARRETT, 
Counterclaimant, 
vs. 
JACK L. GARRETT, 
Counterdefendant. 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, Thelma V. Garrett, AND THE RESPONDENT'S 
ATTORNEY, Christ T. Troupis, Troupis Law Office, P.A., 1299 E. Iron Eagle, Suite 130, P.O. 
Box 2408, Eagle, ID 83616, AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant, Jack L. Garrett, by and through undersigned counsel 
of record, Rebecca A. Rainey of Rebecca A. Rainey, P .A., hereby appeals against the above-
named respondent, Thelma V. Garrett, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment 
entered in the above-entitled action on the 1 st day of June, 2011, Honorable Judge Gregory M. 
Culet presiding. 
2. Appellant has a right to appeal the final judgment entered in this matter to the 
Idaho Supreme Court as the Judgment described in paragraph 1 above is a final and appealable 
judgment under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(I) I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of issues on appeal which the appellant intends to assert 
in the appeal is as follows: 
a) Whether the District Court erred in taking evidence on the question of Alva 
Garrett's intent when executing the 1990 quitclaim deed for purposes of 
determining whether such deed was intended to transmute his separate 
property interest into community property; 
b) Whether the District Court erred in finding that Thelma Garrett proved, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that Alva Garrett intended to transmute his 
separate property interest in the subject property to Thelma Garrett. 
c) Whether the District Court erred in not limiting Thelma's community property 
interest in the subject property to the amount of the $20,000.00 mortgage 
taken at the time title was placed in the names of Alva Garrett and Thelma 
Garrett. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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d) Whether the District Court erred in finding that the 2006 quitclaim deed to 
Jack Garrett was a gift. 
e) Whether the District Court erred in fmding that Thelma Garrett proved, by 
clear and convincing evidence, that Alva Garrett delivered the 2006 quitclaim 
deed prior to his death. 
Pursuant to LA.R. 17(f) this preliminary statement of issues shall not prevent appellant from 
asserting other issues on appeal. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. Transcripts: 
a) The following transcripts are requested: 
1. The reporter's standard transcript of the trial held on April 11-12, 
2011, supplemented by closing arguments of counsel; 
11. The reporter's standard transcript of the hearing on motions for 
summary judgment held on June 18, 2010. 
b) The appellant request the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript in [ ] hard copy [] electronic format [X] both 
6. In addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R., the appellant 
requests the following additional documents be included in the clerk's record: 
a) Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed May 14, 
2010. 
b) Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffiCounterdefendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed May 14,2010. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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c) Affidavit of Rebecca Rainey in Support of PlaintiffiCounterdefendant' s 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed May 14,2010, and all exhibits thereto. 
d) DefendantlCounterclaimant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed May 19, 
2010. 
e) Affidavit of Christ Troupis in Support of DefendantlCounterclaimant' s 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed May 19,2010, and all exhibits thereto. 
f) Memorandum in Support of DefendantiCounterclaimant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed May 19,2010. 
g) Reply Memorandum in Support of Jack L. Garret's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Memorandum in Opposition to Thelma V. Garrett's Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed June 4, 2010. 
h) Affidavit of John Garrett in Support ofPlaintiffiCounterdefendant's Response 
to Defendant/Counterclaimant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed June 4, 
2010. 
i) Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of DefendantlCounterclaimant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to 
PlaintiffiCounterdefendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed June 9, 
2010. 
7. The Appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
a) Plaintiffs Exhibits 3,5, and 16 26. 
b) Defendant's Exhibits A, D, E, K, L, BB, KK. 
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8. I certify: 
a) That a copy ofthis notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom 
a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below 
1. Laura Whiting 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
b) That the clerk of the district court has been paid an estimated fee of $400.00 
for preparation of the reporter's transcripts. 
c) That the estimated fee of$100 for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid. 
d) That all appellate filing fees have been paid. 
e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. 
DATED tbis Ig~ ofJuly, 20 II. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
REBECCA A. RAINEY, P.A. 
BY~01~' 
Rebecca A. Rainey 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
000270 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I~ of July, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Christ T. Troupis 
Troupis Law Office, P.A. 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Suite 130 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Facsimile (208) 938-5482 
Attorneys for DefendantlCounterclaimant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6 
Oq u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
oQ Facsimile 
000271. 
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 




Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CANYON COUNTY 
JACK L. GARRETT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 














Case No: CV OC 09-8763-C 
RESPONDENT'S 
DESIGNATION OF ADDITIONAL 
DOCUMENTS TO BE 
INCLUDED IN CLERK'S RECORD 
ON APPEAL 
-----------------------------) 
COMES NOW RESPONDENT THELMA V. GARRETT, by and through Christ T. 
Troupis, her attorney, and hereby designates the following additional documents for 
inclusion in the Clerk's Record on Appeal: 
All of the Defendant's exhibits offered and admitted at trial, to the extent not 
previously designated in Appellant's Notice of Appeal. 
Dated: July 19, 2011. 
Christ T. Troupis 
Attorney for Respondent 
Thelma V. Garrett 
Respondent's Designation of Additional Documents to be included 
in Clerk's Record on Appeal 1 000272 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of July, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Respondent's Designation of Additional Documents to 
be included in Clerk's Record on Appeal, by U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
Rebecca A Rainey 
Attorney At Law 
2627 W. Idaho st. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Respondent's Designation of Additional Documents to be included 
in Clerk's Record on Appeal 2000273 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTI OF CANYON 
JACK L. GARRETT, an individual, ) 
) 





THELMA V. GARRETT, an individual, ) 
) 
Defendant -Counterclaimant- ) 
Respondent. ) 
Case No. CV-09-o8763*C 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify the following 
exhibits were used at the Court Trial and requested in the Notice of Appeal: 
Plaintiffs Exhibits: 
3 Irrigation Land Lease Marked Sent 
5 Quitclaim Deed Marked Sent 
16 Deed of Trust Admitted Sent 
17 Quitclaim Deed Admitted Sent 
18-20 Amend. of Deed of Trust Admitted Sent 
21 Substitution of Trustee Admitted Sent 
22-25 Quitclaim Deed Admitted Sent 
26 IDADIV Credit Union Statement Admitted Sent 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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Defendant's Exhibits: 
A Quitclaim Deed Admitted Sent 
B Contract for Wills Admitted Sent 
C Last Will and Testament Admitted Sent 
H Home Federal Bank CD Admitted Sent 
J VISA account Statement Admitted Sent 
L Warranty Deed Admitted Sent 
N Property Tax Bills Admitted Sent 
0 Appl. For Property Tax Red. Admitted Sent 
P Farm Bureau Insurance Policy Admitted Sent 
U Promissory Note Admitted Sent 
V Checks Admitted Sent 
W T.V. Livestock Statement Admitted Sent 
X Racing Commission License Admitted Sent 
Z Les Bois Park Statement Admitted Sent 
BB Joint Income & Expense Reg. Admitted Sent 
CC Quitclaim Deed Admitted Sent 
DD Petition for Informal Probate Admitted Sent 
EE Statement of Informal Probate Admitted Sent 
FF Letters Testamentary Admitted Sent 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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GG Personal Rep. Deed Admitted Sent 
HH Land Lease Admitted Sent 
II Notes Admitted Sent 
KK Mortgage Admitted Sent 
LL Deed of Trust Admitted Sent 
MM Notice of Default Admitted Sent 
NN Trustee's Deed Admitted Sent 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ---"--'-_ day -'--'--'-~..::..-____ , 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
for the County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTI OF CANYON 


















Case No. CV-09-08763*C 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my 
direction as, and is a true, full correct Record of the pleadings and documents under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, including documents requested. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ---l.C-I.-_ day --"-''-''-'-~=--_, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 


















Supreme Court No. 38971-2011 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the 
Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to the attorney of record to each 
party as follows: 
Rebecca A. Rainey, RAINEY LAW OFFICE 
Christt. Troupis, TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ---"'---"'_ day 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and County of Canyon. 
By: Deputy 
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